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A B S T R A C T
The potential of user-generated sensor data for participatory sensing has mo-
tivated the formation of organisations focused on the exploitation of collected
information and associated knowledge. Given the power and value of both
the raw data and the derived knowledge, we advocate an open approach to
data and intellectual-property rights. By treating user-generated content as
well as derived information and knowledge as a common-pool resource, we
hypothesise that all participants can be compensated fairly for their input.
To test this hypothesis, we undertake an extensive review of experimental,
commercial and social participatory-sensing applications, from which we iden-
tify that a decentralised, community-oriented governance model is required to
support this open approach. We show that the Institutional Analysis and De-
sign framework as introduced by Elinor Ostrom, in conjunction with a frame-
work for self-organising electronic institutions, can be used to give both an ar-
chitectural and algorithmic base for the necessary governance model, in terms
of operational and collective choice rules specified in computational logic.
As a basis for understanding the effect of governance on these applications,
we develop a testbed which joins our logical formulation of the knowledge
commons with a generic model of the participatory-sensing problem. This re-
quires a multi-agent platform for the simulation of autonomous and dynamic
agents, and a method of executing the logical calculus in which our electronic
institution is specified. To this end, firstly, we develop a general purpose,
high performance platform for multi-agent based simulation, Presage2. Sec-
ondly, we propose a method for manually translating event-calculus axioms
into rules compatible with business rule engines, and provide an implementa-
tion for JBoss Drools along with a suite of modules for electronic institutions.
Through our simulations we show that, when building electronic institu-
tions for managing participatory sensing as a knowledge commons, proper
enfranchisement of agents (as outlined in Ostrom’s work) is key to striking a
balance between endurance, fairness and reduction of greedy behaviour. We
conclude with a set of guidelines for engineering knowledge commons for the
next generation of participatory-sensing applications.
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P U B L I C AT I O N S
Some ideas and figures have appeared previously in the following publications
involving the author:
self-organising management of user-generated data and knowl-
edge presents our review of participatory-sensing applications and the frame-
work for the management of participatory sensing as a knowledge commons,
and according to Ostrom’s principles. This paper covers much of the same
ground as chapter 2 and chapter 3 of this thesis (Macbeth and Pitt, 2015).
principled operationalisation of social systems using presage2
presents the use of the Presage2 simulation platform for the purpose of Princi-
pled Operationalisation, as per the sociologically-inspired computing method-
ology. This is done through the description of the design and implementation
of simulations of a linear public good game, and the Kyoto Protocol. Some
of the figures and description of the Presage2 platform also appear in chap-
ter 4 (Macbeth et al., 2014).
distributive justice for self-organised common-pool resource
management discusses the application of the theory of Distributive Jus-
tice, as described by Nicholas Rescher, to common-pool resource manage-
ment. My contribution was the implementation of the simulation model, using
Presage2, and the collection of results through controlled experimentation (Pitt
et al., 2014).
animation of self-organising resource allocation using presage2
is a demonstration and poster, describing the implementation of a resource-
allocation problem using Presage2, and the animation and visualisation of this
problem (Macbeth et al., 2012).
animation of open multi-agent systems presents a case study of
the Presage platform’s use for the simulation and animation of four different
multi-agent systems (Pitt et al., 2011a).
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 motivation
Participatory sensing (Burke et al., 2006) is the process of leveraging user de-
vices which are capable of various sensor measurements, to gather data in
a bottom-up fashion and gain knowledge from the analysis of this data. It
has already been applied in many varying domains, from traffic and trans-
portation (Costa et al., 2012; Mathur et al., 2010), to environmental condi-
tions (Hasenfratz et al., 2012; Mendez et al., 2011), product pricing (Deng and
Cox, 2009) and behavioural information (Miluzzo et al., 2008).
In all of these applications, individual users or devices are gathering data
which is then aggregated by a third party. Having collected this data, it is
primarily this third party who reaps the benefits from the analysis of the data.
The value of data gathered through these means has been estimated in the bil-
lions of dollars (Manyika et al., 2011). While some organisations provide some
return to contributors, usually in services, the equitability of this arrangement
is debatable (van Dijck, 2009). This has led to a call for the empowerment of
users such that they can achieve a fair exchange for their data (Buckingham
Shum et al., 2012).
A key issue is the provision of tasks for participatory sensing. This is the
process by which an entity determines a set of parameters to sense, and builds
community and infrastructure for this purpose. This is often a top-down pro-
cess: of the applications we have mentioned the majority are centralised. The
result is that a single entity holds all of the collected data (often taking owner-
ship or property rights of the data provided by others (O’Hara and Shadbolt,
2010)), sets the policies regarding access to data and knowledge derived from
the data, and controls how these policies are changed.
This approach is in direct contrast to how some of the most successful re-
sources for data and knowledge have developed on the internet. The Open
Data Institute has shown the benefits of open access to government data and
that significant additional value can be generated by allowing others open and
permissive access (Shadbolt et al., 2012). Similarly, Wikipedia1 is an example
1 http://www.wikipedia.org
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where individuals contributing knowledge have created an encyclopaedia at a
scale which would be infeasible to do in a traditional top-down manner. Its
continued success is down to its decentralised governance which allows its
users to direct the trajectory of the site’s policy (Famiglietti, 2011).
To understand the implications of how these organisational structures affect
user participation and the associated benefits from the data and knowledge
generated, we look at how social organisations have developed around knowl-
edge repositories. Hess and Ostrom (2003) argue that information can be seen
at a common-pool resource and thus analysed using the considerable existing
literature on the commons (Hess and Ostrom, 2006). Some initial investiga-
tions have been applying this approach to user-generated content (Pitt, 2012)
which we take further here.
From her significant field work on physical commons, Ostrom (1990, p.42)
outlined ‘the problem of supplying a new set of institutions’. This is the prob-
lem that, in order to form an organisation, someone must first provide an ini-
tial set of rules by which the organisation and its members are governed. This
is a difficult task as there are many stakeholders to satisfy under changeable
conditions. Through survey of both successful and unsuccessful institutions
Ostrom extracted a set of principles which were more prevalent in successful
cases.
This thesis tests the hypothesis that, in participatory sensing we can em-
power users by providing them with the ability to supply institutions, and the
knowledge to assess the effect of the rules and organisational structure gov-
erning sensing applications. Furthermore, we test whether Hess and Ostrom’s
(2006) work on the Knowledge Commons can be applied here to achieve equity
and sustainability.
1.2 methodology
In this thesis we follow closely a methodology called Sociologically-Inspired
Computing (SIC) (Jones et al., 2013). This is a method for the design of socio-
technical systems from the analysis of social and organisational concepts. Built
upon the synthetic method underlying research in artificial societies and artifi-
cial life (Steels and Brooks, 1994), the formalisation of social relations in multi-
agent systems (Neville and Pitt, 2004), and other attempts to apply ideas from
the social sciences to the design of computational systems (Edmonds et al.,
2005), it provides a series of steps to go from an observed social phenomenon
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Figure 1: Methodology for sociologically inspired computing (Jones et al., 2013).
to an observed performance of a derived computer model under controlled
experimentation conditions. These steps are illustrated in Figure 1.
We begin with an observed phenomenon, for example, from the social sci-
ences, a human social, legal, or organisational system. The process of Theory
Construction generates a PreFormal Theory, usually expressed in a natural lan-
guage. Formal Characterisation creates a specification of this theory in a calculus
of some kind, where ‘calculus’ is meant to be any system of calculation or com-
putation based on the manipulation of symbolic representations. This calculus
is then embedded in a computer model in the Principled Operationalisation step.
This computer model enables simulations that can include both implementa-
tions of individual agents, and/or treatment of large populations. Through
Controlled Experimentation with this computer model we can observe the per-
formance of the model.
Through our use of this methodology we have two major contributions to
the Principled Operationalisation and Controlled Experimentation steps. The plat-
form Presage2 (Macbeth et al., 2014) which enables both of these steps, and a
rule engine for Electronic Institution which enables rapid operationalisation of
common concepts from Electronic Institutions, with flexibility to accommodate
further rules from the calculus. These contributions are presented in chapter 4
and chapter 5 respectively.
1.3 thesis outline
This thesis follows the aforementioned SIC methodology, thus is structured
accordingly, with each chapter corresponding to a portion of this process. Fig-
ure 2 shows this structure.
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Figure 2: Thesis Outline with repect to Sociologically-Inspired Computing methodol-
ogy.
chapter 2 reviews governance in participatory-sensing applications. We
present an approach to the management of information and knowledge as a
knowledge commons, from the social sciences, where systems based on the
exchange of information and knowledge can be managed as a shared resource.
We discuss the principles defined by Ostrom (1990) which can be applied to
increase the likelihood of success of this endeavour.
We then perform a critical review of participatory-sensing applications from
various domains, and compare and contrast the outcomes of these applications
to that of systems based on the collective management of information and
knowledge, as a commons. We argue that the characteristics of participatory
sensing allow it to be seen as a knowledge commons, and that managing it as
such could address the problems we identified in current applications.
chapter 3 firstly presents a formalisation of participatory sensing as a
provision and appropriation system. This allows us to do a thorough analysis
of the problem using Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
framework, and to link this system to an axiomatisation of Ostrom’s principles,
by Pitt et al. (2012). We then adapt the latter’s Event Calculus (EC) axioms for
the purpose of the knowledge commons, and participatory sensing in particu-
lar, creating a formal specification in the EC.
chapter 4 firstly surveys platforms for Agent-based modelling (ABM) of
socio-technical systems for the purpose of principled operationalisation. We
require such a platform in order to implement the specification presented in
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the previous chapter. Having found no existing platform suitable for the task,
we present the design and implementation of the Presage2 platform which we
have written specifically for this purpose.
chapter 5 looks at the problem of effectively executing a specification of
an Electronic Institution written in the EC, such that we can execute our spec-
ification from chapter 3. We review existing approaches to electronic institu-
tions, and their specification and execution. We explore the execution of the
EC, benchmarking a representative specification and finding significant perfor-
mance issues. We then show that using a rule-based approach for deductive
queries can overcome these issues, and describe a process for manually trans-
lating EC specifications into business rules for the JBoss Drools rule engine. We
describe our reference implementation, Drools-EInst, and implemented speci-
fications for it.
chapter 6 concerns the implementation of the system specified in chap-
ter 3. We propose a model of participatory sensing as a reinforcement learning
problem. We implement this model using Presage2, then integrate it with an
institution specification, based on the axioms given in chapter 3, implemented
using Drools-EInst. Using this simulation model we run a series of experi-
ments which give us empirical evidence of the benefits of Ostrom’s principles
for management of a knowledge commons in participatory sensing.
chapter 7 summarises this work, and gives conclusions based on our sim-
ulation results. We formulate a set of guidelines for the application of Ostrom’s
principles to participatory sensing, based on what we test in our simulations,
and based on the analysis from chapter 3. Afterwards we present several lim-
itations of our simulation model, the Presage2 simulation platform, and our
method of manually translating EC specifications into Drools. We conclude
with several lines of further work possible each of these three contributions.
1.4 contributions
This thesis has five main contributions. Three of these pertain to the problem of
governance of participatory-sensing applications, and achieving sustainability
and equity therein. The other two enable this analysis by contributing tools for
the SIC methodology. The contributions are therefore the following:
1.4 contributions 18
• A review of governance in participatory-sensing applications, identifying
a lack of governance consideration and user enfranchishment.
• An analysis of participatory sensing as a knowledge commons, using
the IAD framework, in conjunction with a framework for self-organising
electronic institutions, which provides an architectural and algorithmic
basis for governance of a knowledge commons.
• A general purpose simulation platform for agent-based simulation and
modelling, Presage2, suitable for the principled operationalisation of a
model of the participatory-sensing knowledge commons.
• A method of manually translating Event Calculus into business rules,
and an implementation for the specification of electronic institutions,
Drools-EInst, along with a suite of modules, with which we can imple-
ment a specification for a self-organising knowledge commons.
• An experimental model of the management of participatory sensing as
a knowledge commons, with which we validate the problem of supply
of institutions, and identify that proper enfranchisement of users can be
used to counter greed and self-interest in participatory-sensing.
In total, this thesis shows that sustainable, collective, self-organising man-
agement of the information and knowledge in participatory-sensing applica-
tions is both possible, and competitive with other approaches. We provide
a framework and guidelines for the provision of institutions for this purpose,
such that autonomous agents can dynamically create and sustain these sensing
campaigns in order to better exploit collective capabilities in open systems.
2
G O V E R N A N C E I N PA RT I C I PAT O RY S E N S I N G
In this chapter we review the governance currently used in participatory-sensing applications. We firstly look at the participatory-sensing paradigmand discuss the involved parties, entities, and their interactions. We then
take a step back, to investigate how governance can be used to manage data,
information and knowledge. We introduce Elinor Ostrom’s work on manag-
ing common-pool resources, and the argument, originally given by Hess and
Ostrom (2003), that the same principles can be extended to information and
knowledge, a so-called Knowledge Commons. We review governance in partic-
ipatory sensing applications to determine to what extent the participants are
enfranchised and treated fairly, and therefore whether the application is likely
to be sustainable and enduring. These outcomes are compared to that of exist-
ing Knowledge Commons, which leads us to believe that fairer outcomes can
be achieved with this approach. Finally, we argue that participatory sensing
can be seen as such a common-pool resource system, and we can therefore
utilise Ostrom’s theories for sustainable resource management.
This chapter forms the first step in the Sociologically-Inspired Computing
(SIC) methodology. Through our review we are observing phenomena in par-
ticipatory sensing and the knowledge commons, and beginning to construct a
preformal theory about the application of the knowledge commons to participa-
tory sensing.
2.1 participatory sensing
The proliferation of consumer devices capable of gathering useful sensor data
about their surroundings has led to a re-evaluation of sensor networks, mov-
ing from a top-down model, where sensors are deployed over an area, to a
bottom-up one, where users are engaged to contribute to data collection. This
paradigm shift to a participatory sensing approach has the potential to enable
cheap and efficient collection of data.
Participatory sensing, coined by Burke et al. (2006), is a form of crowdsourc-
ing, where contributions are solicited from a large number of individuals to
obtain results at a far lower cost than if employees or contractors were to be
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used. In general, participants are willing to contribute as they either have some
stake in the process or its outcome, or they are incentivised, either monetarily
or through some other utility benefit.
The same process has been named community sensing (Krause et al., 2008),
referring to its community aspect. This ‘community’ can refer to both an In-
ternet community of people persuing a similar goal using social tools, and a
physical community of people in the same town or city who want to gather
data about a particular phenomenon.
Campbell et al.’s (2008) people-centric sensing differentiates participatory sens-
ing from what they call opportunistic sensing. They suggest that participatory
sensing is driven by the user, and permission is required each time data is to be
gathered. To prevent the need for constant user intervention they propose that
opportunistic sensing—where gathering is done automatically in response to
the requirements of a remote application—is a more effective approach.
However, this mentality seems to reflect a lack of consideration of the device
owner’s role in the data-gathering process. Buckingham Shum et al. (2012)
note that there are many costs for a users to consider when choosing whether
to participate in a sensing campaign, such as energy consumption of their
sensing device and communication fees. Users are unlikely to give up control
over their mobile device without limits on what the external application can
do, or sufficient transparency to guarantee an acceptable usage of resources.
Burke et al. (2006) define a ‘campaign’ model for participatory-sensing ap-
plications. A participatory-sensing ‘campaign’ describes the process through
which something to be sensed is identified, users are solicited to gather data,
and algorithms are developed to derive knowledge from the data. This model
identifies four general user roles in a campaign:
1. initiators, who create the campaign and direct its operation;
2. gatherers, who participate in the data gathering as directed;
3. evaluators, who verify and classify gathered data;
4. analysts, who process the data to generate conclusions and information.
Participatory sensing can be seen be a subset of the ‘Big Data’ trend of recent
years. Rather than the traditional data mining done in other domains, this data
is contributed by individuals. The analysis of this data has been enabled by
advances in large-scale data processing, such that valuable information can
be extracted from large datasets. This derived information is the raison d’être
2.2 data and knowledge as a commons 21
for participatory sensing. It can be used to incentivise users to start and/or
continue contributing to the campaign, or to generate revenue for the initiator
of the campaign.
Participatory sensing has so far been deployed in domains ranging from
measuring of environmental conditions, such as pollution and traffic, to per-
sonal health and activity monitoring. In these applications the focus has gen-
erally been on the practical aspects of deploying the campaign: how data is
gathered; scaling of data collection infrastructure; and development and im-
plementation of evaluation and analysis algorithms.
The spread of ‘Big Data’ and participatory sensing, as well as the abundance
of information on the Web, has led to privacy concerns with the processes of
data mining and predictive analytics. There is a balance to be found between
the benefits of having information available with as little restriction as pos-
sible, and preventing too much personal information about a gatherer being
revealed by the available data (O’Hara and Shadbolt, 2010). Shadbolt et al.
(2012) demonstrates the value of open data and the “serendipitous reuse”—
value generated from unexpected reuse of information—which can be enabled
through its availability.
Thus, we argue that these issues of opportunism, incentivisation and con-
trol of information require explicit governance to be handled in a sustainable
manner. For this governance we look to theories from the management of
information and knowledge.
2.2 data and knowledge as a commons
In their book, Hess and Ostrom (2006), argue that information and knowledge
can be described as a ‘Knowledge Commons’, and that managing these com-
mons as a common-pool resource is key to their sustainability. In this section,
we give some background on the commons and introduce Ostrom’s work on
mangaging common-pool resources, and describe how the characteristics of in-
formation and knowledge as resources mean that repositories thereof can also
be viewed as commons, and therefore managed in the same way. This then
forms a basis of understanding how a knowledge commons with open access
and multiple stakeholders can be sustained.
The commons is a term generally used to describe shared resource systems.
They are often also called Common-Pool Resource (CPR) systems. These sys-
tems are characterised as systems where the ownership of the resource system
(land, air etc.) and resource units (trees, radio frequencies, etc.) are shared,
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public property, or not covered by any property rights; and it is difficult to
exclude access to the resource and resource units to others. Hardin (1968) the-
orised that these properties would inevitably lead to overuse and depletion of
the resource, a ‘Tragedy of the Commons’, and that enclosure (via privatisation
or centralisation) of the resource system was the only solution.
2.2.1 Governing the commons
Having done extensive field work analysing both cases where this tragedy had
been overcome and where it had not, Ostrom (1990) contested that it was in
fact possible to sustainably manage these resources as a commons. The key to
this success was how the commons were governed and how the individuals
involved in the use and maintenance of the commons were engaged in this
governance. Ostrom identified eight principles which, when all satisfied, will
likely lead to a successful commons1 (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 91-101):
1. Clearly defined boundaries—“Individuals or households who have rights
to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must
the boundaries of the CPR itself." This states that the rights to access the
resource must be well defined, as well as where the limits of the resource
lie. This provides clarity in issues of unauthorised access, and control of
access rights can solve issues of over-use of a resource.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local cond-
itions— “Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or
quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision
rules requiring labor, materials, and/or money." This states that rules
regarding resource appropriation and provision should take into account
local conditions. For example allowing unrestricted pumping from a
reservoir during a draught would be an appropriation rules incongruent
with local conditions.
3. Collective-choice arrangements—“Most individuals affected by the op-
erational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules." This
states that those who must abide by particular operational rules of the
CPR system must be given some empowerment to modify them. This is
important, as those affected by these rules will also be some of the best
informed about the effectiveness of these rules and prevailing conditions.
1 This claim has been empirically validated by Cox et al. (2010).
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4. Monitoring—“Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appro-
priator behaviour, are accountable to the appropriators or are the ap-
propriators." This principle requires that, firstly, there are mechanisms
for monitoring compliance with the rules of the CPR, and secondly, that
those doing this monitoring are motivated to do so properly, through
accountability to those who want to reduce non-compliance.
5. Graduated sanctions—“Appropriators who violate operational rules are
likely to be assessed [sic] graduated sanctions (depending on the seri-
ousness and context of the offence) by other appropriators, by officials
accountable to these appropriators, or by both." This states that the sanc-
tioning methods of the institution should be graduated, i. e. that sanc-
tions should be gradually increased for repeat offences. This principle
leads to ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ of participants.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms—“Appropriators and their officials have
rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appro-
priators or between appropriators and officials." This states that conflict-
resolution methods should be fast and low cost. Thus it is easy for one
to contest, for example, a wrongful sanction.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise—“The rights of appropriators
to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external govern-
mental authorities." This principle states that the institution’s right to
self-organise should be recognised by external authorities.
8. Nested enterprises—“Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement,
conflict resolution, and governance activities are organised in multiple
layers of nested enterprises." This principle refers to the structure of the
institution, requiring that a nested, hierarchical structure is used to man-
age the complexity at each layer.
The analysis methodology used for this work was later formalised in the
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2005). This
framework examines the relevant factors in an institution which manages a
commons, allowing the evaluation of institutions with respect to Ostrom’s
eight principles, and with respect to other institutions which have been anal-
ysed in the same way.
Since Ostrom’s (1990) book many new areas have been recognised as com-
mons. It has been deemed applicable to many shared resource problems: from
transport to radio spectrum to the Internet (Hess, 2000). Many have emerged
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from technological innovations which have either created a new virtual re-
source, or transformed the properties of a resource such that it is feasible to
treat it as a commons. One example is knowledge (Hess and Ostrom, 2006),
with open-access publishing as a specific case study.
2.2.2 Data, Information and Knowledge commons
The shift to treating knowledge as a commons has largely been enabled by
the digitalisation of information which has separated the knowledge from the
physical format of publication (Hess and Ostrom, 2003). In this section we
consider data, information and knowledge as resources, and how they are
managed. For this discussion we require a definition of these terms within
this context. Most definitions, such as Machlup (1983), give a hierarchy where
data is just raw values, information is data organised in context, and knowl-
edge is an understanding of meaning of information and how to use it. These
definitions are echoed by others:
“Knowledge derives from information as information derives from
data” (Davenport and Prusak, 2000, p.6).
“Current usage sees the terms data and information used inter-
changeably – strictly speaking information is data with an inter-
pretation” (Shadbolt, 2013, p.203).
For example the tuple (51, 0) would be data; adding the context that this
tuple corresponds to latitude and longitude transforms it into information; and
knowledge would be the ability to provide directions to travel to this location
along public roads. It is generally thought that with current technology the
creation of knowledge requires human intervention (Davenport and Prusak,
2000), but data and information can be generated independently by devices.
In this work we define these terms as follows:
• Data is a set of one or many values. These are often numerical, but could
also be any other type of unstructured values.
• Information is data organised into a context, which can normally be done
by simply labelling it.
• Knowledge is understanding of the meaning of information and how to
use it.
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Table 1: Types of goods. Source: Hess and Ostrom (2006)
SUBTRACTABILITY
Low High
EX
C
LU
SI
O
N Difficult
Public goods
Useful Knowledge
Sunsets
Common-pool resources
Libraries
Irrigation systems
Easy
Toll or club goods
Journal subscriptions
Day-care centres
Private goods
Personal computers
Doughnuts
Hess and Ostrom (2003) assessed how information and knowledge can be
a commons by using a classification of exclusion and subtractability. Exclusion
is a measure of how easy it is to exclude individuals from the benefits of
the good, either through physical or legal means. Subtractability (also called
rivalry) is a measure of the extent to which the benefits consumed by one
individual subtract from the benefits available to others. These properties can
be combined to give a two dimensional classification of goods (see Table 1)
giving four types of good: Public goods, common-pool resources, toll or club
goods and private goods.
The shift that has occurred in information and knowledge due to technol-
ogy is that its distribution has become non-rivalrous2 (Hess and Ostrom, 2003;
Bollier, 2007). Previously information and knowledge would have to be put
into tangible form, for example a book, to allow others to use it. In this form it
has high subtractability: by owning a book you prevent someone else owning
that copy of the book, and the supply of books is limited by the publisher. This
meant that information and knowledge goods were either common-pool or pri-
vate goods depending on whether they were distributed by a library (difficult
exclusion) or sold (easy exclusion). In digital form, however, these goods can
be freely copied for negligible cost. They are infinite and undepletable (Bol-
lier, 2007). Therefore these goods would count as either public goods or club
goods.
In the context of information and knowledge as goods, Copyright law en-
ables exclusion to be controlled by the information or knowledge creator. This
allows a book to simultaneously be a private good—when purchased by an
individual—and part of a common-pool resource—when made available by a
library. Digital information has gained the same flexibility, both through the
2 i. e. Having low rivalry/subtractability
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protection of the law, but also through technological means via access control
and digital rights management (Lessig, 2004). Wikipedia provides a public
knowledge resource, having chosen to not have any exclusion, while Journals
use pay-walls to exclude access for those without subscriptions.
Lessig (2004) also shows that copyright law has also been used to artificially
change the subtractability of digitalised information and knowledge. For ex-
ample, some publishers have imposed ebook lending limits on libraries, pre-
venting too many simultaneous withdrawals. This effectively prevents this
knowledge from becoming a public good, ensuring that library lending re-
mains a common-pool resource.
Therefore we can cast this resource into any of the four goods categories.
While information and knowledge should naturally be a public good, techno-
logical and legal control allows the properties to be changed in order to create
a more beneficial good for the creator. Copyright law generally advocates that
creative work should eventually become public goods by falling into the pub-
lic domain, and that the protected state of work is purely an incentive mech-
anism (Samuelson, 2006). The argument for this is that, because information
and knowledge also aid in the creation of new information and knowledge,
having a large public domain will have a cumulative effect and increase over-
all knowledge as a result. We reach a dilemma where the knowledge creators
wish to exert their control to achieve a short term benefit which causes a sub-
optimal outcome for all the users of their knowledge, and also their long-term
productivity.
The premise of the information and knowledge commons is that a method
of collective action as seen in past commons literature can be used here in
order to tap into the benefits of making information and knowledge more
available (Hess and Ostrom, 2006; Fuster Morell, 2010; Shadbolt, 2013). Ostrom
and Hess (2007) analysed the knowledge commons in the same way as physical
commons: using the IAD framework.
The creation of an institution in order to manage knowledge and informa-
tion in practical scenarios is certainly non-trivial. There is a problem of sup-
ply (Ostrom, 1990, p. 42)—that someone must provide the initial organisational
structure and institutional rules—and, as we will see in the next section, there
is a fine distinction between the emergence of centralised and collective gov-
ernance. Rules which satisfy Ostrom’s eight principles are often very specific
to the resource characteristics so we don’t have a pre-existing ‘library’ of rules
available when looking to ‘supply’ an institution with which to manage a new
resource. The difficulty of implementing effective collective governance struc-
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tures is arguably a contributing factor to why in many cases initiators decide
to follow Hardin’s advice (see page 22)—privatisation seems to be the only
way.
2.3 participatory sensing and the knowledge commons
This section presents a review of existing participatory-sensing applications in
order to assess their current approach to governance models. We outline a set
of criteria which we use to evaluate a representative sample of both experi-
mental applications from the literature and commercial applications leverag-
ing participatory sensing in their product. We also look at two socio-technical
systems dealing with information and knowledge as an example of effective
self-organising management of such a resource.
There are two other relevant surveys on participatory-sensing applications.
Christin et al. (2011) surveys privacy in 30 sensing applications. The survey
identifies privacy threats by looking at what is sensed and the granularity of
the sensing in each application. Tilak (2013) performs a survey of the domains
of several applications and the hardware and software tools used for sensing.
This survey differs from these, in that our focus is on the organisational struc-
tures and where benefits are accrued in each application.
2.3.1 Evaluative Criteria for Participatory Sensing
Our survey criteria assess three distinct points in the sensing process: what and
how information flows into the system, how information is managed inside
the system, and what benefits are generated by the system and who can access
them. The aim is to determine the flow of value (in the form of information and
knowledge) into and out of the system, and if and how users are incentivised
to contribute to and sustain the system.
We classify information flowing into the application in two ways. Firstly, by
the source of the information. It can be people-centric, collecting information
about the user, or environment-centric, capturing information about the par-
ticipants’ surroundings (Kanhere, 2013). The latter is public information, any
other user could gather the same data by being in the same physical location
(or equivalent). Secondly we look at how the data is gathered. This can be
explicitly contributed or implicitly gathered (Shadbolt, 2013). Most participa-
tory sensing is explicit—the user knows that they are contributing information.
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However, increasingly information is being gathered implicitly, often without
user knowledge.
The management of information is dictated by the organisational structure
of the system, both technical (the architecture) and social (governance). A sens-
ing system’s architecture and governance combine to specify where the power
and assets lie in a system. A centralised governance will mean that a small
number of actors have control over the system and the rules all users must ad-
here to. Less centralised governance methods will spread this power around
and possibly require consensus for rule changes and/or elected positions. A
centralised architecture is one where all data is aggregated under one entity’s
control. While this is often a practical solution to data aggregation, it gives
this individual power through control of the core assets of the system. Effec-
tive governance is required to limit these powers. The architecture can also
be decentralised, for example using peer-to-peer (p2p) technologies. This can
have a limiting effect on the governance of a system as there is no single point
where control can be applied.
We classify the benefits of a participatory-sensing application on two fac-
tors: who they are beneficial for and who can access them. An output benefit
from an application can either be personal—tailored to an individual based on
the information they have contributed—or community—aggregated informa-
tion useful to everyone on the given task. Access to benefits can be public or
private, which denote whether some kind of membership is required to receive
benefits.
In total we have six criteria:
• Information source: environment or people.
• Gathering method: explicit or implicit.
• Governance: centralised or community.
• Architecture: centralised server or peer-to-peer (p2p).
• Benefits: personal and/or community.
• Access: private and/or public.
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2.3.2 Review of Participatory-Sensing Applications
We took a sample of experimental applications from the literature covering
multiple domains including environment monitoring, traffic management and
price comparison. The reviewed applications are as follows:
• The Pothole Patrol system (Eriksson et al., 2008) uses vibration and GPS
data from participating vehicles to detect road surface conditions.
• CenceMe (Miluzzo et al., 2008) is a mobile phone application which at-
tempts to infer the current context of the user from the device’s sensors
as well as neighbouring devices’ sensors.
• The LiveCompare (Deng and Cox, 2009) phone application users con-
tribute pictures of grocery products’ price tags which are analysed to
create a price matching service.
• VTrack (Thiagarajan et al., 2009) collects location information from smart-
phones in order to provide travel time estimation for drivers.
• In Parknet (Mathur et al., 2010) vehicles monitor for available road-side
parking spaces which is then aggregated to provide real-time parking
availability over a city-wide area to various third-parties.
• VibN (Miluzzo et al., 2011) gathers smartphone sensor data to identify
events in a city in real-time.
• P-Sense (Mendez et al., 2011) measures air pollution from smartphones
to generate pollution maps of the local area.
• Cloud2Bubble (Costa et al., 2012) collects data on ambient conditions on
public transport from smartphones and suggests to users changes that
they can make to their journey to give themselves a better quality of
experience.
• Gas-Mobile (Hasenfratz et al., 2012) uses low-cost sensors connected to
smartphones to measure air pollution levels.
To see how participatory sensing is deployed in real-world scenarios we ex-
tended the survey to two commercial applications, Waze3 and OpenSignal4.
Waze is a smartphone application which provides car navigation information
3 http://www.waze.com
4 http://opensignal.com
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to the user as well as alerts about hazards which may affect users’ journeys.
Information is sent back while the app is in use to track the speed of cer-
tain routes and traffic levels. Users may also actively report events which
affect their progress, such as accidents or flooding. Waze uses this information
to firstly build a map of possible driving routes and detect new roads, and
secondly provide optimal routing to users with accurate arrival predictions.
OpenSignal aggregates information on mobile phone signal quality from user
devices in order to generate maps of the quality of service available under each
provider across the world.
Each application was evaluated according to our criteria. The results are
shown in the ‘Experimental Applications’ and ‘Commercial Applications’ sec-
tions of Table 2.
2.3.3 Survey Observations
From this review we see that the experimental applications all follow a similar
methodology. Each one identifies a domain to which participatory sensing can
be applied, determines a method for gathering appropriate data from users,
develops an algorithm for producing useful analytics from the data set, and
deploys a small test application to verify the method. Under this method there
is no need to consider how to incentivise participation in the application via
fair governance and access to benefits.
We made the following observations from our survey:
• Data gathering is almost always explicit. Users are recruited specifically
for the purpose of the sensing campaign.
• Governance is not considered in any case. In deployed applications it
is assumed that the institution has complete control over the application
with no oversight.
• In most cases, architectures are centralised. This is the simplest way to de-
ploy such a system when scaling is not a requirement. In some cases the
authors considered scaling and thus architectures which utilised some
peer-to-peer technologies were used (Mendez et al., 2011; Hasenfratz
et al., 2012).
• Access to the system’s benefits is only specified in four cases, and this
access is always private, requiring certain membership or ownership of
an app. As the authors’ aims were generally to show that the proposed
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algorithms generate correct inferences from the sensors then access to
this data for users was not considered.
From the survey of commercial applications we see that in both cases a cen-
tral governance is used. The companies control any changes to policies govern-
ing the data they hold and access to it. The applications differ in how data is
collected and benefits accessed. OpenSignal is explicit about data gathering—
the sole purpose of their app is the gathering of signal strength data. Their
aggregated data set is then made open to the public via their websites and
publications. Therefore this application does not provide incentives for users
to participate in the gathering effort beyond some personal stats on their own
gathered data. Waze, on the other hand, hides its data gathering behind the
app’s functionality as a satellite navigation tool. While the app is performing
navigation for the user, data is fed back to Waze in order to improve the naviga-
tion performance. Through its design the app implicitly enforces a reciprocal
relationship where information on traffic and road conditions is exchanged for
optimised travel directions. The app encourages additional explicit contribu-
tions in the form of tagging roadwork locations etc., which is then provided to
other users to alert them about hazards or to improve routing. While access to
the real-time travel map is made publicly available through the Waze website,
it does not provide the navigation functionality available in the app. Therefore
the application sustains itself simply by providing accurate navigation via the
app which in turn causes users to implicitly contribute information to improve
the service.
We draw two main conclusions from this review. Firstly, that the current
work on participatory sensing focuses on the provision of sensing campaigns
and algorithms for the processing of data for those campaigns. Secondly,
where governance and infrastructure has been provisioned for large-scale, long
running participatory-sensing deployments it tends to be centralised. The fact
that centralised governance is provisioned should not be a surprise. For the
organisations involved it satisfies a self-interested strategy, which is also an
effective one in terms of return on investment and/or profit. This governance
choice does not seem to hinder the operation of the system as users can be
incentivised to contribute.
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2.3.4 Extension to Knowledge Commons
To assess possible alternatives to centralised governance of participatory-sensing
systems we extend our survey to a particular kind of social system which is
accessed and controlled via the Internet. These systems involve large numbers
of participants and contributors, who access and build on the information and
knowledge in a shared resource. They can be seen as knowledge commons.
We look at two examples: Wikipedia5 and Free/Open-Source Software (FOSS)6.
Wikipedia is an example of a very successful deployment of community gov-
ernance which has created a knowledge commons which is arguably richer
than what could be produced through other means. In FOSS we have a general
framework which has enabled anyone in the world to create and contribute to
software which can compete with commercial products, and also give free and
libre7 access to this software. We have tested both of these systems against the
same criteria we used previously, and the results are again in Table 2 (Social
Systems section).
Under our survey criteria, Wikipedia is classified as gathering information
explicitly. Contributions are new articles, modifications to existing ones, or
moderations of others’ submissions, and therefore users generating this con-
tent are aware that they are provisioning it to Wikipedia. The result of these
contributions is a knowledge resource which is available to anyone, and no spe-
cific rewards are reserved to encourage editing or moderation actions. While
its architecture is centralised under one website, Wikipedia has a complex com-
munity governance which allows policies on the site to change provided con-
sensus is behind the change. This governance has developed over time to
become more open in response to criticism and concerns over possible involve-
ment from commercial organisations (Fuster Morell, 2011). The need for dy-
namic governance is in part driven by the permissive licence given to content
on the site, which allows anyone to publish the content elsewhere, and has
in the past led to the forking of whole sections to separate sites (Famiglietti,
2011).
Like Wikipedia, contributions to FOSS are explicit. Contributions take the
form of code commits, code review, bug reporting, mailing-list discussion
and general project administration. There are some cases of open-source soft-
5 http://www.wikipedia.org
6 Software which is free and open source, as advocated by the Free Software Foundation
(http://www.fsf.org), amongst others.
7 In the context of open-source software these terms are used to describe two different meanings
of ‘free’: ‘for zero price’ and ‘with little or no restriction’ (libre).
2.4 managing participatory sensing as a commons 34
ware which gather anonymised usage information, a process which would
count as implicit information gathering, however currently this is quite rare
(although increasingly common in commercial software). The governance of
FOSS projects tends to be informal and dynamic (Schweik, 2007). Addition-
ally, as the FOSS community has matured, tools for both the administration of
source code (code repositories, bug trackers etc.) and the administration of
project governance (mailing lists, discussion forums etc.) have been developed.
The availability of these tools is generally free and commoditised to such an
extent that creating the infrastructure for a new FOSS project can be done at
zero monetary cost8.
For both Wikipedia and FOSS, analyses have been done with respect to Os-
trom’s framework. Forte et al. (2009) describe how Wikipedia’s governance
conforms to Ostrom’s eight principles. Schweik (2007) uses the IAD analysis
on FOSS. The innovation of Copyleft (Stallman, 1999), which allows the cre-
ation of code licensed under this regime to be considered as a public good,
is credited as being a key rule-in-use in FOSS by legally binding works into
the commons and keeping them there. It offers a middle ground between
the copyright extremes of ‘all rights reserved’ and public domain. Schweik
(2007) also advocates that the FOSS collaborative paradigm can be applied to
any collaboration around intellectual property. These two examples show that
successful systems have been built to develop and manage shared resources of
information and knowledge using decentralised, community governance. As
in physical commons, the governance system can be shown to conform to Os-
trom’s principles, and further analysis can identify some particular features
which contribute to their success.
From our survey of participatory sensing applications we have identified
the prevalence of centralised control and no governance consideration. When
we consider social systems for managing knowledge commons we see that
it is possible to sustain such a commons with open access and decentralised,
community governance. We argue that this approach can be applied to partic-
ipatory sensing.
2.4 managing participatory sensing as a commons
Participatory sensing deals with two types of ‘good’: the information gathered
from sensors, and the evaluative or analytic knowledge to process this infor-
8 Sites such as http://sourceforge.net and https://github.com provide a full suite of tools for
free to projects licensed under FOSS licenses.
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mation, encapsulated in an algorithm. As we saw with the information and
knowledge commons, classifying these goods in terms of exclusion and sub-
tractability is difficult. We expect low subtractability—beyond artificial schemes
to simulate scarcity, digital resources can be trivially shared. As we described,
exclusion can be defined by the application as access control. However, when
dealing with environmental sensor information exclusion may become impos-
sible, for example if multiple gatherers are in the same physical location then
they cannot exclude each other from generating data about the environment
there. Therefore, depending on specific circumstances, we classify that the
goods in participatory sensing are either public or toll goods, but this is a
choice which can be specified by the institutional rules.
We argue that, in order to have open participatory sensing, we should man-
age it as an information and knowledge commons. Three properties of partici-
patory sensing lead to this deduction:
• The collected information and knowledge is collected from a large num-
ber of independent actors, and therefore no individual can claim an over-
all stake in the pool.
• The value of gathered information is cumulative, in that additional con-
tributions to the pool increase its value.
• If access to the pool is open and no incentive to contribute is given, it is
likely to suffer from under-provision, a form of free-riding.
Therefore, we have a dilemma, much like that of the original tragedy of the
commons. Ostrom’s approach to CPR problems showed that problems arising
from shared resource ownership coupled with incentive to free-ride could be
solved with appropriate governance. The reviewed knowledge commons are a
demonstration of this. They both have the same three properties and as such
could suffer from the same dilemma, but have achieved long term success and
sustainability.
The alternative solution to this dilemma, is that of Hardin (1968), privati-
sation, and is the path taken by the majority of the reviewed participatory-
sensing applications. Firstly, ownership of information and knowledge is taken
by the initiator. Secondly, pool access may be restricted to create exclusion, and
thus transform the good into a toll or club good. This gives control, to erect
paywalls, and to provide incentives to contribute on the initiator’s terms.
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2.5 summary
In this chapter we have introduced the participatory-sensing paradigm. Hav-
ing looked at the management of information and knowledge in social sys-
tems and Hess and Ostrom’s Knowledge Commons, we reviewed a selec-
tion of participatory-sensing applications and provided a comparison to socio-
technical systems utilising the Knowledge Commons paradigm. Finally, we
made a case for the management of participatory-sensing applications accord-
ing to this paradigm in order to achieve a more open, egalitarian and democra-
tised outcome in these applications.
We identified that adherence to Ostrom’s (1990) principles is an indicator of
sustainable governance in the Knowledge Commons, just as it is in physical
CPR systems. Therefore, these principles, and the associated IAD framework,
form the basis of our preformal theory of self-governing management of partici-
patory sensing as a Knowledge Commons.
This analysis confirms our motivating suspicion that information providers
in participatory sensing are being exploited, and reveals a solution path through
the treatment of participatory sensing as a Knowledge Commons. In the next
chapter we explore this path through an analysis of this commons with the IAD
in conjunction with a framework for self-organising electronic institution. This
will lead to a formal characterisation of a participatory-sensing Knowledge
Commons.
3
A C O M M O N S F O R PA RT I C I PAT O RY S E N S I N G
We have seen how information and knowledge can be treated as acommons, and some examples where collective governance hasbeen supplied for this purpose. We now see how we can fully
develop this concept into a theory for self-governing management of participa-
tory sensing as a knowledge commons, and a formal characterisation of this
theory.
However, so far we have only seen knowledge commons managed by human
actors. As a socio-technical system, participatory sensing has the potential for
both human and computational actors interacting. For example in situations
where decisions must be made quickly, frequently and repeatedly, a compu-
tational agent is likely to be much better suited—Wikipedia allow the use of
bots1 for tasks such as detecting and reversing malicious edits and checking for
copyright violations.
To properly integrate these computational actors there needs to be some
kind of common interface within which both they and human actors can inter-
act with the system and its governance. For this purpose we use an Electronic
Institution, as defined in section 5.1, to describe the institutional rules and or-
ganisational state. The institution is intended to enable agents to interact in
order to achieve both individual and collective goals by regulating and con-
straining their behaviour, voluntarily, according to a set of conventional rules.
In this chapter we propose an architecture for provision and appropriation
of information and knowledge for participatory sensing and analyse it, using
the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2005),
as an information and knowledge commons. We then give a formalisation
of an electronic institution for participatory sensing using this architecture,
show how it can accommodate Ostrom’s principles, and evaluate the expected
outcomes of such an institution according to the evaluative criteria of the IAD.
Finally, we consider how a formal system can provide a library of rules which
can be instantiated in order to ‘supply’ an electronic institution.
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Bots
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3.1 participatory sensing as a provision and appropriation sys-
tem
A provision and appropriation system is a Common-Pool Resource (CPR) sys-
tem which has the symmetric actions, provision and appropriate. Provision is an
action which adds resources to the pool, while appropriate takes away. This
system model can be used to describe the CPR systems which Ostrom (1990)
studied. In all cases resources are appropriated by users of the system, how-
ever the source of provisions is a key system classifier. With endogenous CPRs
provisions are also internal to the system, performed by users. Exogenous
resources have external provision, be it through environmental or other pro-
cesses external to the system and its members.
This model of a provision and appropriation system simplifies the nature of
interactions with the resource such that we can talk about different approaches
to management of CPR systems in a uniform manner. A fisherman taking
a particular location in a lake for the day, and a user running a process on
a particular core of a shared processor are both appropriations of resources
which can be compared.
Pitt and Schaumeier (2012) propose an abstract game for reasoning about
provision and appropriation of homogeneous, endogenous resources, using a
variant of the linear public good game, which they name LPG’. This can then
be used to test how the institutional rules affect outcomes in an abstract way.
In the same work they use this approach to test how agents can be encouraged
to comply with the rules through the use of monitoring.
Participatory sensing, and knowledge commons in general, differ from this
representation in two key ways. Firstly, the resources are heterogeneous. Not
all knowledge and information is of equal utility, and nor is its utility constant
for each user. Therefore, we need to distinguish between each artifact in a
pool.
Secondly, the resources are non-rivalrous. Normally in provision and appro-
priation systems an appropriation action will remove resources from the pool,
thus the focus on achieving compliance in this aspect such that the pool is not
depleted. Being non-rivalrous, information and knowledge can be appropri-
ated without negatively affecting the pool or other users.
In participatory sensing there are multiple resource pools in a single sys-
tem. As well as the pool of information gathered from sensors, knowledge to
process this information can be gathered in a pool. We can identify the inter-
actions with these pools by taking the set of four general user roles, as defined
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by Burke et al. (2006), and presented in section 2.1. These roles do not address
the use of derived information generated in the application, so we add one,
consumers, giving five roles as follows:
• initiators, who initiate the application and form an organisation around
it;
• gatherers, users who participate in the information gathering and provi-
sion it;
• evaluators, who verify and classify received information;
• analysts, who process the information to create conclusions on the data,
often in form of new information and/or knowledge; and
• consumers who demand the derived, or second-order, information and
knowledge.
We consider a ‘role’ in this context to be an institutionally assigned label to de-
note what is expected and/or permitted for a user to do. Note that user roles
are not mutually exclusive and a user may occupy many roles simultaneously
within one institution. For example, in a large proportion of cases gatherers
are also consumers, and in fact their compensation for their gathering efforts
is the right to consume. Equally, initiators often are evaluators and analysts too.
Therefore the model allows appropriation of knowledge by a user occupying
the role of consumer, if that user also occupies the role of analyst. The formu-
lation of role in this section specifically allows agents to occupy multiple roles
in the same institution, and indeed different roles in different institutions.
We consider this participatory-sensing application in the form of a provi-
sion and appropriation system, where the resources being provisioned and
appropriated are information and knowledge. Figure 3 illustrates such a sys-
tem and how each role interacts with the resource. Four boxes represent user
roles interacting with the resource. Some roles will require additional agent in-
ternals, such as gatherers requiring appropriate sensors and analysts requiring
knowledge to aggregate sensor information. Arrows represent movement of
information and knowledge; dotted arrows represent optional actions.
3.2 iad analysis
Given participatory sensing as a provision and appropriation system, we can
use the IAD framework to analyse, develop, and evaluate it. The IAD is split
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Figure 3: Participatory sensing as a provision and appropriation system. Dotted ar-
rows represent optional actions for that role.
into nine areas of analysis (Figure 4). The left side of the framework looks at
what the resource and the community using it is like, and rules which have
been created for resource and institution management. The middle section
deals with where interactions occur and who these interactions are between.
The right-hand side observes what the outcomes are and evaluates them.
Our use of the IAD in the section is split into three parts. Firstly we provide
an analysis of a participatory sensing system using the left-hand side of the
framework, looking at resource and community characteristics and rules-in-
use. Secondly we propose a new set of rules-in-use to address each of Ostrom’s
principles for sustainable institutions. Finally we use the observational and
evaluative aspects on the right of the IAD framework to evaluate our proposed
system. The final part of this section addresses the issue of supply of such an
institution.
We now present this analysis of participatory sensing as a provision and ap-
propriation system. Following the IAD framework we discuss the characteris-
tics of the information and knowledge gathered through sensing as a resource
(bio-physical characteristics), the community of individual actors involved in
the sensing process (attributes of the community), and how institutional rules
are or could be created (rules-in-use).
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Figure 1. Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
 There are three ways to enter the framework when studying a question: One can 
start in the middle with the Action Arena, at the right-hand side with the Outcomes, or at 
the left-hand side with the underlying factors (the Physical/Material characteristics, the 
attributes of the relevant Community, and the Rules-in-Use at several levels). Entering 
the analysis with the Physical/Technical and Institutional Characteristics is most 
appropriate when one is trying to understand the nature of the resource being shared, by 
looking at the physical, biological, and technical constraints and capacities of the 
resource, as well as the boundaries, size, communities of users and producers, and the 
relevant rules-in-use. The Action Arena consists of the Action Situation and the 
Participants (individuals or groups) involved. The Action Arena, often at the heart of the 
analysis, is particularly useful in analyzing specific problems or dilemmas in processes of 
institutional change. Within knowledge commons, it is an appropriate place to start when 
Figure 4: Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Ostrom and Hess, 2007,
p.44)
3.2.1 Bio-Physical Characteristics
Typically this area is concerned with the physical attributes of the resource, in
terms of flow and facility. This distinction separates the resource units (flow)
from where they are stored and generated (facility). In order to deal with the
complexity of information and knowledge Hess and Ostrom (2003) put for-
ward an alternative method, considering ideas, artifacts and facilities. In this
framework, ideas are data, information and knowledge in intangible form; ar-
tifacts are the expression of ideas into tangible, observable form; and facilities
store artifacts and make them available. As intangible objects, ideas, by defi-
nition, cannot be represented within a computational system—they must be
expressed into files, databases or algorithms to be used. In this form they are
t en artifacts. Therefore we treat ideas as a resource flow external to the system,
and instead manage the tangible derivative works from them: artifacts.
In participatory sensing, th artifacts are raw sensor data, c ntextualised
sensor information, algorithms for the analysis of data, and rich information
generated from these algorithms. Some of these artifacts will be protected
by copyright law, and this will affect what control the organisation is able
to have over them. The status of data and information (as we have defined
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them) with regards to copyright is currently ambiguous; traditionally it was
not copyrightable, however databases are copyrightable (Miller et al., 2008).
This copyright protection is important as it affects how easily the organisation
can protect its assets. Bad protection limits the ability of the organisation to
prevent forks2 of the information. This affects the excludability of the artifacts,
as while one may be able to exclude access to one database, if the information
can be freely copied elsewhere then this control is lost. It has become prevalent
in the age of digital information that when individuals feel there will be no or
little chance of punishment for sharing information, they do so on a large
scale (Lessig, 2004, pp. 62–66).
The facilities constitute how the data, information and knowledge are stored.
A suitable facility depends on the properties of the resource (for example,
where this storage is physically located, i. e. under whose control it is) and who
is willing to underwrite its costs. In existing participatory-sensing applications
the initiator, evaluators and/or analysts provide this infrastructure and pay for
it. Alternatives would be distributed or peer-to-peer databases where a set of
individuals cooperatively provide infrastructure and bear that cost (perhaps
being compensated by those who cannot contribute). A peer-to-peer system
could be one where each individual looks after their own data and responds to
requests for it (cf. Global Sensor Network (Aberer et al., 2006) and Open Mus-
tard Seed (Hardjono et al., 2014a)), or a robust replicated system where every
user has a copy of the whole data set (cf. decentralised version-control sys-
tem Git3 and crypto-currency Bitcoin4), or anywhere between these extremes.
We may also have different facilities for different artifact types within a single
organisation if the artifact quantity and use differ.
We can furthermore consider computational resources as facilities. Eval-
uators and analysts use their knowledge (i. e. algorithms) with the informa-
tion stored in the facility to generate new information. This process requires
computational resources which are provided by the evaluator or analyst them-
selves. Alternatively participants could provision resources or share costs for
this computation. The commodification of computational resources makes this
very easy to achieve in practice as, for example, computing power and storage
space can be purchased on a metered basis from cloud providers, preventing
the need for large capital outlays.
2 A fork is when a new organisation is formed from a copy of one repository of information or
knowledge.
3 http://git-scm.com
4 http://bitcoin.org
3.2 iad analysis 43
3.2.2 Attributes of the Community
To identify the community for the knowledge commons, Ostrom and Hess
(2007) begin by assessing information users, information providers and infor-
mation policymakers. Users appropriate information, providers constitute both
providers of artifacts and facilities, and policymakers are those who partake
in the organisational governance. Each of these groups contain multiple sub-
groups, each with different interests and agendas.
The users in participatory sensing are those appropriating information in
order to apply knowledge to it (evaluators and analysts) and those appropriating
this derived data (consumers). As in many cases consumers are also providers
as they have a reciprocal relationship with the analysts.
Providers constitute the users providing sensor information (gatherers), users
providing both information derived from knowledge and/or the knowledge
itself (evaluators and analysts), and users providing infrastructure for facilities.
This is a diverse group which is likely to involve almost all users in the ap-
plication. However it is also one of the most critical groups, as a lack of pro-
vision will be a key factor in the success of the organisation. Big data has
shown us that the value of information is additive, often exponentially so, and
gaining traction—a critical mass of providers—is important. We have seen in
section 2.3 some methods for incentivising contribution.
Finally, policymakers constitute a more diverse and abstract group of commu-
nity decision makers. Any user or provider can be a policymaker, but equally,
membership of those groups is not a requirement. Currently many parti-
cipatory-sensing applications have a very small number of predefined policy-
makers, and this is in direct violation of Ostrom’s third principle—that those
affected by the rules can participate in their modification. Therefore we would
like to see larger groups of decision makers like in Wikipedia and Free/Open-
Source Software (FOSS). This does not mean that all policymakers will have
equal power (in terms of capability to enact change) however, policy making
communities can be nested, as we see in social communities and the systems
reviewed in section 2.3.
3.2.3 Rules-in-Use
The rules-in-use dictate what users must, must not, or may do in an organisa-
tion. The IAD breaks these rules down into three levels: operational, collective-
choice and constitutional. Operational rules deal with day-to-day operations
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regarding the resource, who can provision and appropriate what, and when.
Collective-choice rules determine how operational rules can be changed, and
constitutional rules determine who can participate in collective-choice deci-
sions and how collective-choice rules can be changed.
For a knowledge commons Ostrom and Hess (2007) advocate the creation
of rules by allocating bundles of property rights, a method which has also
been adopted for the Creative Commons licenses5. Seven rights were identi-
fied (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992):
• Access—The right to enter an area and enjoy non-subtractive benefits.
Typically this right would be for physical access to the property, though
this concept can be extended to information commons. In participatory
sensing, access would grant the ability to browse or search the repository,
but not to extract anything. This can be likened to browsing a library
without the right to loan anything.
• Contribution—The right to contribute artifacts to the repository, or right
of provision. This can be discriminated by the type of information/-
knowledge being contributed.
• Extraction—The right to obtain artifacts, or right of appropriation. As
with contribution this could be discriminated by information/knowledge
type, for example only certain experts may be allowed to extract sensor
information, but everyone can extract the information generated by these
experts.
• Removal—The right to remove one’s artifacts from the resource.
• Management/Participation—“The right to regulate internal use patterns
and transform the resource by making improvements" (Ostrom and Hess,
2007, p.52). The first part of this right is a collective-choice right, but the
second part is also applied at the operational level. Management of the
resource could involve pruning, aggregating or compressing information
in order to keep facility costs down.
• Exclusion—“The right to determine who will have access, contribution,
extraction and removal rights and how those rights may be transferred" (Os-
trom and Hess, 2007, p.53). This is a collective-choice right which con-
trols the level of access for users of the resource.
5 http://creativecommons.org
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• Alienation—“The right to sell or lease extraction, management/participa-
tion, and exclusion rights" (Ostrom and Hess, 2007, p.53). In this defini-
tion the sale of a right prohibits the seller from utilising that right once it
is transferred. Therefore it is not a right which is particularly applicable
to information commons.
With these rights we can make rules to describe the operational and most
of the collective-choice levels of many organisations managing information
and knowledge. Rights give users the institutional power, permission and/or
obligation to take actions within the context of a knowledge commons. We can
formalise these relationships to write rules which are machine readable, such
that agents can understand when they are permitted or obliged to perform
actions, and when someone has broken the rules (Artikis et al., 2009).
3.3 formal characterisation
Having analysed participatory sensing as a knowledge commons, we can now
begin to formally characterise such a system. Pitt et al. (2012) used the Event
Calculus (EC) (Kowalski and Sergot, 1986) and Institutionalised Power (Jones
and Sergot, 1996) to formally characterise a resource-allocation system and
address six of Ostrom’s (1990) eight principles. We follow the same methodol-
ogy, applying it instead to a provision and appropriation system with multiple
resource types.
Figure 5 illustrates the participatory-sensing provision and appropriation
system with multiple levels of information and knowledge. The same actions,
provision and appropriate, can be used for several different resource types. As
well as those shown in the diagram, facilities and institutions can be provi-
sioned. We assume that we are able to distinguish between each of these
resource types and thus tailor rules. In our representation we use simple pred-
icates to make these distinctions.
3.3.1 The Event Calculus and Institutionalised Power
For this formalisation we wish to use a language which is able to represent and
reason about action, agency, social constraints, and change. We continue with
the EC, as we are extended the specification from Pitt et al. (2012). Additionally,
its clarity of exposition and executable specification are useful for this task.
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Figure 5: Participatory sensing as a provision and appropriation system with multi-
ple types of information and knowledge. Raw information from sensors is
provisioned then knowledge is used to generate multiple different types of
information from this. Dotted arrows represent optional actions for that role.
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The EC is a logical formalism for representing and reasoning about actions or
events and their effects, based on a many-sorted first-order predicate calculus.
An EC specification consists of an action description which includes axioms that
define: action occurrences, using happensAt predicates; the effects of actions,
using initiates and terminates predicates; and the values of fluents, using initially
and holdsAt predicates. Table 3 summarises EC predicates which we use in our
specification. Variables start with an upper case letter and are assumed to be
universally quantified. Note that the underscore ‘_’ denotes the anonymous
variable which can stand for (be unified with) any value. Predicates, function
symbols and constants start with a lowercase letter. Fluents are properties
which can have different values at different points in time.
Table 3: Main Predicates of the Event Calculus.
Predicate Meaning
Act happensAt T Action Act occurs at time T
initially F=V The value of fluent F is V at time 0
F=V holdsAt T The value of fluent F is V at time T
Act initiates F=V at T The occurrence of action Act at time T
initiates a period of time for which
the value of fluent F is V
Act terminates F=V at T The occurrence of action Act at time T
terminates a period of time for which
the value of fluent F is V
In this work we use a subset of Shanahan’s ‘full version’ of EC Shanahan
(1999) as used in Artikis’ norm-governed system specification Artikis et al.
(2009). This dialect was used for the specifications we build upon in this work,
and is defined in full in (Artikis, 2003, p.35).
In order to represent and reason about permissions and access control within
an institution we need a formalisation of institutionalised power (Jones and Ser-
got, 1996). This term refers to the feature of institutions whereby designated
agents, often acting in specific roles, are empowered, obliged or permitted to
perform certain actions which in turn may modify certain institutional facts.
In EC we formalise these powers as fluents which indicate whether an agent
has or had a specific power at a time.
An institutionalised power for an agent to perform an action signifies that
the institution has granted the agent the power that performing the designated
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action will lead to a change in institutional state. The absence of this power
does not preclude the agent from performing this action however, it just means
that, as the institution does not recognise it as a valid action, it will not result
in the same change in institutional state as when the empowered agent did the
action. This power differs from physical capability, as one can still perform an
action when one is not empowered to do so, but the reverse is also true, that
one could be empowered to do something that one is not able to do.
Permission represents that an agent has been explicitly permitted to perform
an action by the institution. This is subtly different to power, as one can have
power but not permission. In this case performing the action will still change
institution state (as the agent was empowered), but may have later repercus-
sions.
Obligations specify actions which ought to be performed. An agent with an
obligation to perform an action should perform that action to avoid sanctions
from the institution for non-compliance. They can often be used to define
protocol. For example a polling period for a vote can be defined by setting an
obligation for when the ballot must be closed.
Take an example of voting in an election. The state will give permission for
a subset of the population to vote. However, the people are not empowered to
do so until they receive a valid polling card. At the polling station, the staff
are obliged to give a citizen a voting slip should they be presented with a valid
polling card, and the time is within the allowed voting period. With this slip
they are then empowered to cast a vote, and performing the action of ticking a
box now counts as a valid vote in the election.
Should the staff fail in their obligation, and give a voting slip without seeing
a valid polling card, they may empower someone to vote who does not have
permission. The vote will still count, despite them not being permitted to vote.
Alternatively, if someone arrived too late to the polling station they cannot
be given a voting slip, and therefore would not have the power to vote, despite
having permission.
Finally, someone could create their own voting slip, mark a cross on it, and
attempt to vote with it. They could still perform the voting action, however,
having not been correctly empowered, the vote would not count, as the counting
process should identify an incorrect voting slip (provided it is not produced
to look the same as a valid one). This is an example of performing an action
without empowerment.
Institutionalised power therefore provides fine-grained and rich method of
describing the ways in which the rules of an institution are administered. It
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has been argued (by Artikis and Pitt (2008)) that being about to express these
powers is vital to be able to properly specify open systems governed by insti-
tutional rules. Therefore we use this formalisation in our specification.
3.3.2 Addressing Ostrom’s principles
Pitt et al. (2012) demonstrated that six of Ostrom’s principles could be axioma-
tised for a resource-allocation problem. There are several differences between
this problem and our provision and appropriation system. Therefore, we fol-
low the same methodology but modify the axioms where appropriate. Their
resource-allocation problem deals with an exogenous resource system, and
as such does not deal with provisions by agents. With an endogenous pro-
vision and appropriation system we must extend the specification to accom-
modate provision of resources. Furthermore, resource allocation deals with
scarce, highly subtractable resources, meaning that one agent’s appropriation
subtracts from what is available for other agents. In the case of information
and knowledge, a key feature which we identified in section 2.2, is the lack of
scarcity and subtractability.
The formal characterisation consists of a set of actions which agents can
perform in the action arena of the participatory-sensing application, a set of
fluents which describe the state of the system at discrete time points, and
rules which describe how the agents’ actions affect the fluents. Through this
characterisation we enumerate how certain rules can satisfy some of Ostrom’s
principles, and may lead to certain outcomes. The rules are sourced from both
social systems that we have reviewed and from technical solutions which are
available for the virtual domain. Table 4 lists agent actions, Table 5 lists fluents
and Table 6 lists the predicates and function symbols.
The specification we present here is that of the institution governing the
described provision and appropriation system. Agents may interact with the
institution through the defined institutional actions without limitation or com-
pulsion. Thus, the use of institutionalised power is a method of instructing
agents what they are able to do (via empowerment), what they are allowed to
do (via permission), and what they ought to do (via obligation). Whether they
do as they should is a matter for the institution to encourage and enforce, and
is the subject of several of Ostrom’s principles.
Note that this specification is not complete. We present axioms in cases
where we must adapt parts of the previous specification by Pitt et al. (2012) for
this new context, and where new mechanisms are required. The purpose at
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Table 4: Agent actions
Action Description
provision(A, I, Obj) Agent A provisions object Obj to institution I.
appropriate(A, I, Obj) Agent A appropriates object Obj from institu-
tion I.
apply(A, I, Role) Agent A applies for the role Role in institution
I.
assign(G, A, I, Role) Gatekeeper agent G assigns the role of Role in
institution I to agent A.
report(M, A, I, Reason) Monitor agent M reports agent A in institution
I for the reason given by Reason.
sanction(H, I, A, O) Head agent H sanctions agent A in institution
I for the offence O.
appeal(A, I, S) Agent A appeals the sanction level S in institu-
tion I.
uphold(C, A, I, S) Head agent C upholds the appeal by agent A
for the sanction level S in institution I.
this point is to explore potential issues and the possible mechanisms to solve
them, rather than propose a full institution specification.
Principle 1: Clearly defined boundaries
Defining boundaries for a digital resource is much easier than with physical
resources. Firstly, the resource facility is not a pre-existing physical area, it is
a virtual portal where the information and knowledge are stored. Access to
the resource is much easier to control due to the availability of authentication
mechanisms (e. g. public key infrastructure, identity management, etc.) which
allow the verification of users accessing the resource. Taking open-source soft-
ware as an example, the facilities (the version control system, bug/issue tracker
and mailing list) have fine grained access control, preventing unauthorised ac-
cess to the resource.
This access control can be implemented in a distributed system using a role-
based system. In addition to the operational user roles for participatory sens-
ing we add roles for institutional tasks, in this case an agent with the role
of gatekeeper. This role empowers this agent to assign roles according to the
specified access-control method for the institution. An agent who applies for
a role can be subsequently assigned to the role by the gatekeeper provided the
conditions of entry for the chosen access control method are satisfied.
3.3 formal characterisation 51
Table 5: Fluents
Fluent Values Description
role_of (A, I, Role) Boolean true iff agent A has the role of Role
in institution I.
provided(A, I, Obj) Boolean true iff agent A successfully provi-
sioned Obj to institution I.
appropriated(A, I, Obj) Boolean true iff agent A successfully appro-
priated Obj from institution I.
applied(A, I, Role) Boolean true iff agent A successfully made
an application for the role Role in
institution I.
acMethod(I, Role) {none, attribute,
discretionary,
vote}
Specifies the access control method
for the role Role in institution I
appLimit(I, Role, Rtype) (Integer, time) The current rate limit on appropria-
tions of the resource type Rtype for
the role Role in institution I. Value
is a two-tuple of number of appro-
priations over a discrete time pe-
riod.
review_score(A, I) [0..1] A rating of the agent A’s provisions
to the institution I.
score_threshold(I) [0..1] The threshold of provision quality
required by the institution I.
appealed(A, I, S) Boolean true iff agent A has made an appeal
over the sanction level S in institu-
tion I.
sanction_level(A, I) Integer The current sanction level of agent
A in institution I.
offences(A, I) Integer The number of offences committed
by agent A in institution I.
adrMethod(I) {arbitration,
mediation,
negotiation, . . .}
Specifies the dispute resolution
method used in institution I.
licenceReq(I) {none, copyleft,
. . .}
Specifies the required licence for ar-
tifacts in institution I.
licence(Obj) {none, copyleft,
. . .}
Gives the current licence type of ar-
tifact Obj.
pow(A, Action) Boolean Agent A has the institutionalised
power to perform action Action
per(A, Action) Boolean Agent A has the institutionalised
permission to perform action
Action
obl(A, Action) Boolean Agent A is obliged to perform ac-
tion Action
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Table 6: Predicate/Function Symbols
Predicate/Function Values/Range Description
type(Obj) {sensor_information,
derived_information,
meta_information,
analytic_knowledge,
evaluative_knowledge}
Determines the artifact type of
Obj.
countAppropriations(
A, I, R, T1, T2)
Integer Counts the number of appro-
priations by agent A of re-
sources of type R in institution
I between times T1 and T2.
countProvisions(
A, I, R, T1, T2)
Integer Counts the number of provi-
sions by agent A of resources of
type R in institution I between
times T1 and T2.
derivedFrom(
S, Alg, O)
Boolean true iff artifact O was derived
from artifact S using Alg.
apply(A, I, Role) initiates applied(A, I, Role) = true at T ←
pow(A, apply(A, I, Role)) = true holdsAt T
pow(A, apply(A, I, Role)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of (A, I, Role) = false holdsAt T
assign(G, A, I, Role) initiates role_of (A, I, Role) = true at T ←
pow(G, assign(G, A, I, Role)) = true holdsAt T
pow(G, assign(G, A, I, Role)) = true holdsAt T ←
applied(A, I, Role) = true holdsAt T ∧
acMethod(I, Role) = discretionary holdsAt T ∧
role_of (G, I, gatekeeper) = true holdsAt T
The axioms above give the example of discretionary assignment6, where
the gatekeeper can decide whether to assign a role or not. An Agent A per-
forming the apply action initiates a period of time during which the fluent
applied(A, I, Role) is true if it is empowered to perform that action; it is em-
powered to perform that action if the agent does not already occupy this role.
Similarly, an agent G can make the institutional fact (fluent) true that an agent
A is assigned to a role Role if it is empowered to perform the assign action.
6 This is an extension of Pitt et al.’s (2012) axioms, which only handles a single member role, to
handle multiple different roles.
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This is the case if agent A has applied for the role, agent G occupies the role
of gatekeeper, and the access-control method is discretionary.
Note that we could also use attribute-based access control, where the gate-
keeper may only assign the role if the applicant satisfies certain conditions. We
could allow agents to vote on new applicants, or, if we want more open access
to certain roles, we can compel the gatekeeper to assign a role to all applicants:
obl(G, assign(G, A, I, Role)) = true holdsAt T ←
Role = gatherer ∧
applied(A, I, Role) = true holdsAt T ∧
acMethod(I, Role) = none holdsAt T ∧
role_of (G, I, gatekeeper) = true holdsAt T
Using roles we can define who will be empowered, i. e. have the right, to
provision and appropriate certain resources, according to Figure 5.
pow(A, provision(A, I, Obj)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of (A, I, gatherer) = true holdsAt T ∧
type(Obj) = sensor_information
pow(A, provision(A, I, Obj)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of (A, I, analyst) = true holdsAt T ∧
type(Obj) = derived_information
pow(A, provision(A, I, Obj)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of (A, I, evaluator) = true holdsAt T ∧
type(Obj) = meta_information
The axioms for appropriation have the same structure, simply changing the
provision action to appropriation and the role and resource type where applica-
ble. Figure 5 specifies which roles can appropriate each resource type.
Principle 2: Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local condi-
tions
The appropriation and provision rules must be relevant for the local condi-
tions, and therefore are often quite application-specific. These rules cover time,
place, technology and quantity of resource units appropriated or provisioned.
The principle is typically violated when the rules cause over-regulation of an
abundant resource, or under-regulation of a scarce one.
In participatory sensing, scarcity may arise in access to the resource, for
example through an excessive quantity of requests going to the facility. One
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method of dealing with such congestion would be to rate limit requests. If we
take an example of a consumer appropriating road traffic information from the
facility, an incorrectly implemented rate-limit could severely limit the useful-
ness of the resource. As the nature of resource usage in this case is bursty (large
number of requests in one go when route planning, then very few for a period
of time afterwards), a quota system of x requests per minute is extremely more
restrictive than 60× 24× x requests per day, despite corresponding to the same
overall quota.
Rate limits can be expressed as follows:
pow(A, appropriate(A, I, Obj)) = true holdsAt T ←
type(Obj) = Rtype ∧
role_of (A, I, Role) = true holdsAt T ∧
appLimit(I, Role, Rtype) = (Limit, Period) holdsAt T ∧
countAppropriations(A, I, Rtype, T − Period, T) < Limit
In Pitt et al. (2012) this principle is addressed by looking at when it is appro-
priate to demand resources. Here, the patterns of interaction are likely to be
more free-form. However in some applications we may want to force a more
symmetric relationship to compel agents to contribute to the resource:
pow(A, appropriate(A, I, Obj)) = true holdsAt T ←
countProvisions(A, I, Rtype, 0, T) = P ∧
countAppropriations(A, I, Rtype, 0, T) ≤ P
Principle 3 : Collective-choice arrangements
“Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modify-
ing the operational rules" – This is certainly not the case in current participatory-
sensing applications. To achieve this, a framework is required to allow users to
propose and agree on new rules and rule changes in the context of the appli-
cation. Many such frameworks exist for human organisations, and some have
been formalised to be usable for agent systems (Artikis et al., 2004), including
robust voting mechanisms (Pitt et al., 2006).
Pitt et al. (2012) formulate a voting mechanism for collective-choice arrange-
ments through effective enfranchisement of members of the institution. This
enfranchisement is achieved by empowering agents to vote and granting an
entitlement associated with this right, ensuring a correct result is declared
from a ballot. This entitlement is implemented as an obligation for a particu-
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lar agent to declare the result of a vote according to an agreed-upon winner-
determination method. This general voting system is fit for purpose across
many domains, indeed it is just a formalisation of protocols used in many
social systems (Pitt et al., 2006), and so we can adopt it as-is for this domain.
An issue remains, though, of how or whether agents can make reasoned deci-
sions about rules, let alone create new rules, without human intervention. This
problem has been explored with the implementation of the game of Nomic
played by agents (Holland et al., 2013). Normative synthesis (Morales et al.,
2013) offers an approach to the generation of rules. We can use the concepts of
learning, self-simulation and self-awareness to provide some reasoning about
the consequences of rules.
Principle 4: Monitoring
Monitoring can be implemented, provided sufficient auditing capabilities are
available (Pitt et al., 2012). Wikipedia sets a good example here: all users are
able to monitor each other through the edit history, which gives a fine-grained
breakdown of what has been contributed and by whom. In technical systems,
this auditing can be done via a log of institutional actions performed by agents.
This creates a narrative, like the ones which can be processed with the EC, and
the process of monitoring is simply looking for actions which are performed
when the actor did not have the permission to perform that action at the time.
Effective monitoring can occur in several different ways. Firstly, some sys-
tems can be designed such that monitoring is a side-effect arising from normal
use. Ostrom (1990) observed this in fisheries which allocated areas of a lake
to different individuals on a rota. If an individual, upon arriving in their al-
lotted zone, found someone else using it they would obviously have detected
the violation of the rules and be able to report it. Secondly, individuals can
be incentivised to monitor for violations. Unlike in the first case this involves
some additional effort on the individual’s part. This incentivisation can be in
the form of a reward for finding violations or payment for performing audits.
Finally, the institution can arrange for an independent third party to monitor
the system, and pay for this by collecting contributions from members.
In the participatory-sensing scenario our access-control procedures provide
protection over access to the resource, therefore monitoring is more concerned
with the content of provisions: the quality of information and knowledge pro-
vided, and whether a user is permitted to provision a particular artifact. These
requirements touch on different concepts and thus need to be handled differ-
ently.
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In the case of the quality of provisioned information and knowledge, the ac-
tions of evaluators can be a form of monitoring. Meta information provisioned
by evaluators can provide indications of the trustworthiness and accuracy of
sensor information, derived information and even other meta information (see
Figure 5). This process is akin to review, rating and trust systems seen in
e-commerce and other online applications. Provided that there are evaluators
provisioning this kind of information in the institution, this is a form of side-
effect monitoring. Incentives can also be created to encourage more provision
of meta information.
We may assign a monitor role to an agent who is required to monitor for
low-quality provisions. To do this, they can simply look for information provi-
sioned by evaluators that suggests an agent’s data is below some quality thresh-
old. If this is the case, it will trigger a report of that agent (indeed, the monitor
may even be obliged to report the offence):
report(M, A, I, O) initiates monitored_offence(A, I) = O at T ←
pow(M, report(M, A, I, O)) = true holdsAt T
pow(M, report(M, _, I, _)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of (M, I, monitor) = true holdsAt T
obl(M, report(M, A, I, baddata)) = true holdsAt T ←
review_score(A, I) = S holdsAt T ∧
score_threshold(I) = Thres holdsAt T ∧
S < Thres
The other concern, provision of artifacts when the individual does not have
the permission to, is more difficult to monitor. There are two possible mali-
cious actions here which we may want to monitor: An agent provisioning an
artifact which has already been provisioned previously; and an agent provi-
sioning an artifact which was generated by another, but has not been provi-
sioned to this institution. In both cases the agent acts maliciously in order to
gain benefits of provision without having to generate an artifact legitimately.
However, any open system facing the problem of non-compliant behaviour
has to consider the related problems: how are these actions detectable, and
if so, is it even worthwhile to monitor? It has been shown (e. g. Balke et al.
(2013)) that the cost of monitoring can outweigh the benefits of preventing
or punishing non-compliant behaviour. This can be particularly acute in any
system with endogenous resources, where the cost of monitoring has to be
‘paid for’ from the same common pool resource that is itself being monitored.
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Principle 5: Graduated sanctions
In order to have graduated sanctions, we require multiple levels of punish-
ment. Firstly, as we have control over the system’s boundaries through access
control, we can implement temporary and permanent banishment as possible
sanctions. Secondly we can revoke certain provision and/or appropriation
rights. Finally, if there exists some form of micro-payment system, we can levy
fines against members. Therefore, given that we have several forms of sanc-
tion which differ in both context and severity, we should be able to implement
graduated sanctions.
Pitt et al. (2012) use a sanction level which increases on each new offence
for that agent. At higher sanction levels a nominated agent (in this case a
role of head assumes this responsibility) is empowered (and may be obliged) to
impose stronger sanctions. This method assumes equal weight to each offence,
though we may define some offences which can cause multiple level increases.
Principle 6: Conflict-resolution mechanisms
In Ostrom’s work this principle was mainly used to deal with conflict due
to ambiguities arising from the way that rules were written. Rules in a com-
putational system (if written correctly) should not have any ambiguities, so
theoretically there should be no need for this principle.
However, as we have collective-choice arrangements, we have a system which
has a rule which says that the rules should be changeable. Suber (1990) hypoth-
esised that such a system will inevitably lead to paradox or gaps in the rule-set.
Given this, the question is whether to give agents recourse to retrospectively
claim for losses due to such issues through conflict-resolution.
In Pitt et al. (2012) Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is used as a fast,
cheap and effective conflict-resolution mechanism. A simple appeals proce-
dure is given, allowing one to appeal sanctions. A more complete specification
of an ADR protocol is given in Pitt (2012). We will simply give an overview of
the semantics of the appeal process, and the method of deciding whether an
appeal is valid and should be upheld. How one argues one’s case is beyond
the scope of this work, but there are several approaches to choose from.
For example, the agent occupying the requisite role (head) is empowered to
sanction another agent if an offence has been reported (see Principle 4), and
this action increases the sanction level against this agent.
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sanction(H, I, A, O) initiates sanction_level(A, I) = S1 at T ←
pow(H, sanction(H, I, A, O)) = true holdsAt T ∧
sanction_level(A, I) = S holdsAt T ∧
S1 = S + 1
pow(H, sanction(H, I, A, O)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of (H, I, head) = true holdsAt T ∧
monitored_offence(A, I) = O holdsAt T
An agent may appeal against its sanction level:
appeal(A, I, S) initiates appealed(A, I, S) = true at T ←
pow(A, appeal(A, I, S)) = true holdsAt T
pow(A, appeal(A, I, S)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of (A, I, _) = true holdsAt T ∧
sanction_level(A, I) = S holdsAt T
The head may then lower the sanction level if the appeal is successful. If the
ADR method for the institution is arbitration, then the head agent, can decide
the outcome of the appeal process itself.
uphold(H, A, I, S) initiates sanction_level(A, I) = S1 at T ←
pow(H, uphold(H, A, I, S)) = true holdsAt T ∧
sanction_level(A, I) = S holdsAt T ∧
S1 = S− 1
pow(H, uphold(H, A, I, S)) = true holdsAt T ←
role_of (H, I, head) = true holdsAt T ∧
appealed(A, I, S) = true holdsAt T ∧
adrMethod(I) = arbitration holdsAt T
An appeal which is upheld could also initiate review and retraction of the
monitored offence (axioms not specified here)7.
Principle 7: Minimal recognition of rights to organise
This principle states that external entities should not interfere with the rule-
making capabilities of the organisation. Heller (1998) wrote that over regula-
tion leads to under-use of a common-pool resource, which he called a ‘Tragedy
7 The sanction, appeal and uphold axioms presented here are largely the same as in Pitt et al. (2012).
They are shown to illustrate the application of this principle.
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of the Anti-commons’. The use of copyright law has the capability of subvert-
ing the internal rules of an information commons.
If users attempt to assert their intellectual property rights in participatory-
sensing applications they could gain more rights than the organisation initially
permitted them with, or gain the power to prevent others performing actions.
For example an analyst may determine that information he generates and pro-
visions is his intellectual property. If an evaluator then wants to appropriate
this information and generate some meta information about it, this could be
seen as a derivative work, and therefore require the permission of the analyst.
Scenarios like this need to be prevented as they stifle productivity (evaluators
will be cautious about what information they appropriate for fear of infringe-
ment) and undermine the authority of the organisation.
Luckily, there has already been significant success in dealing with these is-
sues. Licenses have been used to ensure that certain rights are released when
information is provisioned. In open-source software Copyleft (Stallman, 1999)
is an example which uses copyright law to its advantage to provide additional
benefits in return. The Creative Commons8 licenses simplify the process of in-
ferring what rights one has regarding specific content. Care must be taken to
choose appropriate licenses for the different forms of information and knowl-
edge generated from the sensing application.
In order to protect itself, an institution may require that contributions are
licensed in a particular way:
per(A, provision(A, I, Obj) holdsAt T ←
licenceReq(I) = L holdsAt T ∧
licence(Obj) = L holdsAt T
We can also formalise aspects of some open-source licences. For example:
the right to redistribute; the right to read source code (which we interpret
as an obligation to provision any knowledge which copylefted information is
derived with); and the obligation to provision any derivative works back to the
institution(s) it originated from.
8 http://creativecommons.org
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provision(A, I, Obj) initiates obl(A, provision(A, I, Alg)) at T ←
pow(A, provision(A, I, Obj)) = true holdsAt T ∧
derivedFrom(_, Alg, Obj) = true ∧
licence(Obj) = copyleft holdsAt T ∧
provisioned(_, I, Alg) = false holdsAt T
per(A, provision(A, _, Obj) holdsAt T ←
licence(Obj) = copyleft holdsAt T
provision(A, I2, Obj) initiates obl(A, provision(A, I, Obj)) at T ←
derivedFrom(Source, _, Obj) = true ∧
licence(Source) = copyleft holdsAt T ∧
provisioned(_, I, Source) = true holdsAt T ∧
I 6= I2
Note that the presence of a derivative work can only be detected once it
is provisioned elsewhere. Additionally, what constitutes derivedFrom can be
difficult to pinpoint in many cases (Lessig, 2004).
3.4 evaluation
We now move on to the evaluative aspects of the IAD. We perform this eval-
uation with respect to current participatory sensing applications and our pro-
posed self-organising approach based on Ostrom’s design principles. We first
look at possible outcomes arising from applications, then determine a set of
criteria to evaluate them with.
3.4.1 Outcomes
We have talked in section 2.3 of some current outcomes seen in participatory-
sensing applications, namely enclosure and inequity. This analysis should help
us understand why we see these, but we will also look at other potential out-
comes we may observe from different organisational approaches.
enclosure What we see often in participatory sensing and other applica-
tions based around information collection is the enclosure of the database. The
data collector wants to keep the information to try and derive as much value
from it themselves as possible. This is firstly inefficient; when data is made
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open much more total value is derived than any individual could achieve by
themselves (Shadbolt et al., 2012). Secondly, it deprives the original informa-
tion provider, the user, from their own property.
access The opposite to the negative outcome of enclosure is access. This
has a beneficial effect of having an information and knowledge resource where
there was none before. The benefits of access increase the more open the
information is.
equity Equity and inequity are outcomes based on the fairness of the al-
location of the resource, in terms of information and knowledge availability.
Fairness can be evaluated in several different ways, many of which are subjec-
tive. We can use a more objective measure by assessing whether each user is
compensated according to the value of their input to the system.
pollution The insertion of incorrect information can affect the quality
of the resource. This information could be contributed accidentally, e. g. a
gatherer, whose sensor is faulty, provisioning information, or maliciously, e. g.
doctoring information to gain a competitive edge (Oreskes and Conway, 2010).
The evaluator’s role can be to validate information and guard against pollution,
for example through trust and reputation systems, or redundancy in the infor-
mation gathering process (this approach has been used to combat pollution in
peer-to-peer systems (Kamvar et al., 2003; Costa and Almeida, 2007)).
degradation and depletion These outcomes are caused by either the
removal of information, or insufficient provision of new information. These
relate to the endurance of a system. They will occur either when the system
does not react to changing external or internal conditions, or if the system
evolves into a ‘bad’ state, causing participation to be no longer worthwhile for
some agents. Lack of reactivity to changing conditions is likely to be caused by
a lack of flexibility in the institution, either by not having mechanisms in place
for reacting, or such mechanisms being blocked by entrenched interests or
inappropriate decision-making processes (North, 1990). Similarly ‘bad’ states
can be caused by malicious groups of agents manipulating the institution for
short-term benefit.
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3.4.2 Evaluative Criteria
Finally, to access the efficacy of the organisational structure on the outcomes
of the system we specify a set of evaluative criteria. We evaluate outcomes and
participant’s interactions with measurable values, allowing objective compari-
son of systems and organisations. We take general criteria applied to knowl-
edge commons, as proposed by Ostrom and Hess (2007), describe how we can
measure them, and then discuss the effect we expect our framework will have
on the values of the criteria. These criteria are: increase in knowledge, sus-
tainability and preservation, participation standards, economic efficiency and
equity through fiscal equivalence.
A successful participatory-sensing application should lead us to have in-
creased knowledge, in terms of more information derived from a large pool of
sensor information. However we may also see an improvement in the knowl-
edge being applied to the information by analysts and evaluators. For exam-
ple, for some machine learning problems, better results can be achieved by
combining several algorithms together as an ensemble (Opitz and Maclin, 1999).
Allowing participants to share their knowledge and then allow others to mod-
ify and improve it is an efficient way of increasing knowledge, and one which
could be leveraged in participatory sensing. Therefore the increase in knowl-
edge can be measured as the quantity and quality of information generated by
the application.
Quantity of provision is achieved through high participation standards and
incentivisation. In our survey we saw several methods of incentivising provi-
sion, and our self-organising approach makes several of these methods avail-
able as rules-in-use. Quality is maintained through effective monitoring. We
have discussed how monitoring can be achieved in our system and be respon-
sive to increases in malicious actions using principles four and five. The dif-
ferentiating factor between our proposed framework and other participatory-
sensing applications is the pool of knowledge available in parallel with infor-
mation. This permissive sharing of knowledge, allowing for iterative improve-
ments by many disparate contributors, is an effective method for the increase
of knowledge, as demonstrated by academia, FOSS and Wikipedia.
Sustainability and preservation of the organisation can be measured in terms
of how long the system endures before participation ceases or falls below a
certain threshold (where the system is not longer economically viable). To
achieve sustainability it must be possible to meet the needs of the majority
of participants over the long term, and also to react to changes in conditions.
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For example, combating a rise in malicious actors before the information pool
becomes over-polluted.
Linked to sustainability are participation standards. This relates to the num-
ber of participants in the system (and in each user role), as well as the level
of contribution from each of those participants. Low levels of participation or
asymmetric participation (e. g. appropriating more than one provides) may be
interpreted as free-riding, depending on the system’s rules. Free-riding is a fre-
quent negative behaviour in the commons and is likely to affect participation
standards if not controlled.
Through collective-choice, a self-organising institution should be more sus-
tainable than dictatorial institutions, as each agent is properly enfranchised
and is able to address any issues they have with the current rules. Equally
effective self-organisation should imply good reactivity to changing condi-
tions. However, we must consider the possible implications of inappropriate
collective-choice procedures which can cause deadlocks. Voting mechanisms
can be manipulated, or unrealistic win criteria may be required for the passing
of motions (Conitzer et al., 2007; Pitt et al., 2011b). In social systems we can
identify these issues and attempt to work around them, but in computational
systems collective choice will simply grind to a halt, unless we explicitly build
in procedures to deal with this.
Participation standards can be maintained through both enfranchisement
and incentivisation. Participatory sensing also has a promotional aspect to
it, which helps to gain and maintain participation. For example, OpenSignal
largely relies on media publicity to attract users. This is an aspect where
open access to information helps. Users are more likely to engage with an
organisation if they initially get something for free. This gives them an idea
of the product and its value, and may then lead to a more active role in the
institution. Both Wikipedia and FOSS projects work based on this concept,
however they only need a very small proportion of appropriators to provision
to the knowledge pool.
It is also possible to measure the economic efficiency of a participatory-
sensing application. We can count the utility generated by the consumers
through the use of information appropriated and compare this to the total cost
of maintaining the resource. This cost contains facility costs and the individual
costs incurred by participants in information gathering and processing.
If we compare centralised with self-organising approaches according to this
metric, it is difficult to determine which will perform better. A self-organising
institution requires additional facilities for the execution of the governance
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layer of the application. Our position is however, that a self-organising insti-
tution will be able to generate more value under the same conditions, due to
the outcomes we have discussed, than a dictatorial one. In order to be more
efficient overall, this increase in generated value must outweigh the additional
operating costs.
Finally, we can assess equity through fiscal equivalence. This is a measure
of the ratio of effort put in, versus benefit extracted from a system. An ob-
servation from other knowledge commons is that consumers often benefit for
little or no effort (e. g. Wikipedia, open-access publishing, FOSS). However
this benefit is not at a cost to the knowledge providers—in these examples
consumption by others usually benefits the providers, helping them achieve
fiscal equivalence—but is a form of redistributional equity. In participatory
sensing there is not such a strong benefit to information providers from its
consumption so we focus more on fiscal equivalence and equality.
Together, these criteria offer a way of measuring the quality of the outcomes
of a knowledge commons. Later, we will derive metrics from these criteria for
our model of participatory sensing.
3.5 supply of a participatory sensing commons
The final question we must answer is how we can enable the supply of an in-
stitution as we have described for participatory sensing. Our requirements are
a platform which can be easily deployed and is capable of providing a techni-
cal means to administer the rules-in-use needed to satisfy Ostrom’s principles,
and therefore create a sustainable institution around the participatory sensing
application. We review the suitability of existing platforms for use with our
framework, and advocate one which we believe fits our criteria best.
There exist several platforms specifically for the deployment of participa-
tory sensing. CarTel (Hull et al., 2006) is a centralised system designed to
accommodate heterogeneous sensor data and provides a web-based portal for
data access. SenseWeb (Kansal et al., 2007) provides a shared resource for
concurrent sensing applications with a centralised coordinator directing infor-
mation acquisition and aggregation. It enables users demanding information
to provide incentives for those who are able to provide it. Global Sensor Net-
work (GSN) (Aberer et al., 2006) is a peer-to-peer network of sensor nodes
which can advertise and respond to queries for data streams across the net-
work. G-Sense (Perez et al., 2010) is a platform which uses a hybrid archi-
tecture to achieve scalability, using local centralised hubs which collaborate
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with a global peer-to-peer network. Demirbas et al. (2010) leverage Twitter as
infrastructure for information provision using encoded tweets.
In general, similar to what we found in our review in section 2.3, these
platforms are dealing with a particular technical challenge of participatory
sensing. Therefore, these platforms do not specify how rules for membership,
provision and appropriation quantities, monitoring and accountability can be
implemented. In peer-to-peer platforms such as GSN, individuals may be able
to control access to their own data by selectively honouring requests, however
there is no governance over-sight to keep consistency and fairness. The use of
Twitter as an independent third party infrastructure provider provides a more
transparent operation, but sacrifices all control over access to the resource.
Open Mustard Seed (OMS) (Hardjono et al., 2014a,b) is an open-source project
which aims to give users control over their data in the cloud through a tech-
nical architecture based on trust and the formation of self-organising groups.
A key feature is a rule engine governing access to data on a per-user basis
and explicit recognition of governance as a key factor in the system. Such a
platform could enable the formation of institutions for participatory sensing
with transparency over information access and use, but also with overrides for
users. The OMS architecture is peer-to-peer, enabling sharing of facility costs
by design, and offering scalability and data privacy.
The OMS platform therefore provides the capabilities needed to deploy an in-
stitution for participatory sensing, with an appropriate technical infrastructure
for decentralisation of stored artifacts and providing individuals with control
over their information and its use. However, before we can effectively supply
an institution with this platform, we require a more empirical understanding
of the effect of the rules-in-use we have discussed in a participatory-sensing
context.
3.6 summary
In this chapter we have firstly described a framework for participatory sensing
as a provision and appropriation system. We then gave a detailed analysis,
using the IAD, of this system to determine how it can be managed according as
a knowledge commons, according to Ostrom’s design principles. We adapted
the axiomatisation of these principles, by Pitt et al. (2012), to be suitable for pro-
vision and appropriation in the knowledge commons. We then evaluated what
kind of outcomes we can expect from such a commons in participatory sens-
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ing. Finally, we discussed how these electronic institutions may be deployed
for participatory-sensing applications.
Our formalisation of institutional rules, specified in EC, represents the formal
characterisation phase of the Sociologically-Inspired Computing (SIC) method-
ology. Our evaluation thus far has only been hypothetical. In order to produce
an objective evaluation we must create a computer model within which we can
test these rules. The next two chapters address the technical challenge of this
process.
4
P R I N C I P L E D O P E R AT I O N A L I S AT I O N U S I N G P R E S A G E 2
Before we can test our hypothesis about a participatory-sensing knowedgecommons we require a suitable tool for principled operationalised.This is the process of transforming a symbolic or formal representation
of a system (often written in some kind of calculus) into a computer model
of the system in question (Jones et al., 2013). This process varies greatly in
difficulty depending on the complexity of the system to be modelled and the
requirements of the computer model. Models can range from small Prolog pro-
grams (Pitt et al., 2006) to significant software engineering undertakings (Timm
and Pawlaszczyk, 2005).
Agent-based modelling (ABM) and Multi-agent based simulation (MABS) are
approaches to modelling and simulating complex systems as multi-agent sys-
tems (Macal and North, 2010; Moss and Davidsson, 2001). This is a form of
micro-simulation, where by modelling low-level interactions from the ‘ground
up’ we can observe macro level behaviours such as self-organisation, self-
adaptation and so on. Simulation models are therefore composed of an en-
vironment or arena which models the behaviour of a physical or virtual world,
and autonomous, intelligent ‘agents’ who interact with this world and other
agents. Axelrod (1997) identifies the usefulness of MABS as a means to under-
stand social systems. This approach fits naturally to the principled operational-
isation phase of the Sociologically-Inspired Computing (SIC) methodology, as
we are observing desirable macro-level performance in social systems (which
are multi-agent in nature), and aiming to reproduce this performance in a
socio-technical system.
It should be noted that neither principled operationalisation, ABM nor MABS
aim to create an exact model of a social or socio-technical system, particularly
in regards to human behaviour. Both the SIC methodology and MABS methods
stress the appropriate use of abstraction and/or compartmentalisation in order
to simplify the model while being able to draw valid conclusions from the
model’s behaviour (Edmonds, 2000).
Work in ABM and MABS has led to creation of many software packages and
platforms to ease the development of simulation testbeds (Nikolai and Madey,
2009). These aim to reduce the engineering effort required to implement agent
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models, providing reusable components, user-interface based design and/or
prescriptive frameworks. In particular, they aim to ensure simulation validity
while maintaining usability and extendibility (Axelrod, 1997).
In this chapter we aim to determine a suitable platform for principled op-
erationalisation for the simulation of a Knowledge Commons. We derive a
set of requirements for a general-purpose software platform for simulation of
socio-technical systems, which is suitable for this principled operationalisation.
We then review a selection of existing platforms with respect to these require-
ments, concluding that building upon our existing Presage platform (Neville
and Pitt, 2008) best meets our needs. Finally we present the result of this work,
Presage2 (Macbeth et al., 2014).
4.1 multi-agent systems and intelligent agents
The term Multi-agent system (MAS) is a broad term encompassing an array
of different concepts and applications. While the meaning of the term can
be decomposed to be a system of multiple agents, the definition of an agent
remains to be settled (Wooldridge, 2002). There is some consensus that, firstly
agents are computer systems situated in an environment, and that they are
autonomous. Other important features of agency are given as (Wooldridge
and Jennings, 1995; Hayes-Roth, 1995):
• reactivity—agents perceive their environment, including other agents, and
react to changes in it.
• proactivity—agents are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour.
• communication—agents can have some kind of social capacity to interact
with other agents.
Thus the requirements for agency are tied to both the capabilities of sys-
tem, and the way in which it makes decisions (in contrast to agency in social
sciences which only requires autonomy). These requirements act as a way of
excluding basic systems, such that not all systems and programs would be
classified as agents (Franklin and Graesser, 1996).
When in an environment, an agent reads the state of the environment via
sensors, and performs actions to change the state of the environment. In most
cases the control that the agent can exert on the environment will only be
partial, in that it can influence the state of the environment. The effect of an
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action may not be deterministic, or it may not have any affect at all, depending
on the properties of the environment (Wooldridge, 2002).
The properties of an environment can be classified according to several rele-
vant criteria (Russell and Norvig, 2003, p.46):
• Accessible—If an agent can perceive the complete environment state via
its sensors, then the environment is accessible to this agent.
• Deterministic—If the next state of the environment is determined purely
from the current state and actions of agents, then it is deterministic.
• Episodic—In an episodic environment the quality of actions do not de-
pend on previous actions.
• Static or dynamic—If the environment can change while an agent is de-
ciding on an action then the environment is dynamic for the agent; oth-
erwise it is static.
• Discrete or continuous—If the set of possible environment states is finite,
then the environment is discrete; otherwise it is continuous.
Wooldridge (2002, pp.31–32) provides a formalisation of an abstract MAS.
This defines a run of an agent in an environment as a sequence of interleaved
environment states and actions, representing the history for that agent; a state
transformer function which defines the effect that agents actions have on the
environment state; and an agent function which maps a run for an agent to an
action, representing an agent’s decision process.
4.2 review of software platforms for agent-based simulation
There are many software tools and platforms available for the simulation of
agent societies: A comprehensive survey by Nikolai and Madey (2009) includes
53 different toolkits. In this section we discuss the state of the art of MABS
toolkits and software platforms.
The afore-mentioned survey by Nikolai and Madey (2009) is an exhaustive
survey of platforms documenting programming languages, software licenses,
targeted research domains, presence of tutorials and support, and more for
each platform. There are several other more focused reviews of simulation plat-
forms: Railsback et al. (2006) describes and compares the implementation of
several models of gradually increasing complexity on four platforms: Netlogo,
MASON, Repast and Swarm. Castle and Crooks (2006) reviews six platforms
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(Swarm, MASON, Repast, Starlogo, Netlogo and OBEUS) with a particular
focus on geospatial simulations. Tobias and Hofmann (2004) compares four
platforms for ‘social-scientific’ agent-based simulation (Repast, Swarm, Quick-
silver and VSEit).
There are several reasons for using specific software tools for ABM and MABS,
rather than bespoke software:
• Tools for non-programmers—The inter-disciplinary nature of ABM means
than for many researchers software development is a major obstacle in
adopting MABS. Platforms can simplify model and agent implementation
and hide complex implementation details, allowing more researchers to
be able to understand and implement models without software engineer-
ing skills.
• Rapid-prototyping—The use of a platform precludes the need for work
implementing and testing simulation control code when writing a soft-
ware model. This time can be used for model implementation from the
start, thus allowing researchers to very quickly of from ideas to working
prototypes running in a simulation.
• Code re-use—An established platform providing a uniform base for the
implementation of models and agent algorithm should allow for the port-
ing of these implementations to other models and simulations. This en-
ables collaboration as ideas can easily be adopted and compared without
having to rewrite code.
• High performance simulations—Optimisation of simulations is a research
area in its own right. Thus it is unrealistic to expect modellers to be
able to write their own simulation software and optimise it. The use
of simulation platforms allows users to benefit from faster simulation
performance.
• Validation and verification—Software engineering is an error prone activ-
ity. Using a known and peer-reviewed simulation platform affords some
level of trust that this component should work correctly and not intro-
duce false results.
In this section we firstly derive a set of requirements and comparative criteria
for agent-based simulation platforms. Using this we review a set of candidate
platforms for principled operationalisation.
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4.2.1 Requirements and Comparative Criteria
We derive a set of review criteria based on a selection of relevant criteria from
the previous reviews.
From Nikolai and Madey (2009) we take generial criteria which affect plat-
form uptake, usability and verifiability:
• Programming Language—The programming language required to use a
platform has an affect on user uptake, quality of available development
tools, code readability and succinctness, and ease of debugging (Rails-
back et al., 2006). Use of custom programming languages may appear
to limit the possible models which can be implemented on the platform,
while general-purpose languages such as Java have known capabilities.
These languages also come with a rich array of development suites to
choose from to ease the development process.
• Software License—Open source licenses are preferable as they allow the
platform’s code to be scrutinised, allowing both users and reviewers to
verify that simulation output will be correct (Polhill and Edmonds, 2007).
Castle and Crooks (2006) identify criteria for ease-of-use:
• Required programming experience—Expertise needed in general pro-
gramming and/or the language of the platform in order to correctly use
the software.
• Integrated charting/graphing/statistics—Whether graphical tools for data
analysis during and after simulation are provided.
• Tutorials/Documentation available—Presence of tutorials and documen-
tation to allow one to train oneself to use the platform correctly and
proficiently.
Tobias and Hofmann (2004) provide several useful general criteria and crite-
ria specific for the modelling requirements of socio-technical systems:
• Support for modelling—Graphical User Interface (GUI) or other tools for
reducing programming work and visualising output.
• Support for experimentation—Tools for generation of simulations and
data recording.
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• Large number of complex agents—The ability of the platform to effi-
ciently run complex agents with intensive reasoning.
• Inter-agent communication—The possibility of sending messages between
agents, and for communication network topologies to be simulated.
• Generating agent populations—Automatic generation of agent popula-
tions from input parameters or data.
• Generating networks—Automatic generation of networks based on vari-
ous characteristics.
• Management of spatial arrangements—Ability to simulate situated agents
(i. e. agents who are spatially located in an environment).
• Dynamically changing model structure—Whether the model can be changed
during simulation execution.
We also add a final criterion specific to the principled operationalisation
process:
• Rule engine—Executable specifications (Artikis and Sergot, 2010) are for-
mal characterisations where the calculus can be directly run as a com-
puter model. These characterisations are declarative in nature, thus with
a rule engine we can improve the speed and accuracy of principled oper-
ationalisation by directly integrating them into the simulation.
4.2.2 Reviewed Platforms
We will now review four software platforms with respect to the criteria we
identified. These platforms are:
• Netlogo (Wilensky, 1999)—This is a GUI-driven modelling environment
for simulating natural and social phenomena, aimed at ease of use for
non-programmers. It uses a custom programming language for the spec-
ification of the environment and agent behaviours.
• Repast (North et al., 2013)—This is a familty of platforms created at the
University of Chicago, originally based on the SWARM platform (Minar
et al., 1996). For this review we will look at their Java-based platform,
Repast Simphony, which has superseded their other tools.
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Table 7: Evaluation of simulation platforms according to review criteria
Criterion Netlogo Repast Mason Presage
Programming Language Netlogo Java Java Java
Software License Closed
source
BSDa AFLb Closed
source
Required programming ex-
perience
Basic Strong Strong Strong
Integrated graphics Yes Yes None Some
Tutorials / Documentation Yes Yes Yes No
a Berkeley Software Distribution licence: A permissive free software licence. Not compatible with
the GNU General Public License (GPL)
b Academic Free License: A permissive free software licence. Not compatible with the GPL
• MASON (Luke et al., 2005)—This is a newer, discrete event, platform
developed at George Mason University written in Java, and focusing on
simulation execution speed.
• Presage (Neville and Pitt, 2008)—This platform is a recent development,
and therefore does not appear in reviews. It was developed specifically
for simulation of social networks and dynamics but has found use in an
array of other MABS applications (Pitt et al., 2011a; Carr et al., 2010) and
features a strong animation and visualisation component.
Table 7 shows the platforms rated according to the criteria we selected from
Nikolai and Madey (2009) and Castle and Crooks (2006). We will now discuss
the remaining criteria:
Support for modelling
This is the extent to which the platform speeds up common modelling tasks,
for example by providing simple GUI-based design and/or simple visualisation
tools.
Being primarily GUI-based, and including environment and graphing visu-
alisation as standard, Netlogo performs well in this criterion. Similarly Repast
has some GUI tools, but still requires the majority of functionality to be im-
plemented in code. The remaining platforms do provide helper classes for
common tasks, but these still require implementation with code.
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Support for experimentation
This is how well the platform supports experimentation over multiple simu-
lations to test parameter spaces. All platforms support parameterisation of
simulation runs, however MASON and Presage lack the ability to automati-
cally generate experiments consisting of a series of simulation runs.
Large number of complex agents
None of the platforms impose a hard constraint on the number of agents in
a simulation, though depending on the efficiency of the software, practical
limits will be reached when either computational resources are exhausted, or
the simulation takes too long to run.
Netlogo’s simulation times have been shown to scale more with the size of
the environment state to be modelled, while Repast and MASON scales with
the number of agents (Railsback et al., 2006). However the agent models tested
were fairly basic. More complex agent architectures are likely to be impos-
sible in Netlogo. MASON is designed with the intention of accommodating
complex agents by being fast and lightweight. Similarly Presage has been
demonstrated simulating complex agents (Pitt et al., 2011a).
All but one of the platforms run their main simulation in a single thread.
Repast uses a multi-threaded discrete-event scheduler to run some events
in parallel, however this performance boost is only available to certain back-
ground tasks, and not appropriate for agent execution. MASON also allows
for some parallelisation within a simulation step, which the users must add
themselves. Thus these simulators have limited capabilities to exploit modern,
multi-core processors.
There are, however, more options for scaling simulations to distributed ar-
chitectures. The Repast developers also distribute a C++ platform for High
Performance Computing (HPC) clusters (Collier and North, 2013), but this is
separate from the Java platform. There have also been several attempts to pro-
vide an automatic scaling of normal Repast models to HPC clusters (Minson
and Theodoropoulos, 2008; Cicirelli et al., 2011). However, this work has yet to
lead to the availability of easy scaling of models for these platforms, generally
imposing some model limitations and requiring additional programming care
in order to achieve a distributed simulation.
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Inter-agent communication
Repast supports basic exchange of data between agents. Presage supports
more explicit message passing between agents. Netlogo and MASON do not
support communication between agents, however some kind of data exchange
could be implemented through modification of shared state values.
Generating agent populations
All platforms support generation of agents from data and parameters.
Generating networks
Presage is able to simulate several types of dynamic network connecting agents,
and these can be based on several agent characteristics (such as communication
range). Similarly Repast is able to generate multiple network types. MASON
and Netlogo do not explicitly support networks.
Management of spatial arrangements
Repast, MASON and Presage support multiple spatial representations for the
environment. Netlogo only has a grid representation.
Dynamically change model structure
Repast and Netlogo allow for changes to agents and models during simulation
execution. Presage and MASON do not (beyond what can be done with a Java
debugger).
Rule Engine
None of the platforms feature declarative rule-engines as core features, how-
ever there have been some successes in integrating rule-engines with Repast (Lotz-
mann and Meyer, 2011).
4.2.3 Summary
From this review we see that the platforms considered here differ little in
terms of features. The platforms all follow a similar pattern of ‘framework and
library’ (Railsback et al., 2006), in which a framework for designing an ABM is
proposed and the platform is an implementation of this framework. Netlogo
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differs from the other platforms in its attempt to make model implementa-
tion simple for non-programmers, while trying to remain powerful enough for
complex use-cases. The others require knowledge of Java in order to use.
Repast performs the best over the evaluated criteria, however its lack of ex-
plicit agent communication is problematic when dealing with complex, social
agents. MASON provides a more stripped down alternative, which is fast, but
requires that most advanced functionality be written from scratch. Being the
least mature of the reviewed platforms, Presage lacks in some areas, particular
documentation and user-friendliness. Its origins in the simulation of social net-
works shows in its competence in agent communication—an important aspect
of socio-technical systems.
A major drawback, which all but Presage suffer from, is their permissive
handling of state. These platforms treat shared state as a public resource, al-
lowing reads and writes from all agents, with no limited accessibility. While
it is a reasonable assumption in most modelling scenarios that agents will use
this access correctly, there are problems from both modelling and verification
perspectives. We believe that, when modelling, it is preferable to separate the
agent logic from the logic updating environment state: The agent logic de-
cides what action to take, and the environment decides the outcome of that
action. The architectures of Netlogo, Repast and MASON put these two pro-
cesses together, such that in order to take an action the agent must update
the environment itself. Presage uses separate action handlers which process
actions from agents in a uniform and consistent way. This ensures that the en-
vironment is the same for all agents, that agents are portable between different
environments, that agents can be unknowledgeable about the consequences of
actions they perform, and that faulty agent code won’t break a simulation.
However, Presage also has shortcomings tied to the way it was developed. It
implementation limits its flexibility, and prevents us from exploiting advances
in software development best practices. It is for this reason that we decide
to build on the framework of Presage and address its shortcomings in a new
version, Presage2. We describe the design and implementation of this platform
in the next section.
4.3 presage2 platform
In the previous section we outlined the need for a simulation platform for prin-
cipled operationalisation, and, through a review of existing platforms, identi-
fied that the Presage framework was best suited to the task. In this section
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we, firstly, describe the framework of Presage2, an evolution of the original
Presage, secondly, describe its implementation as a Java library, and, finally,
evaluate it with respect to the criteria in the previous section. We describe the
software largely on a conceptual level, in order to justify our self-evaluation of
its features. A low-level description of software structures and algorithms is
outside of the scope of this presentation.
4.3.1 Framework Description
The Presage2 framework is a result of an iterative improvement to that of the
original Presage framework (Neville and Pitt, 2008). We take several of the
most useful concepts and features from Presage, and build our new framework
from that base, namely:
• A simulation platform as a black box, with simulation parameters and
specification of agents and environmental processes as input, and results
as the output.
• A time-driven mode of execution.
• A layer of separation between agents and environment state, preventing
direct modification of the latter by the former.
At its core, our framework uses a discrete-time driven simulation loop. This
is similar to the discrete-event models used in platforms such as MASON
and Repast, except that every agent is given the opportunity to submit ac-
tions at each discrete time-step. This method establishes a minimum unit of
time within the simulation which is equal for all agents. The drawback of a
discrete-time approach is that the simulation cannot optimise periods when
agents want to wait several time-steps with no action, which is possible with
discrete-event simulators. However, in practice, this performance hit is negli-
gible as, firstly, most agents have reactive components which require constant
monitoring of the environment state, and secondly, a waiting agent can simply
return immediately when queried for actions by the simulator, wasting very
few resources. The advantage of time-driven over event-driven simulation is
that the former is simpler to parallelise (Ferscha, 1995).
Beyond the discrete-time driven constraint, the framework does not spec-
ify how agents should be implemented, or what architecture they should use.
There are many possible architectures which can be used for agents to define
their agent function (Rao and Georgeff, 1995; Kakas et al., 2004). The platform
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simply queries for the result of this function each time-step. To support op-
erating at multiple levels of granularity, and to handle cases when agents are
able to perform multiple actions at once (for example a communicative action
could be performed at the same time as a physical action), we allow multiple
actions per agent per time-step.
The state of the environment and observable state of agents (i. e.state which
can be perceived by other agents), collectively referred to as shared state, is
updated each time-step by a function we call a state transformer function. This
takes the current state and set of agent’s actions as input, and creates the
next state. This state change may be non-deterministic with the addition of
randomness. State changes may also be applied independently of an action.
Note, however that the state change is transactional—all changes for one time-
step are applied atomically. This makes the environment static for agents, and
means that the result of an action is not observable until the following time-
step. Furthermore, it allows for deterministic state transitions, even when the
execution order of agents cannot be guaranteed.
While the shared state of the simulation can be made entirely accessible to
agents, in most practical systems agents will not have full observability or
omniscience. Each agent instead has a partial view into the shared state. This
may be simply a subset thereof, or it could provide modified values to simulate
lossy or faulty sensors. Thus we can model arbitrary levels of accessibility for
each agent in the simulation.
This state model implicitly enables inter-agent communication of arbitrary
data between agents. A message action can simply create a state value which
is only accessible to the intended receiver agent. This action may also fail ran-
domly, if the agents are physically situated too far from each other, or due
to any other deterministic or non-deterministic factors relating to the envi-
ronment state. Therefore, we can model agent communication networks of
arbitrary complexity.
With the described framework we can formalise a modelled system as a four
tuple:
Mt = 〈A, e, τ, φ〉t
Where e is the environment state, A is the set of agents, τ is the state trans-
former function and φ is the state observability function. Each agent a ∈ A
has internal state sa,t ∪ s′a,t, where sa,t is public and s′a,t is private, and an agent
function fa. This function maps the agent’s state and his observation of the
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environment and agents’ public states (calculated with the state observability
function φ) to a private state for the next time-step, s′a,t+1, and a set of actions
Ha,t:
fa : s′a,t × φ(a, et, SAt )→ Ha,t × s′a,t+1
SAt :=
⋃
a∈At
sa,t
The state transformer function τ defines how the set of all agents’ actions Ht
for a time-step map the current environment and agents’ states to new values
for the next timestep:
τ : Ht × et × SAt → et+1 × SAt+1
Ht :=
⋃
a∈At
Ha,t
In his abstract architecture for intelligent agents, Wooldridge (2002) defines
a run for an agent as a sequence of interleaved environment states and actions.
Here we can do the same, but expressing that in our framework the state is a
view of the system’s shared state, and that an agent may have a set of multiple
actions between consecutive states:
φ(a, e0, SA0 )
Ha,0−−→ φ(a, e1, SA1 )
Ha,1−−→ . . . Ha,u−1−−−→ φ(a, eu, SAu )
Additionally, we can express a simulation in this way, as interleaved shared
states and sets of actions:
(e0, SA0 )
H0−→ (e1, SA1 ) H1−→ . . .
Hu−1−−→ (eu, SAu )
4.3.2 Software Design and Implementation
This framework purely specifies what can be implemented, and how state
should be controlled. There are many other criteria for a platform beyond this,
as we outlined previously. In this section we describe how this framework is
transformed into a platform architecture and an implementation in Java. The
Presage2 platform is a complete rewrite of the original Presage platform, al-
though in some cases we reuse class names from Presage for consistency of
terminology.
Our framework states that a simulation consists of four components: a set
of agents, an environment state, a state transformer function, and a state ob-
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servability function. In order to support modularity and component reuse
in the platform we decompose the monolithic functions to provide units of
functionality. The state observability function is split into a set of functions,
named environment services providing high level access to shared state, while
also defining observability. The state transformer function consists of two sets
of functions: firstly a set of action handlers which define state changes for spe-
cific actions, and secondly, a set of environment functions which define general
state changes, for example for persistent effects on agents (e. g. momentum or
current), or periodic (either random or triggered) events. As we do not con-
strain the agent architecture, the agent function is not decomposed. Through
specification of these sets of components one can define arbitrarily complex en-
vironments. Furthermore, components can be bundled together into ‘modules’
which provide specific functionality.
The state of the environment, and public state of agents (shared state) is man-
aged by a state engine. This acts as a low-level state-data store which other
components use to access state values and commit state changes. It provides a
read-only interface to fetch data as well as an interface to specify what changes
should be made to the state at the end of the time-step. The aggregated state
changes are then all executed in a single transaction. Thus it is impossible for
agents to read a future state of the system.
As we have stated, environment services provide high-level access to the en-
vironment state. By this, we mean the service can provide a more rich repre-
sentation of the raw state data. This could be, for example, searching the state
of neighbouring cells in an environment and returning a list of nearby agents.
The service can also simulate partial observability of the state by returning
limited or modified results from these queries.
Conceptually, these environment services simulate the behaviour of a percep-
tion device for an agent. In a real-world scenario an agent would have some
interface for perceiving the state of the environment. By using this abstraction
we aim to enable the writing of agents that are not tied too closely to the sim-
ulation platform, and whose simulated perception can be replaced with real
perception for rapid transition from simulation to deployment.
Figure 6 shows the interactions between environment service, action handler
and state engine for an example scenario. When an agent is invoked by the
simulation scheduler it can retrieve its state (in this case a location) via an
environment service. This service, in turn, queries the state values from the
state engine and returns them to the agent. Using this information the agent
chooses to do a ‘move’ action, submitting it via its environment connector (a
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Figure 6: UML Sequence diagram of interactions with shared state in Presage2
simple interface used to perform actions). This connector then chooses an
action handler for this action, and a state change is submitted to the state
engine. Note the state is not actually changed until the engine is instructed to
commit changes at the end of the time-step.
An example of how this would be implemented in an agent is shown in
Listing 1. The AbstractParticipant base class provides a useful base for the
implementation of agents in Presage2. For example, fields in the agent class
of type State provide a dynamic binding to an agent’s state, via the appro-
priate environment service, and the act function submits agent actions to the
environment. The @Step annotation designates which function(s) in the class
are agent functions. In this case, the agent function reads the agent’s current
location, then constructs a move action to a target location and submits it to
the environment.
If there is more than one agent function specified for an agent they will
be all executed in parallel. Java’s concurrency features can be used to ensure
serial execution, if required, using the synchronized keyword on each func-
tion. Function execution order may be controlled by specifying precedence
arguments in the @Step annotation.
The final component required to implement the Presage2 framework is a
simulation loop to execute these functions correctly. The use of an immutable
shared state during a time-step simplifies this process, as state cannot be cor-
rupted by out-of-order operations. As we show in Figure 6, environment ser-
vices are triggered by requests from agents, and similarly, action handlers are
triggered by actions. Therefore at the top level the simulation scheduler sim-
4.3 presage2 platform 82
Listing 1: Presage2 agent implementation
class Agent extends AbstractParticipant {
public State<Location> location;
Agent(String name, Location initial) {
super(name);
this.location = new State<Location>(" location ", initial);
}
@Step
public void step(int t) {
Location loc = location.get();
// calculate move to get to target from current
Move m = getMove(loc, target);
this.act(m);
}
} 
ply must invoke all agent and environment functions. Once these tasks have
completed the state change is committed.
This process is parallelised on multi-core processors by running agent and
environment functions in parallel using a thread pool. This is a pool of threads
available to which tasks can be submitted. The pool manages the allocation of
tasks across the threads in the pool to optimise resource utilisation1. This
enables multi-threaded simulation which is transparent to the model imple-
menter.
Listing 2 shows this simulation loop. Note object types and function names
have been simplified for illustrative purposes. The threadpool object here
extracts and executes step functions from objects submitted to it.
The platform as a whole consists of several components, as shown in Fig-
ure 7. We have already described the state engine, and the simulation loop
which is part of the core simulator. We will now introduce the remaining
components which bring an array of different features to the platform.
4.3.3 Simulation initialisation
With the state engine and simulation loop we have the base components to run
a simulation, however for this to work we need to initialise all the components
required for the simulation. Firstly, we must create all the required objects for
1 We use the ThreadPoolExecutor implementation provided in the Java libraries.
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Listing 2: Presage2 multi-threaded simulation loop
do {
for(Agent a : agents) {
threadpool.submit(a);
}
for(Function f : environmentFunctions) {
threadpool.submit(f);
}
threadpool.waitUntilComplete();
stateEngine.commit();
} while(checkFinishCondition() == false); 
Simulator Experimentation tools
Libraries
State Engine
Environment Agents Network
Database
Batch 
executor
Rule Engine
Presage2 
Architecture 
Core
Figure 7: Presage2 architectural block diagram
the environment: action handlers, environment functions and environment
services; secondly, we must create agents and link them to the environment
and environment services; and finally, we must create an initial shared state of
the environment and agents. This process should be parameterised, as in order
to perform experiments, we require that the initial state can be controlled.
The construction of complex objects, with multiple dependencies, in lan-
guages such as Java is often a verbose and tedious process, often referred to
as ‘boilerplate’ due to it requiring large quantities of code for little function-
ality. In order to avoid needing such ‘boilerplate’ we utilise a practice called
dependency injection (Vanbrabant, 2008). With this method object dependen-
cies are resolved at runtime, and the object tree is automatically constructed
according to bindings specified by the user, with the correct dependencies in-
jected into each constructor. This allows us to specify an environment with a
4.3 presage2 platform 84
Listing 3: Specification of a simulation and parameters in Presage2
public class MySimulation extends RunnableSimulation {
@Parameter
public int size;
@Parameter(optional=true)
public int agents = 1;
public void initialiseScenario(Scenario scenario) {
addModule(Area.Bind.area2D(size, size));
addModule(new AbstractEnvironmentModule()
.addActionHandler(MoveHandler.class)
.addParticipantEnvironmentService(ParticipantLocationService.
class));
for (int i = 0; i < agents; i++) {
scenario.addAgent(new Agent(...));
}
}
} 
series of bindings which define which action handlers, services etc. to load into
the simulation. The dependencies for each of these will also be automatically
loaded.
Thus, an environment can be defined by declaring the set of classes which
will be action handlers, environment functions and environment services. This
can be done at runtime, and so be responsive to parameter changes. Simulation
parameters are also bound, enabling them to be injected at any point they are
needed. Listing 3 shows an example simulation specification in Presage2. The
bind and agents parameters are defined via java annotations, and modules are
used to define the environment and add agents to it.
The Presage2 platform allows for a simulation to specify a series of simula-
tion parameters. These are named variables which should be specified when
executing a simulation, and can take on any valid number, Boolean, string, or
enumerated type value. These variables can be then used by the model im-
plementer to control the creation of initial agents and state. Agents are then
connected to the environment, through which they can attempt to load envi-
ronment services they require and perform actions.
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4.3.4 Module Library
The intention of the software architecture we have chosen for the environment
is to enable a modular approach to environment modelling. These modules
compartmentalise particular functionalities such that they can be plugged into
any environment without conflict with other modules. In addition, modules
can build on top of other modules, providing high level abstractions. As a
proof of this design concept, and to provide the groundwork for a comprehen-
sive set of modules for common modelling tasks, we have implemented several
environment modules, which we present here.
Situated Agents
A commonly used concept in ABM is that of agents that are situated within
a physical environment. This is used in the modelling of scenarios where
agents must use their physical mobility to complete tasks and achieve goals.
We provide a module for this functionality.
The module provides environment services and an action handler for the
following:
• Specifying a configurable area in which agents can move. This area may
be continuous (any real number coordinate is valid within the area), or
cellular (agents may only occupy discrete cells). The area can also have
each edge configured with a distinct behaviour for when an agent at-
tempts to move beyond it, including stopping at the edge, wrapping
around to the other side of the area, or simply throwing an exception.
An environment service is provided for querying information about the
area.
• A location state which may be associated with an agent. This expresses
the agent’s current location within the environment area.
• An environment service for agents to query for their location and that of
nearby agents. The results of the latter query may be limited if the agent
has state to indicate a limited perception range.
• An action handler to process move actions from agents and update their
location accordingly.
• Helper functions for agents to determine correct actions to move towards
a target location and/or at certain speeds.
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This implementation covers the majority of use-cases for situated agents.
Inter-agent communication
We expressed the need for inter-agent communication in subsection 4.2.1. We
implement a module which provides communication between agents via mes-
sage actions. This module allows configuration of constraints which allow
the simulation of different dynamic network topologies. Arbitrarily complex
topologies can be simulated, but typical configurations would be fully con-
nected, peer-to-peer and mobile ad-hoc networks.
The network simulation is achieved by three entities:
• The sending agent’s interface to the network—this takes the set of mes-
sages it wishes to send and determines how to send them. For example in
an ad-hoc network the user may wish to forward messages via a specific
forwarding algorithm.
• The message action handler—this takes messages which each agent wish-
ed to send and determines whether to send them based on a set of con-
straints. These reflect environmental constraints on messaging such as
wireless range and/or random message loss.
• The receiving agent’s network interface—this takes messages delivered
from the global controller and decides what to do with them. This device
may be forwarding messages in an ad-hoc network, dropping messages
if it can’t afford to forward them, or making messages intended for itself
available to the underlying agent.
This architecture allows for flexible network simulations and topology con-
straints can be pushed to the appropriate level. For example if the user wants
to simulate an ad-hoc network but without having to write a specific forward-
ing algorithm we can create a constraint in the global controller to simulate
how optimal forwarding would perform. Rather than constraining messag-
ing to physically connected agents (i. e. within direct communication range),
this constraint would generate a network topology, and allow messages to be
directly delivered to logically connected agents.
On top of this low level messaging we have built support for defining mes-
saging protocols as finite state machines. The user can specify states and tran-
sitions, where moving to a state triggers a custom action for the agent, and
transitions are governed by composite rules triggered by the arrival of mes-
sages. This framework allows complex protocols to be defined and simplifies
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the often complex task of managing multiple conversations with large num-
bers of agents simultaneously.
Social Capital
Petruzzi et al. (2014) have developed a framework for social capital in agent-
based systems, based on the model of social capital proposed by Ostrom and
Ahn (2003). This framework, shown in Figure 8, is implemented for Presage2
as an agent module, allowing agents using it to reason about social capital.
Figure 8: Social Capital Module (Petruzzi et al., 2014)
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4.3.5 Rule Engine
Rule- and logic-based specifications are a popular tool in artificial intelligence.
Equally, these tools can be used to formally specify complex human decision
processes (Pitt et al., 2006), and logic-based calculi such as the Event Calcu-
lus (Kowalski and Sergot, 1986) are commonly used for such formalisations.
For these reasons, we stated that a desirable feature for a simulation platform
would be rule-based specifications of the environment. To this end, we have de-
veloped an extension to the Presage2 state engine to incorporate a declarative
rule-engine for management and modification of shared state.
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Production rules systems have a more simple reasoning engine than full
logic engines, but have been shown to be capable of implementing a useful
subset of logic programs (Bragaglia et al., 2012). Thus by using such a rule
engine we gain the performance and scalability of production rules, while
still being able to implement rules translated from formal logics. Finally, the
availability of rule engines written in Java enables native integration between
the rule engine and simulation platform.
We have chosen to integrate the JBoss Drools business rule engine2 into the
Presage2 platform due to its event processing and advanced reasoning features.
The Drools rule engine defines a knowledge base, which is a repository of the
defined rules, and a working memory which holds the current state of facts in
the current session. This working memory can be modified by the user; asserting,
retracting and updating facts. The rules are not executed until the rule-set is
explicitly fired, at which point all rules in the knowledge base are checked and
triggered.
This rule engine architecture maps directly to the Presage2 state engine ar-
chitecture. The working memory can hold the simulation shared state, the rules
perform the role of action handlers and environment services, and triggering the
rules performs a state change transaction.
We provide an alternate state engine implementation which provides the
same features as the original, but using the rule-engine for state storage, and
with the addition of a rule-based state transition. Providing the same interface
as the default state engine ensures backwards compatibility for environment
modules. A subset of agent actions can be inserted directly into the rule engine
and then processed with rules.
Listing 4 shows an example of how a rule can implement action handling.
Rules are specified as ‘when condition then consequence’ clauses. The when
condition specifies that there must be a Move action from an agent for whom
there also exists a Location. The colon represents a variable assignment or
unification to the name on the left-hand side of the operator. The then clause
defines the consequence when a tuple matching the condition is found. In this
case the agent’s location object is updated and the action removed (to prevent
subsequent matches of the same rule).
2 http://www.drools.org
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Listing 4: Drools rule example.
rule "Move agent"
when
$m : Move($a : agent, $dx : dx, $dy : dy)
$l : Location(agent == $a)
then
modify($l) {
setX($l.getX() + $dx);
setY($l.getY() + $dy);
}
retract($m);
end 
4.3.6 Verification & Validation
Verification and Validation are important considerations when developing soft-
ware for scientific research. Verification is the process of checking if a system is
working as intended, while validation checks whether the system is the correct
system for the task (Wallace and Fujii, 1989). Specifically in the ABM domain,
verification covers whether the model is implemented correctly, and valida-
tion concerns whether the model is the correct one (Ormerod and Rosewell,
2009). From the perspective of a software tool for simulation we must answer
the following questions: How can we verify that the software is executing the
model correctly, and secondly, what does the tool provide to aid verification
and validation of models written with it?
The first question requires a verification of our implementation of the Pres-
age2 framework. Using software testing we are able to guarantee, up to a
high level of confidence, that the framework implementation is correct. Tests
range from unit tests of individual classes or logical components, to full system
integration tests. Each test prepares an environment and inputs for the code
under test. The response to these stimuli are then compared to the expected
values. These tests are combined with an automated build system that will
ensure that all tests pass each time the platform is compiled. This prevents the
introduction of errors through later code modifications.
For example, a unit test may check that the vector addition used for com-
puting a new agent location given an initial location and movement action
is returning the correct results given a range of sample inputs. An integra-
tion test would load an entire simulation and test whether the agent is able
to move as expected. The former test ensures that individual components are
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implemented correctly, while the latter ensures the components are properly
composed and interact correctly. Tests such as these have been implemented
for Presage2.
The use of this unit-testing method in the platforms development has a
knock-on benefit for verification of user-defined models. With the platform’s
test-suite, the groundwork is in place for addition of additional unit-testing of
models.
However, verification in artificial intelligence and agent-based systems in-
troduces additional difficulties over general software verification (Wooldridge
and Jennings, 1998). Menzies and Pecheur (2005) specify testing as a baseline
verification method, and go on to give four more advanced formal methods:
run-time monitoring, static analysis, model checking and theorem proving.
These methods can be applied to verify both environment and agent imple-
mentations (Sudeikat et al., 2006).
Run-time monitoring is the analysis of the state of parts of an executing
program to detect invalid states. This can be achieved by logging within a
Java program. Further information can be provided by exceptions, which pro-
vide traces to the occurrence of an error. Presage2 provides detailed logging
through the log4j library3, and also includes diagnostic simulation messages
in the log to allow one to ascertain when log messages are triggered in the
simulation. Furthermore, exceptions are caught and logged by the simulator,
which will provide information about expected and unexpected errors occur-
ring during a simulation.
Static analysis is error checking without code execution. Part of this can be
achieved using a strongly typed, compiled programming language, such as
Java, which will find coding errors at compile-time. This includes some errors
caused as a consequence of code changes leading to errors in other source files.
There are further tools providing in depth static analysis for Java sources, such
as FindBugs4 and PMD5. These tools aim to detect common programming
errors, or problematic patterns. For Presage2, the use of a language with a
rich ecosystem of static analysis tools, Java, aids us in regards to this kind of
verification, and we have used these tools to improve the code quality of the
platform).
Model checking and theorem proving are more formal and stringent meth-
ods for checking an algorithm and its implementation. Generally, these meth-
3 http://logging.apache.org/log4j
4 http://findbugs.sourceforge.net
5 http://pmd.sourceforge.net
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ods require further consideration at design time about their integration. Model
checkers attempt to search all paths and states of a system to find property vi-
olations. This requires finite and deterministic state, and a separate model to
describe the system to be checked. Therefore significant extra work is required
to take this approach.
The verification of an implemented model is largely left to the model im-
plementer, but, as we have described, we enable a variety of testing and static
analysis methods for this purpose. In addition, in Presage2 we encourage
design practices aimed at increasing the robustness and reliability. Modular-
isation and component re-use attempts to prevent individual components be-
coming overly complex. The Presage2 state change framework also prevents
non-determinism outside of the modeller’s control, for example the execution
order of agents (which cannot be guaranteed in multi-threaded execution) can-
not lead to divergent states. Furthermore, repeatable randomness is provided
via the platform’s pseudo random number generation tools. Repeatability is an
important aspect of replicability (Axelrod, 1997; Ormerod and Rosewell, 2009),
so we encourage a best-practice that the same input parameters and random
seed combine to give identical simulation results.
4.3.7 Data gathering and visualisation
A vital component of a simulation is being able to extract results after a run.
Results can range from a single value, or set of values, which summarise the
final state of the environment, to detailed raw data which could reconstruct
the simulation state at any time-step. With Presage2 our approach is to enable
any type of data to be stored, and in any quantity, depending on the user’s
preference. This process should also be transparent to the simulation: if data
gathering is disabled the simulation will still run in the same way. Gathered
data should also always be associated with the input parameters to a simula-
tion, to ease the use of the platform for controlled experimentation.
Like MASON, and in contrast to Netlogo and Repast, Presage2 separates
visualisation from simulation. Visualisation is driven purely by gathered data,
in that rather than probing a running simulation in order to visualise it we use
gathered and stored data. This approach allows real-time and post-simulation
analysis to be done using the same tools, when visualising we can always
go back as well as forward in time, and the simulation will always run at
maximum speed. The disadvantage is that we must explicitly state which
data we wish to store for visualisation and results may lag slightly behind the
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actual simulation progress (though in practice simulations are likely to run
faster than the speed we want to view the visualisation).
Presage2 provides a high level data storage Application Programming Inter-
face (API), allowing for storage of data tuples. These tuples store data values
associated with a named key, and may also specify an agent and/or time-step
for this data. Thus the following tuples can be stored:
(key, value)
(key, timestep, value)
(key, agent, value)
(key, agent, timestep, value)
This API is paired with implementations for several popular storage methods.
These can be defined in configuration files such that the appropriate database
is loaded when the simulation starts. The current implementations include the
following:
• JSON files—Javascript Object Notation is a human-readable, machine
parsable data-interchange format6 which is supported by many program-
ming languages. JSON data is stored in standard files so is easy to use
with zero installation or configuration. This implementation is suitable
for development or testing, however does not scale for significant vol-
umes of data or allow concurrent data access.
• MongoDB7—This is a fast document database. It is schema-less, and as
such is naturally compatible with our tuple -based storage API.
• SQL—This is a generic implementation for database which support SQL
queries through the Java Database Connector (JDBC) API. This includes
popular Database Management Systems (DBMSs) such as MySQL8 and
PostgreSQL9.
Visualisation is then built either using the Presage2 API directly in Java, or
using a preferred tool for the storage engine. The former is a more generic
approach, and we provide a framework for using this method for a web-based
simulation management and visualisation tool.
6 http://json.org
7 http://www.mongodb.org
8 http://www.mysql.com
9 http://www.postgresql.org
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Figure 9: Presage2 simulation process diagram. The dashed box shows that Drools is
an optional component.
4.3.8 Experimental Support
The usage of Presage2 for modelling and simulation can be expressed as a two
part process, as shown in Figure 9. In the design and implementation phase
decisions are made about the model and agent implementations. A simulation
specification is then created, combining user-implemented modules with mod-
ules from the Presage2 library in order to define an environment, agents, and
a mapping of parameters to initial state and configuration. Following this, ex-
perimentation and evaluation can be performed by providing parameter sets
with a database configuration in order to generate simulation data. This is an
iterative process, as from initial data it is likely that one will go back and refine
the model and implementations in order to fix problems and achieve a desired
outcome. This process is enabled by support for automated experiment gener-
ation and execution.
We provide an API for the specification of a set of values for each parame-
ter in the simulation. The tool can then automatically generate the set of all
parameter permutations, and create an experimental schedule from this spec-
ification. The tool is also able to include a specified number of repeats for
each parameter set. Experimental schedules can then be run in batches by the
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Figure 10: Simulation Management in Presage2 WebUI
batch executor tool. This tool can be configured to exploit multiple machines
running experiments across a local area network, including using HPC facilities
where available.
These simulation schedules can be managed through a web interface pro-
vided with the platform. Figure 10 shows a screenshot of this interface being
used to add new simulations manually.
4.4 presage2 showcase
In this section we provide a short summary of a range of applications which
have been modelled and simulated using Presage2.
Several applications have used Presage2 to model iterated games. In these
applications Presage2’s time-driven model helps in particular to synchronise
each game round. Other applications model more concrete scenarios, such as
road networks, to apply agent-based modelling techniques to them. The final
set of applications have linked Presage2 to other tools, to provide on-demand
modelling for serious games or decision making:
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• The LPG’ game is a variant of a linear public good game, and was first de-
fined by Pitt and Schaumeier (2012). It has been used to explore the issue
of non-compliance in resource appropriation, and later to demonstrate a
method of fairly allocating resources based on Nicholas Rescher’s theory
of Distributive Justice (Pitt et al., 2014). The game was implemented us-
ing Presage2, utilising the rule engine to specify the game rules (Macbeth
et al., 2012).
This implementation of the LPG’ game has been integrated with an Au-
tonomous Power Management system to apply Distributive Justice to the
power grid (Kohler et al., 2014).
• The Game of Nomic, proposed by Suber (1990), is a rule amendment
game. The aim of the game is to successfully propose new rules, or
modifications to existing rules. A version of this game was implemented
with Presage2, using Drools for rule execution, to test if agents can suc-
cessfully reason about dynamic and mutable rule-sets (Holland et al.,
2013). This implementation includes agents who are able to perform
sub-simulations with the rule-set to determine the effect of changes they
intend to propose.
• Petruzzi et al. (2014) test their social capital framework with a simple
cooperation game, implemented with Presage2.
• Petruzzi et al. (2013) model a market for exchange of energy allocations
in a SmartGrid, utilising social capital to encourage cooperation.
• Schaumeier (2013) models an exogenous common-pool resource, with
rules implemented to test each of Ostrom’s (1990) principles for self-
governing institutions. Again Drools was used for environmental rules.
• Sanderson et al. (2013) modelled fleets of self-driving cars, using multi-
ple self-adaptive mechanisms to optimise their behaviour. This work in-
cluded an implementation of Institutionalised Paxos consensus (Sander-
son and Pitt, 2012) using Drools.
• The Presage2 platform has been used to model the carbon emissions as a
common-pool resource, and exploring the effect of the Kyoto Protocol on
these emissions (Macbeth et al., 2014). This work provides an example
case of policy-based modelling with Presage2.
• The Social Mpower game is a serious game to inform, raise awareness
and motivate consumers about energy efficiency (Bourazeri and Pitt, 2014).
4.5 presage2 evaluation & conclusion 96
Presage2 is used as a background simulation component of the game,
communicating with a graphical game frontend, which sends actions
triggered by both humans playing the game and computational agents
within the game.
4.5 presage2 evaluation & conclusion
Having described the Presage2 platform and its usage, we return to our evalu-
ative criteria from section 4.2 in order to evaluate how well Presage2 performs
as a platform for principled operationalisation of socio-technical systems.
Table 8 shows Presage2 evaluated according to the basic criteria. Like the
other Java-based simulation platforms, we require strong programming skills.
However, the introduction of rule-based components allows for these parts to
be easier to understand for non-programmers than standard Java code. So
far the platform has not given significant focus to integration of graphing and
visualisation options, instead taking a data-driven approach and letting users
choose their preferred data-visualisation tool. Finally, tutorials and documen-
tation are readily available from the Presage2 webpage10.
Table 8: Evaluation of Presage2 according to review criteria
Criterion Presage2
Programming Language Java
Software License LGPLa
Required programming experience Strong
Integrated graphics Some
Tutorials / Documentation Yes
a Lesser General Public License: GPL compatible licence for software libraries.
Presage2 has limited GUI tools, thus support for modelling remains limited.
The tools that it does have mainly support experimentation, with a GUI for
management of simulation runs, automated simulation generation, distributed
experiment execution, and detailed data recording.
Large numbers of complex agents can be run due to the simulator’s exploita-
tion of multi-threaded execution, and the agent agnostic approach allowing for
users to implement complex agents in simulations. These agents can also be
10 http://www.presage2.info
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automatically generated from input parameters as part of the initial state of
the simulation.
The Presage2 state engine enables simulation of situated agents; automati-
cally generated, dynamic networks; and dynamically changing models. Fur-
thermore, these features are modular, and separated from agent implementa-
tions.
Therefore, we believe that the Presage2 platform is not only an improvement
over the original Presage platform, but has several significant features which
distinguish it as a tool for principled operationalisation over the platforms we
have reviewed in section 4.2. The remaining outstanding issue, with respect to
our criteria, is that of graphical modelling support.
Such graphic modelling support is a topic of future platform development.
We are confident that graphical support can be added to the platform without
sacrificing the current functionality and performance, and without the resul-
tant graphical tool being too limited for generation of complex models. In
particular, three properties of Presage2 will aid this. Firstly, the platform’s
modularity allows for design by composition. An environment can be built
by simply combining a set of modules and linking simulation parameters to
module parameters. Secondly, the Java language’s introspective and self gener-
ation capabilities will enable automatic code generation from graphical models.
Therefore the graphical tool will simply act as a compiler to generate Presage2
models, and no functionality is lost. Finally, through the Eclipse IDE11, Java
has significant support for interactive graphical tools for code generation. We
envisage that by leveraging these features we can bring graphical model devel-
opment to Presage2.
The use of the platform over a range of projects has shown its effectiveness as
a simulation and modelling tool. The focus of the current applications on sce-
narios with a strong rule or governance mechanic is largely due to the uptake
of the platform. It has been adopted in this domain due to the ease of working
with rule-based specifications and implementing adaptive and self-organising
agents. However, we have shown in this chapter that the platform’s framework
is generic and extendible. Thus, we expect an increase in application domains
for which Presage2 is used as it gains traction.
This chapter identified a void in tool support for principled operationalised
of socio-technical systems, as outlined in the SIC methodology. With the de-
velopment of the Presage2 platform, we have filled this void, while also creat-
ing a tool with significant use as a general-purpose simulation and modelling
11 http://eclipse.org
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tool. Having now a tool for principled operationalisation of the participatory-
sensing knowledge commons, we now move on to the problem of efficiently
executing an institutional specification for this commons, in the next chapter.
5
A R U L E - E N G I N E F O R E L E C T R O N I C I N S T I T U T I O N S
Electronic Institutions have been identified as a powerful tool for main-taining order and cooperation in ‘open’ multi-agent systems (Estevaet al., 2001; Artikis et al., 2009). Taking lessons from the develop-
ment of institutions (defined as sets of rules which specify what is permitted
and forbidden within a given context) in human social and organisational sys-
tems (Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990), they aim to regulate interactions as norms—
specifying expectations of behaviour—or concrete rules to say what is required
and forbidden.
This set of rules has been given other names in the context of multi-agent
and agent-based systems. Artikis et al. (2009) specify “norm-governed” sys-
tems, however these ‘norms’ are analogous to institutional rules, in that they
are social constraints on the actions of agents within an arena. Similarly, an
institutional rule can be called a ‘policy’, as often seen in network management
(Sloman and Lupu, 1999). In all cases, the institution is assigning some form
of institutionalised power, permission, obligation and/or prohibition (cf. Jones
and Sergot (1996)) for agents to perform certain actions (and it has been argued
that this kind of assignment is essential to properly specify a system which ex-
tends beyond purely physical state (Artikis and Pitt, 2008)). In an open system
any agent could perform any action (within its physical capabilities). An elec-
tronic institution used in this context is able to distinguish between actions
which should and should not cause a change in institutional state, and actions
which are allowed and forbidden.
An institution may also make agents aware of when they have the power,
permission or obligation to do an action. This aids in the planning of actions,
so that agents do not waste energy with ineffectual actions, or worse, forbidden
actions which may lead to sanctions. For example, most governments will
notify their citizens of the time window in which going to one’s local polling
station and marking a cross on a piece of paper will count as an election vote.
Outside of this window this action has no effect.
Thus, an implementation of an electronic institution should be an executable
specification which, firstly, holds some state of the institution, through which
powers, permissions and obligations can be deduced; secondly, defines how
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actions may change the state of the institution at a given time; and finally,
allows agents to query whether they are empowered, permitted, obliged or
forbidden to perform any given action.
Furthermore, in human organisations, certain useful procedures have been
formalised and specified in such a way that they can be reused in institu-
tions as a tool for certain tasks. For example, Robert’s Rules of Order (Newly
Revised) (RONR) (Robert et al., 2011) is a specification of a parliamentary au-
thority for organisations. Organisations can take this specification and update
their institutional rules accordingly to incorporate this robust1 protocol. The
aim of electronic institutions is to provide such tools for open, agent-based
systems, and work has been done on specifying various protocols, include a
voting protocol from the aforementioned RONR (Pitt et al., 2006), floor control
protocols (Artikis et al., 2004; Artikis, 2009), monitoring and sanctioning pro-
cedures (Pitt and Schaumeier, 2012), argumentation (Artikis et al., 2003) and
auctions (Rodríguez et al., 1997). However, an integrated tool providing a
suite of these protocols for use by institution designers is yet to emerge.
We are concerned with how to implement electronic institutions for both
simulated applications and real-time system monitoring. This implementation
should therefore meet the following loose requirements: It should be:
• fast enough for real-time systems;
• expressive, such that complex rules and relationships can be implemented;
• readable, such that the behaviour is apparent from the specification; and
• modular, such that institutions can be built up from the composition of
smaller modules.
In this chapter we investigate the specification and execution of electronic
institutions. We review languages for specification of institutional rules. Tak-
ing the Event Calculus (Kowalski and Sergot, 1986) as an example, we assess
its use for the execution of voting as per Robert’s Rules of Order. By profiling
the performance in this representative task, we show how performance can be
drastically improved using a naive rule-based implementation of the Event Cal-
culus. Finally, we argue that a business rule engine has the necessary features
to implement electronic institutions, and show how Event Calculus specifica-
tions can be manually translated to the JBoss Drools rule engine, using the
RONR example.
1 It is robust, in that there is little or no ambiguity over which actions can be taken, and who can
perform them; and the protocol is not vulnerable to manipulation. This means that the protocol
will be able to function effectively in most circumstances.
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We are yet to formally define what we mean by an Electronic Insitution, be-
yond saying that they are an instantiation of what economists define as an
Institution, but in a computational domain. North (1990) defines Institutions
as follows:
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more for-
mally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human inter-
action.” (North, 1990, p.3)
Despite this definition, institutions are often confused and conflated with or-
ganisations. This is partly because many organisations are called ‘institutions’,
for example an ‘academic institution’ refers to the organisation, not the rules.
It is also because it is within an organisation that institutions function:
“A crucial distinction . . . is made between institutions and organi-
zations. . . . Conceptually, what must be clearly differentiated are
the rules from the players.” (North, 1990, p.4)
Therefore, if we consider an institution as a set of rules governing the in-
teractions, and constraints thereon, between humans within a society, then we
can consider electronic institutions as rules governing interactions between ac-
tors within a computational domain. Note, this does not mean that all of the
actors are computational agents—socio–technical systems require institutions
which can be applied uniformly to both human and computational actors. The
distinction between a human and electronic institution is that the latter is spec-
ified and executed in a computational domain.
Esteva et al. (2001) specify electronic institutions with a similar definition,
also derived from that of North (1990). Their specification allows the institu-
tion to dictate how and when interactions occur via a dialogic framework (a com-
mon language of communication) and scenes, which define subgroups where
dialogues occur. These scenes are then linked together via a performative struc-
ture, and normative rules describe when actions are obligatory and/or forbid-
den.
The concept of electronic institutions appears frequently, however often not
named as such, in open agent systems and normative systems. Artikis and
Pitt (2008) survey the specification of these systems, including the aforemen-
tioned framework of Esteva et al. (2001), and in all cases some kind of rule
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or constraint set is used to establish norms or desired interaction patterns. In
Artificial Social Systems (Moses and Tennenholtz, 1995) a set of restrictions on
agents’ behaviour, called social laws, are specified. Enterprise Modelling (Fox
et al., 1995) uses constraints on members of an organisation, including norma-
tive relations such as obligation, authority and empowerment. Finally, commit-
ment protocols (Chopra and Singh, 2006) are another method which has been
used to express normative relations between agents and establish order to an
open system.
However, Artikis and Pitt (2008) argue that all four approaches fall short on
their specification of institutionalised power, particularly of ‘empowerment’;
and their handling of non-physical, or ‘institutional’ facts and actions. Jones
and Sergot (1996) state the utility of empowerment as part of a normative
framework, and it is lacking in each of the surveyed approaches. To address
this, Artikis et al. (2009) give a specification of social constraints which ex-
presses:
• physical capabilities;
• institutionalised powers;
• permissions, prohibitions and obligations;
• and sanctions and enforcement polices to deal with forbidden actions.
This specification represents a superset of an electronic institution specifi-
cation. Physical capabilities are obviously outside of the scope of the elec-
tronic institution: being a social construct it cannot constrain what agents do
physically. On the other hand, institutionalised powers and permissions, pro-
hibitions and obligations are obviously within the institution. We argue that
the final set of constraints—sanctions and enforcement policies—are actually a
feature which the institution may provide, but are not part of its definition.
North (1990) also states that a defining feature of human institutions is that
they can be changed by the organisations which use them. This institutional
change allows the organisation to adapt to changing conditions and/or opti-
mise inefficiencies (although it can also make things worse), and as such, is
an important property to translate. Artikis (2012) extends his specification of
open agent systems to enable the specification, which contains the institutional
rules, to change over time as a result of agent’s actions.
Therefore, we define an Electronic Institution as a set of executable rules
which specify:
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• Institutionalised powers, and how they change, over time and through
the actions of agents.
• Permissions, prohibitions and obligations of the agents.
• How rules can be changed.
5.2 executable specification of electronic institutions
As we have defined that for an institution to be electronic it must be executable,
we now re-visit electronic institution specifications, and particularly, their op-
erationalisation.
Work on specification of constraints, or norms, for multi-agent systems often
focuses on the use of logics for specification. Logical specifications have the
advantage of enabling model checking and formal proofs of validity. Logics
typically also support deductive, abductive and inductive reasoning:
• Deductive tasks (also called projection or prediction) determine “what is
true when”, given “what happens when” and “what actions do”.
• Abductive tasks (also called postdiction or planning) determine “what hap-
pens when”, given “what actions do” and “what is true when”.
• Inductive tasks (learning or theory formation) determine “what actions do”
given “what is true when” and “what happens when”.
Action languages are a particularly popular specification language, due to
their incorporation of state while maintaining logical semantics and satisfia-
bility checking. However, we often see performance issues when scaling exe-
cutable specifications of this type, as we will see later in this chapter.
Arcos et al. (2005) specify rules and constraints in first-order and deontic
logic, however these must then be translated into custom declarative specifi-
cation language for their ISLANDER (Esteva et al., 2002) tool, which can then
verify the specification. This specification can be executed within their AMELI
platform. Aldewereld et al. (2006) also proposes the translation of logic, this
time into constraints. In their HarmonIA framework, Vázquez-Salceda and
Dignum (2003) go further, proposing four levels of translation, starting with
high level abstractions of statutes and norms which eventually are translated
into computationally efficient procedures.
Chopra and Singh (2006) use the action language C+ (Giunchiglia et al., 2004)
to specify their commitment protocols. Artikis et al. (2009) also use this language
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in their specification. This language allows the representation of the properties
of actions, including those with conditional and indirect effects. There is an
implementation of the C+ language, the Causal Calculator2, which translates
C+ action descriptions into propositional logic then allows querying of the
compiled system. Queries can perform deductive and abductive tasks given
both partial or complete information.
In addition to C+, Artikis et al. (2009) employ the Event Calculus (EC). Like
C+ it is a formalism for representing and reasoning about actions and their
effects in a logic programming framework. It has an implementation in Prolog
which is capable of deduction, abduction and induction.
Tampitsikas et al. (2011) execute electronic institutions using an extension
of EC which allows for events and fluents to be complex objects, the Object
Event Calculus (Kesim and Sergot, 1996). This approach enables a more object-
orientated representation of institutional state.
Fornara et al. (2008) give a framework for the specification of electronic insti-
tutions directly as event-condition-action rules. They also show how specifica-
tions within this framework can be expressed using semantic web technologies,
with the OWL ontology and SWRL rules (Fornara and Colombetti, 2010). They
claim significant performance improvements over an EC implementation of the
same specification, however no quantitative comparison is provided.
Finally, Cliffe et al. (2006) use answer set programs (Baral, 2003) to model
institutions, using a specification language semantically very similar to the
EC. They argue that their formalisation has several advantages over both EC
and C+, largely related to simplifying the execution of specifications from an
algorithmic perspective.
We chose the EC for our work for several reasons. It is easy-to-use and intu-
itive. As Prolog compiles specifications very quickly, one can very quickly test
implementations, avoiding some of the longer development cycles of the lan-
guages we introduced above. Furthermore, the majority of the protocols and
specifications we wish to use already have implementations in EC. Therefore,
for us, it is a good starting point for a library of tools for electronic institutions.
2 http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/ccalc
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The Event Calculus3 is a widely used formalism for executable specification
of electronic institutions. It also has a rich feature set, enabling verification
of specifications, deductive, abductive and inductive tasks (Shanahan, 1999).
However, like with other declarative logic specifications, this richness comes
at the cost of performance and scalability. This problem is particularly acute
when we wish to use a specification in real-time or in a simulation, with a
constant stream of events, and many deductive tasks to query the state of the
institution.
In this section we will quantify this performance, using an example elec-
tronic institution specification. In Pitt et al. (2006), a voting protocol from
RONR is specified in the EC. This specification has an associated implemen-
tation in Prolog, whose execution we can test (this specification is listed in
section A.1). This is a slightly reduced specification from the original, omitting
obligations and sanctions, leaving just institutionalised power and the voting
protocol. This problem, coupled with a suitable narrative, is a representative
example of an electronic institution specification. Therefore, benchmark results
obtained using it are an indicator of the general performance of EC implementa-
tions for electronic institutions. We test two implementations of EC: the Simple
Event Calculus and Cached Event Calculus. We then show that significantly
faster execution can be achieved for deductive tasks with a simple rule-based
implementation of EC predicates.
5.3.1 Experimental Setup
We intend to test the performance of different EC implementations with the
same specifications and with the same narratives. We start with a common
initial state, defining an initial population of agents as per the voting protocol
implementation. We define seven agents, one occupying the role of chair and
two who qualify for proposer and seconder roles. All agents also occupy the
voter role. This state is encoded in Prolog as shown in Listing 5.
A simple narrative generator was written to create a valid narrative which
will: open a session; propose, second, and randomly generate votes for a user-
defined number of motions; and close the session. This generator returns a
3 We gave a brief primer on the EC and its predicates in subsection 3.3.1. A more detailed intro-
duction to the concepts can be found in Shanahan (1999).
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Listing 5: Initial state of voting protocol in Prolog
initially(qualifies(cAgent0,chair)=true).
initially(qualifies(cAgent0,voter)=true).
initially(role_of(cAgent0,chair)=true).
initially(role_of(cAgent0,voter)=true).
initially(qualifies(pAgent0,proposer)=true).
initially(qualifies(pAgent0,seconder)=true).
initially(qualifies(pAgent0,voter)=true).
initially(role_of(pAgent0,voter)=true).
initially(qualifies(pAgent1,proposer)=true).
initially(qualifies(pAgent1,seconder)=true).
initially(qualifies(pAgent1,voter)=true).
initially(role_of(pAgent1,voter)=true).
initially(qualifies(vAgent0,voter)=true).
initially(role_of(vAgent0,voter)=true).
initially(qualifies(vAgent1,voter)=true).
initially(role_of(vAgent1,voter)=true).
initially(qualifies(vAgent2,voter)=true).
initially(role_of(vAgent2,voter)=true).
initially(qualifies(vAgent3,voter)=true).
initially(role_of(vAgent3,voter)=true). 
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Listing 6: Voting protocol narrative with one motion passed
narrative([happens(open_session(cAgent0,s0), 1),
happens(propose(pAgent0,m0), 2),
happens(second(pAgent1,m0), 3),
happens(open_ballot(cAgent0,m0), 4),
happens(vote(pAgent0,m0,aye), 5),
happens(vote(vAgent2,m0,aye), 6),
happens(vote(vAgent1,m0,nay), 7),
happens(vote(vAgent0,m0,nay), 8),
happens(vote(pAgent1,m0,aye), 9),
happens(vote(vAgent3,m0,aye), 10),
happens(close_ballot(cAgent0,m0), 11),
happens(declare(cAgent0,m0,carried), 12),
happens(close_session(cAgent0,s0), 13)]). 
list of events for this narrative, which we encode as a Prolog statement for our
tests. Listing 6 shows an example of a narrative with one motion.
The Prolog EC implementations were tested using SWIProlog4. This is a
commonly-used, up-to-date, and fast implementation. It also contains useful
profiling functions which we can use to test performance. In particular we
use the time/1 function which calculates the required execution time of the
specified goal. We can then define a test procedure which will profile the time
to, firstly, process the provided narrative, and secondly, perform a deductive
query on the institution state. The former is done via a doUpdate function,
which will be different for each EC implementation. The latter performs a
holdsAt query to check which resolutions are asserted at a time after the voting
session has been closed.
test :-
call(time(doUpdate)),
call(time(holdsAt(resolutions=V, 14))).
5.3.2 The Simple Event Calculus
The Simple Event Calculus is the most basic form of the EC (Shanahan, 1999).
This version was used in the original RONR voting protocol implementation,
and is shown in Listing 7. To this we added a doUpdate implementation which
simply asserts each happens tuple.
4 http://www.swi-prolog.org
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Listing 7: Prolog implementation of the Simple Event Calculus
holdsAt(Fluent, T) :-
initially(Fluent),
\+ broken(Fluent, 0, T).
holdsAt(Fluent, T) :-
happens(Event, EarlyTime),
EarlyTime < T,
initiates(Event, Fluent, EarlyTime),
\+ broken(Fluent, EarlyTime, T).
broken(Fluent, T1, T3) :-
happens(Event, T2),
T1 =< T2,
T2 < T3,
terminates(Event, Fluent, T2).
terminates(Event, Fluent = V, T) :-
initiates(Event, Fluent = V2, T),
\+ (V = V2). 
Table 9: Runtime of voting protocol with the Simple Event Calculus. With three mo-
tions the code failed to terminate in the given time. Note, narrative time is
reported as <1 ms as the timing method does not report times less than this.
Motions Actions Narrative time /s Query time /s
1 13 < 1 ms 0.005
2 24 < 1 ms 13.849
3 35 < 1 ms >24 hours
We tested the execution time, as reported by the SWIProlog profiler, with an
increasing number of motions to pass. These results are shown in Table 9. As
inferences are made at query time, the narrative has a negligible process time,
and in fact the timing method used is unable to measure it. Query times scale
very badly as the total number of action increases, such that with just three
motions in the narrative the query did not terminate.
5.3.3 The Cached Event Calculus
Chittaro and Montanari (1996) propose an alternative implementation of the
EC, the Cached Event Calculus (CEC) which moves computational complexity
from query to update processing. This means that each event is processed
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Figure 11: Execution time of voting protocol using the Cached Event Calculus with
SWIProlog and tuProlog engines
when it is created, and a resulting state calculated. Subsequent queries can
then be processed extremely quickly, without having to consult the specifica-
tion.
In this case performance is significantly better, as shown in Figure 11a. How-
ever as the number of motions increases, execution time is exponential.
5.3.4 Integration with Java
As we are working with a Java-based simulation tool, Presage2, we would
like to be able to interface with our electronic institution specification from
Java. This can be done either with a bridge between the Java application and
a Prolog interpreter, as offered by the JPL project5; or with a pure Java Prolog
engine. The former will offer comparable performance to the standalone Pro-
log implementation, as the overhead of the communication between Java and
Prolog processes will be negligible (in relation to the runtime of the Prolog
query). The drawback of this method is portability: it requires a Prolog binary
to be available to the Java runtime.
Java Prolog engines offer a portable implementation which integrates na-
tively with Java code. tuProlog (Denti et al., 2005) is a lightweight Prolog
5 http://www.swi-prolog.org/packages/jpl/java_api/index.html
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implementation in Java. We ran another performance test using this Prolog
engine to compare with those in the previous section.
We orchestrated the same testing scenario as before, with identical narra-
tives. The use of Java aids the automation of these tests, so we ran 10 repeats
for each narrative. Additionally, runtime optimisation by the Java Runtime En-
vironment (JRE) means that the execution time will improve over time, thus we
excluded the first results, only taking results after the JRE had ‘warmed-up’6.
Timing was calculated using the Java built-in function System.nanoTime()7
which provides up-to nano second accuracy for timing tasks.
Figure 11b shows the performance of the Cached Event Calculus running
on TuProlog. It shows that this engine is significantly slower than running the
same Prolog code in SWIProlog. However it scales slightly better, with the
performance going from 60 times slower with one motion, to 30 times slower
at 30 motions.
5.3.5 A rule-based implementation of EC axioms
The Prolog implementations of the EC provide deductive, abductive and in-
ductive reasoning capabilities. This allows for a broad range of tasks, such as
planning and monitoring. However, the cost of catering for all these tasks in
a single logic engine is shown in the computational complexity of seemingly
simple deductive tasks. If we wish to use an electronic institution, in a simu-
lation or application, purely for deductive tasks (to know what is true when,
given what has happened), then Prolog is not a very efficient solution. We
tested this hypothesis by creating a proof-of-concept implementation of a rule-
based approach of the processing of EC axioms, and analysed its performance
with the same RONR voting specification.
A purely deductive EC implementation will only need to be able to query
for facts which can directly be inferred to be true. This will be either whether
a fluent holdsAt a time t (or what value it holds at that t), whether a fluent
is true initially, whether an event happens at a time t, or whether an event
initiates or terminates a fluent. We can specify this as a Java interface as shown
in Listing 8. This interface supports fluents with non-Boolean values, and also
implicit inference of these values when a placeholder is passed object as the
value.
6 This ‘warm-up’ refers to the dynamic, just-in-time compilation, and run-time optimisation per-
formed by the JRE, which causes slower performance early in the program life-cycle (Blackburn
et al., 2008)
7 http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/System.html#nanoTime()
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Listing 8: Java interface for deductive queries on an EC Specification
interface ECQuery {
boolean holdsAt(Object fluent, int t);
boolean holdsAt(Object fluent, Object value, int t);
boolean happens(Object event, int t);
boolean initially(Object fluent);
boolean initially(Object fluent, Object value);
boolean initiates(Object event, Object fluent, int t);
boolean terminates(Object event, Object fluent, int t);
boolean initiates(Object event, Object fluent, Object value, int t);
} 
Listing 9: Java interface for declaration of an EC specification
interface ECSpecification {
void initiates(InitiatesRule rule);
void holdsAt(HoldsAt rule);
void assertInitially(Object fluent);
void assertInitially(Object fluent, Object value);
void assertHappens(Object event, int t);
void assertInitiates(Object event, Object fluent, Object value, int t)
;
} 
This interface uses the Java Object type for both fluent names, fluent values
and events. This gives maximum flexibility to the user, as all types in Java
extend from this base type. When querying, fluents and events can be looked
up using Java equality operators. These operators can be overrided, such that
more complex look-up functionality can be implemented. This functionality
is exploited in order to implement Prolog-style anonymous and inferred vari-
ables in fluent names.
We also give a programmatic interface through which an EC specification can
be provided, shown in Listing 9. This interface also allows for the assertion
of facts at runtime, letting the specification manipulate fluent values. The
specification is given in terms of objects representing rules, which define either
what an event initiates, or whether a fluent holds. An initiates rule can define a
fluent change by calling assertInitiates which will update the value for that
fluent at the given time. HoldsAt rules consist of a Matcher component, which
tests whether the rule matches a provided fluent, and a Binder, which infers
the value of the given fluent at a specified time.
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Listing 10: Example of initiates rule. Matchers are used to built a description of the
event we wish to match. The matched arguments in this event are then
used in the holdsAt query to check whether the actor is empowered to
perform the action. If the event and query are both valid we assert the
change to the status predicate.
// initiates( open_ballot(C,M), status(M)=voting(T), T ) :-
// holdsAt( pow(C, open_ballot(C,M))=true, T ).
ec.initiates(new InitiatesRule() {
Matcher C = new AnyStringMatcher();
Matcher M = new AnyStringMatcher();
Matcher open_ballot = new PredicateMatcher("open_ballot", C, M);
public void apply(Object action, int t, SimpleEC ec) {
if (open_ballot.matches(action)
&& ec.holdsAt(new Predicate("pow", C.getLastMatch(),
new Predicate("open_ballot", C.getLastMatch(),
M.getLastMatch())), t)) {
ec.assertInitiates(action,
new Predicate(" status ", M.getLastMatch()),
new Predicate("voting", t), t);
}
}
}); 
In order to simplify the writing of EC specifications written in Prolog we im-
plement objects to represent predicates and tuples, including Matcher imple-
mentations in order to perform dynamic matching of these objects with anony-
mous and infered variables. For example we could match a Prolog predicate
pow(V, vote(V,M,_)), inferring the values of V and M in the process. Exam-
ples of both types of rule specification are shown in Listing 10 and Listing 11.
Note, this method achieves a one-to-one correspondence between EC axioms
and rules. However, the verbose nature of Java results in a long, and difficult
to read specification.
Our implementation of this rule-based EC is a simple inference engine. A
fluent cache stores the values of strongly asserted fluents at each discrete time
point. Strongly asserted fluents are ones which have been explicity set with
assertInitially or assertInitiates. When an event is asserted at time t1
it invalidates the cache for t >= t1. All events after and including those at
t1 are then processed. An event is processed by triggering all initiates rules
with the event and time pair. The fluent cache is dynamically expanded for
new timesteps by simply copying the cache for the previous time. Deductive
queries are handled by firstly looking for a matching fluent in the cache. If
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Listing 11: Example of holdsAt rule. The matches function filters fluents which match
the form we are looking for. If the fluent matches, inferValue determines
the value based on the status of other fluents and using matched values
from the specified fluent. A MultiStringMatcher is used to match multiple
strings in an expression against to a ‘master’ string, which is also bound
during expression parsing. This is used to unify the C variable in this
example.
// holdsAt( pow(C, open_session(C,S))=true, T ) :-
// holdsAt( sitting(S)=false, T ),
// holdsAt( role_of(C,chair)=true, T ).
ec.holdsAt(new HoldsAt() {
final MultiStringMatcher C = new MultiStringMatcher();
final Matcher S = new AnyStringMatcher();
final Matcher open_session = new PredicateMatcher("open_session",
C, S);
final Matcher pow_open_session = new PredicateMatcher("pow",
C.master, open_session);
public boolean matches(Object o) {
return pow_open_session.matches(o);
}
// Binder method
public Object inferValue(Object fluent, int t, ECQuery ec) {
return !ec.holdsAt(new Predicate(" sitt ing ", S.getLastMatch()), t)
&& ec.holdsAt(new Predicate(" role_of ",
C.getLastMatch(), " chair "), t);
}
}); 
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Figure 12: Execution time of RONR using a rule-based EC implementation.
none is found, each Matcher in the set of HoldsAt rules is checked to find a
candidate rule to infer the value with. If one is found, we use the Binder to
return, or check the value of the fluent.
We can rewrite the RONR voting protocol specification to run with this im-
plementation, and then again run our test suite to determine performance. As
before, we perform 50 repeats of each narrative and allow for the Java Runtime
Environment to ‘warm-up’ before collecting results. The results are shown in
Figure 12.
Note that this runtime is several orders of magnitude faster than any other
implementation tested in this section. From this result we can draw the con-
clusion that, if only deduction is required, a rule-based implementation of the
EC will scale much better than with Prolog.
However, we note that this is a simple, and fairly naive implementation of
a rule-based approach to the EC. It omits features such as forward chaining,
which would be required to properly handle multiple actions per timestep. In
particular this implementation requires a verbose manual translation of the
Prolog specification, a process which is error-prone. The format of these man-
ually translated rules is fairly structured and uniform, therefore it would be
possible to write a compiler from EC axioms to these programmatic rule im-
plementations. However, there already exist Java rule engines which have
declarative rule definitions, and employ much more robust and optimised rule-
processing algorithms. We discuss how we can leverage these Production Rule
Engines in the next section.
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An additional issue when using Prolog-like syntax for axioms is the limita-
tions of tuple- and predicate-based variables. This variable system is readable
and expressive with simple constructs; however it lacks reliable mechanisms
to reference other objects, and as the size and depth of nested tuples increases
readability is lost. This is in contrast to Java where we can have many member
variables in an object, and complex reference trees from these variables. This
shortcoming is highlighted in EC specifications, where multiple different flu-
ents are used to describe different aspects of a single entity, while in Java one
would have a single object with multiple attributes.
5.3.6 Summary of Event Calculus Performance
In summary, this section has outlined the issues with using direct Prolog im-
plementations of the EC when dealing with primarily deductive tasks, and
interfacing these with a Java runtime. Furthermore, by implementing a simple
version of rule-based deduction of fluents from manually translated EC axioms
we observe an improvement in performance of two orders of magnitude com-
pared to the best Prolog implementation. Thus we propose that we can achieve
a fast and robust deductive EC engine using a standard rule engine.
There is still ongoing work in implementing faster Prolog EC specifications,
which haven’t been tested here. RTEC (Artikis et al., 2012) for example has
been shown to achieve performance in event recognition tasks comparable
to that of rule-based approaches, using a rolling time window to reduce the
length of fluent history to store, and compiling axioms into optimised forms.
However, this approach requires specifications to be rewritten into a special di-
alect of the EC, and additional metadata to be specified for events and fluents
for the compiler’s optimisation algorithm. This requires in depth knowledge
of the optimisations and how to exploit them, which is a significant hurdle to
the implementation of specifications.
The use of time windows has also been proposed by Carr et al. (2010) to
speed up the EC. This method specifies a cut-off time point before which
one can no longer perform holdsAt queries. In doing so, the number of rele-
vant events can be reduced, and so, more linear scaling can be achieved. Still,
there is a trade-off to be made between the amount of history to be kept, and
query/event processing run time.
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5.4 a rule-engine implementation of event calculus specifica-
tions
In the previous section we demonstrated both speed and scaling issues with
Prolog implementations of the EC, and showed that for purely deductive rea-
soning a rule-based approach is significantly faster. While specification of an
Electronic Institution in EC is still worthwhile, particularly for verification and
the other non-deductive reasoning tasks, for runtime deductive reasoning with
a large number of incoming events we advocate a rule-based implementation.
Therefore, if we are specifying in EC, but implementing in a different paradigm,
we require a robust translation process so the specifications will be consistent.
In this section we present a method of rewriting EC axioms in a declara-
tive rule form, using the language of a Production Rule System system, JBoss
Drools. We also present our implementation of a framework, and module
library, Drools-EInst, to enable the use of specifications manually translated
with this method within a Java program, and the current set of modules imple-
mented from various EC specifications. Finally, we give a runtime performance
comparison using the same RONR voting protocol example as in the previous
section.
5.4.1 JBoss Drools
JBoss Drools8 is a Business Rules Management System (BRMS), a software
framework use for Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. The core com-
ponent of this is a Production Rule System (PRS) which provides an ontol-
ogy for knowledge representation and rules which the system reasons with.
This system is then fed data, through which it determines a knowledge state.
Drools’ PRS has a rule engine which employs hybrid reasoning, enabling both
forward-chaining and backward-chaining reasoning.
In a PRS, ‘knowledge’ is represented as rules. These rules specify a condition
which, when matched, causes a consequence. This matching is done against a
state, which is data expressed with the rule system’s ontology.
The Drools rule engine is implemented with an improved version of the Rete
algorithm (originally proposed by Forgy (1982)). This algorithm optimises the
speed of pattern matching in the rule engine by employing a network of nodes.
8 http://www.drools.org/
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Drools has developed various extensions to the original algorithm to improve
performance, properly integrate Java objects, and fuzzy reasoning9.
The Drools PRS then has the following runtime components:
• Production Memory, which contains the production rules;
• Working Memory, which contains the state of the system, also called
‘facts’;
• A Pattern Matcher, which matches production rules against facts or fact
tuples;
• The Agenda, which is the set of matched rules paired with matched fact
tuples. When a rule and set of facts are added to the agenda it is called
an ‘activation’.
With the former two being specified and initialised by the user, the latter
two are part of the rule-engine implementation.
Drools allows the user to control the execution of rules through a fireAllRules
method. This procedure will start recursively executing the consequences of
matched rules sequentially until there are none remaining. Matched rules are
ordered in descending order of a user-specified ‘salience’ property on a rule,
with tie-breaks resolved arbitrarily. Each consequence will cause insertion, re-
traction or modification of facts in the working memory, which in turn may
cause matched rules to be added or removed from the agenda. Thus this en-
ables forward-chaining reasoning.
Rules are specified in a custom Drools rule language, which allows for
declarative rule specification with tight Java integration. Rules are written
as shown in Listing 12. A ‘when’ section describes the condition to trigger the
rule. This consists of object types with constraints which match to facts. These
conditional elements can be combined with various logical operators to form a
matching tuple. Furthermore, variables can be bound with the unification op-
erator (:), which can then be referred to in a later conditional element, and/or
in the consequence. Note that the convention is that variables bound in this
way are prefixed with a $ in Drools. The consequence of the rule, specified
in the ‘then’ section, is written in Java, with some syntactic shortcuts given
for convenience. Namely, one can insert, update and/or retract facts with
shorthand functions.
9 A full description of the algorithm is given in the software documentation, avail-
able at http://docs.jboss.org/drools/release/6.1.0.Final/drools-docs/html/
HybridReasoningChapter.html
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Listing 12: Syntax of a Drools rule.
rule "Rule name"
when
Pattern1(constraints...)
Pattern2()
then
insert(...)
end 
The rule-engine also supports what is called ‘logical’ insertion of a fact. If a
fact is inserted ‘logically’ then its truth is dependent on the truth of the ‘when’
clause that led to its assertion. This means that the fact will be automatically
retracted if this conditional becomes false.
Backward-chaining reasoning and state checking is done through queries.
These are written in the same syntax as ‘when’ conditions and are able to
unify matching fact tuples, or sets of fact tuples using full or partial input data.
Queries allow for questions to be asked about the current facts in the system,
for example returning all facts matching a given constraint, or unifying a set
of facts which hold specific relationships between each other.
Drools also has support for Complex Event Processing. This extension al-
lows for special facts, called events. These events are attached with temporal
properties to enable the use of temporal constraints in rules. Furthermore the
rule engine can manage the lifecycle of the event objects, so events which can
no longer be matched by a rule can be removed from the working memory to
save space.
5.4.2 Electronic Institution Implementation in JBoss Drools
Drools offers a rich syntax for the specification of institutional rules. Coupled
with the event processing tools it enables logical and temporal constraints for
rules, coupled with native integration of Java objects. Furthermore, it allows
multiple state changes as a consequence of a rule, unlike the EC in which
multiple clauses must be written to update multiple fluents, even if they are
caused by the same event. Consequently, we consider it as a viable platform
for the construction of a Electronic Institution engine.
However, there are several main design challenges to overcome to be able to
transfer EC specifications into Drools:
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1. The EC allows reasoning about the state of the system in the past. This
is done either by holding a cache of all the previous states of fluents, or
being able to re-calculate this state from first principles. Drools’ working
memory has no concept of when a fact is true, only that the fact’s current
state is true at the present point in time.
2. Facts in Drools must be concrete. Unlike in the EC, where fluents can
hold with anonymous values, in Drools every fact is an instantiated ob-
ject. By default this object will then only match an object with the same
values in all of its member variables. Particularly when dealing with in-
stitutionalised power it is important to be able to specify that an agent is
empowered to perform a particular type of action, but with some specifics
omitted.
3. Nested fact matching. Drools does not support nesting of a pattern
within another pattern. For this kind of matching we require separate
patterns and a constraint to show that the first match should be nested
in the second pattern.
4. Queries cannot be overloaded. In the EC, predicates such as holdsAt are
often defined multiple times for different input fluents. In Drools we
would only be able to have a single query definition which must handle
all cases. For example, if we wished to write a holdsAt query in Drools,
this single query would have to be able to provide the answer for every
possible fluent which we wish to ask about. It is not possible to write
multiple queries with the same name, each of which handles a different
portion of the domain of inputs.
Bragaglia et al. (2012) overcame these issues by requiring that a specifica-
tion only consists of initiates clauses, defined in Java code. These clauses are
then compiled into Drools rules which assert the internal predicates Clip and
Declip10. Validity intervals can then be calculated in order to determine when
fluents are true. This implementation therefore only utilises Drools’ rule lan-
guage for the specification of EC axioms, and the actual domain specification
must be done in Java code.
For these reasons, we take a different approach. Rather than implementing
EC axioms in Drools, we instead follow a process to manually translate EC spec-
ifications to work within a Drools workflow. Therefore instead of initiaties and
holdsAt axioms, we simply write Drools rules, and follow Drools conventions.
10 Clip and Declip are EC predicates which determine if a fluent is terminated or initiated within
a time interval.
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The working memory holds the current state of fluents. We assume that
events are in order, so the state of the system when the event occurs should be
relevant to the event processing. When historical state is required extra rules
can be written to store this. This approach has the following advantages:
• We only store historical information about fluents when it is needed,
reducing space complexity of the engine.
• We no longer need to nest fluents in queries of facts to indicate their
validity interval, preventing the need for nested fact matching for this
use.
• holdsAt queries are replaced with simple conditionals for the fluents
themselves, so we no longer need to overload queries.
Therefore we have addressed the first and fourth design challenges, and one
use-case of the third.
The remaining issue is that of enabling the loose matching of actions. The
particular use-case here is granting institutionalised power, permission or obli-
gation to perform an action—where we wish to specify a range of possible
actions. We can create a fact to represent the agent-action tuple in an object.
For example we have a class Pow with actor and action fields. A naive usage
of this power would be to just check that an event matches this action:
$act : Action($a : actor)
Pow(actor == $a, action == $act)
However, this approach will only work in a very narrow range of cases.
Firstly, we must explicitly specify all attributes of the action which the agent
is empowered to do. In cases where there are several possible valid actions
(for example voting) we must enumerate each possible action. Furthermore, it
is possible in some cases that the set of possible actions is infinite. Thus, this
method is inappropriate for the task.
We enable ranges of actions to be specified by implementing a matches
method in Pow. This method checks whether a given action matches the range
of actions specified in this Pow object. This range of actions is defined by an
object of the desired action type which may have some fields set to null. The
matches method returns true if and only if both actions are of the same type,
and for each non-null field the values are equal. This method allows simple
specification of a range of allowed actions, and simple use of institutionalised
power in rules. To amend the previous example:
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Listing 13: OpenSession action as a Java object
public class OpenSession extends Action {
final String name;
public OpenSession(Actor actor, Institution inst, String sessionName)
{
super(actor, inst);
this.name = sessionName;
}
} 
$act : Action($a : actor)
Pow(actor == $a, action.matches($act))
As this matches method equality is defined on a per-object basis, it can be
overridden to provide nested dynamic matching. In the above example the
Action class has been modified to use this concept of equality with other ob-
jects, but also member fields of the class can do the same.
5.4.3 Manual Translation of EC Electronic Institution Specifications
With the design groundwork in place we now demonstrate how EC specifica-
tions can be manually translated into Drools. We present these translations
as a set of steps to undertake, and illustrate these steps with examples of the
manual translation of the RONR voting protocol specification.
Declaration of events
Events should be declared as Java objects, extending the provided base Action
class. This base class allows the engine to distinguish actions from fluents,
and attach time and other metadata to the action. The event object should be
immutable, when possible, as it is a constant. Listing 13 shows the open_session
event from RONR as a Java object.
A narrative is then constructed by inserting event objects into the rule engine
in ascending timestamp order, and triggering rules each timestep to update the
state of the system fluents.
5.4 a rule-engine implementation of event calculus specifications 122
Representation of fluents
We can simplify the state representations of electronic institutions by collecting
related fluents into objects. For example, in the voting protocol there are sep-
arate fluents for the status of a motion and the number of votes in favour and
against. Furthermore there is no fluent expressing the link between a motion
and the session it is occurring in. We can easily encapsulate all this information
in a Motion object.
The EC specification also uses string identifiers to reference entities such
as motions and sessions. In Java and Drools we can directly reference other
objects, which is a much more robust form of linking, and prevents possible
key clashes or ambiguities.
Manual Translation of Initiates clauses
An initiates clause is written in Prolog in the form:
initiates( event, fluent=value, T ) :-
holdsAt( condition1, T ),
...
holdsAt( conditionN, T ).
This can be manually translated into Drools roughly as follows:
rule " Init iates example"
when
Event(constraints...)
$fluent : Fluent(condition1)
...
OtherFluent(conditionN)
then
modify($fluent) {
setValue(value)
}
end
The first line of the Drools rule matches an event when it occurs. As well as
constraints on the event we can also bind attributes of the event to variables
to use later in the when or then clauses. The subsequent lines in the when
clause perform two purposes: firstly they test for fluents matching the given
constraints at the current time. Secondly, they gather any other information
from fluents, including the fluent to be modified itself, which are needed in
the then clause. The then clause then performs the desired change in value
to the fluent. Note that in Drools we can perform multiple modifications to
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the working memory during a then clause. So in some cases, where there are
multiple fluents to be updated from a single event with the same conditions,
we can reduce several EC axioms into one Drools rule.
With initiates rules, we must also consider when a rule should be activated.
A change to any object in the set of conditions on a rule may cause it to be
activated. While, with such a rule, we only want an activation to occur when
the event is inserted and the conditions are true, if the event remains in the
working memory it may cause an activation later if the conditions become
true. Therefore we require a mechanism to falsify the event condition after
initial processing.
We provide two such mechanisms, which work for different use-cases. Firstly,
a valid attribute is attached to actions11. This attribute is false initially, and
should be set to true when the action is processed by a rule. This means that
the rule can be prevented from being re-activated for a specific event by using
a valid==false constraint. Another rule can then clean up any invalid actions
each timestep to prevent activations. The second method uses a fact T which
gives the most recent timestep. This can then be compared to the attribute t of
the action to ensure that the clause can only be activated in this timestep. The
value of the fact T is updated by a rule each timestep. These two methods are
shown below:
rule "Validity check"
when
$e : Event(valid == false)
// conditions...
then
modify($e) {
setValid(true) // rule can no longer be triggered for this event
}
// other changes...
end
rule "Timestep check"
T($t : t)
Event(t == $t)
// conditions...
then
// other changes...
end
11 This attribute is named ‘valid’ primarily as the main use-case of this mechanism is the validation
of events when they are inserted into the rule engine.
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Listing 14: Example of manually translated initiates clauses. The original Prolog spec-
ification is shown in the comment above each rule.
// initiates( second(B,M), status(M)=seconded, T ) :-
// holdsAt( pow(B, second(B,M))=true, T ).
rule "Second"
when
$sec : Second($b : actor, $m : motion, valid == false)
Pow(actor == $b, this.matches($sec))
then
modify($m) {
setStatus(Motion.Status.Seconded);
}
modify($sec) {
setValid(true);
}
end
// initiates( second(B1,M), role_of(B2,seconder)=false, T ) :-
// holdsAt( pow(B1, second(B1,M))=true, T ),
// holdsAt( qualifies(B2,seconder)=true, T ).
rule "Unassign seconders"
when
T($t : t)
Second($i : inst, valid == true, t == $t)
Qualifies($a : actor, role == "seconder")
$r : RoleOf(actor == $a, $role == "seconder", inst == $i)
then
retract($r);
end 
To illustrate this process in practice, we give two examples from the voting
protocol. Listing 14 shows the original Prolog and the manually translated
Drools rules. In this case, there are two rules to be triggered off the same action,
so we cannot use the valid attribute for both. As the second rule will trigger
between zero and several times, depending on how many agents qualified for
the ‘seconder’ role, this uses T for activation control. In this second rule we
can also avoid checking the institutional power again, as it is implicitly true by
virtue of the action being valid. Note also the additional clause in this rule to
retrieve the RoleOf fluent we wish to retract.
Manual Translation of HoldsAt clauses
HoldsAt clauses in the EC state that a fluent is true when certain conditions are
satisfied. They can be written in Prolog as follows:
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Listing 15: Example of a manually translated holdsAt clause. The original Prolog spec-
ification is shown in the comment above the rule.
// holdsAt( pow(B, second(B,M))=true, T ) :-
// holdsAt( status(M)=proposed, T ),
// holdsAt( role_of(B,seconder)=true, T ).
rule "Pow second motion"
when
RoleOf($b : actor, $i : inst, role == "seconder")
$m : Motion(status == Motion.Status.Proposed)
then
insertLogical(new Pow($b, new Second($b, $m)));
end 
holdsAt( fluent=value, T) :-
holdsAt( condition1, T),
holdsAt( conditionN, T).
These can also be simply implemented with rules in Drools. As the resulting
fluent is only true when the conditions hold, we use the insertLogical feature
of Drools. This ensures that if the conditions no longer hold, the fact will be
automatically retracted. The manually translated clause is therefore as follows:
rule "HoldsAt example"
when
Fluent(condition1)
...
OtherFluent(conditionN)
then
insertLogical(new Fluent(value));
end
Listing 15 shows an example rule from the voting protocol. Each condition
from Prolog becomes a Drools condition, and the bound variables are used to
construct the relevant institutionalised power.
Limitations of anonymous variables
We described our method of enabling matching of actions with anonymous
variables in Drools. This method imitates the underscore operator in Prolog,
allowing any value to match that field. However, in some cases we wish to
specify that a field may be any value except ones within a certain set. This
cannot currently be implemented, however it can be overcome with a simple
workaround.
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Listing 16: Drools manual translation of RONR open session.
// holdsAt( pow(C, open_session(C,S))=true, T ) :-
// holdsAt( sitting(S)=false, T ),
// holdsAt( role_of(C,chair)=true, T ).
rule "Pow open session"
when
RoleOf($c : actor, $i : inst, role == " chair ")
then
insertLogical(new Pow($c, new OpenSession($c, $i, null)));
end
// initiates( open_session(C,S), sitting(S)=true, T ) :-
// holdsAt( pow(C, open_session(C,S))=true, T ).
rule "Open Session"
when
$open : OpenSession($a : actor, $i : inst, $name : name, valid ==
false)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($open))
not(exists(Session(inst == $i, name == $name, sitting == true)))
then
insert(new Session($i, $name, true));
modify($open) {
setValid(true);
}
end 
Returning to the RONR example, we can see a case where this problem arises
in the following clause:
holdsAt( pow(C, open_session(C,S))=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( sitting(S)=false, T ),
holdsAt( role_of(C,chair)=true, T ).
This specifies that an agent is empowered to perform the open_session action
for any session which is not sitting (i. e. an infinite set of actions, minus a finite
set of exceptions). In Drools we can only specify that the agent is empowered
to open any session. Therefore, in order to maintain this condition, and so that
we do not process an action incorrectly, we can move this condition to the rule
which processes the action, as shown in Listing 16. The first rule allows for
the agent in the ‘chair’ role to open a session with any name by setting that
field to null. The check for a conflicting session is then done in the second rule,
once the action has been performed.
This approach is not ideal, as it could lead to an agent thinking it has power
to do something when it does not. However, this is a limitation of the Drools
rule language. For situations when such constructs are critical, it may be pos-
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sible to assert a negated power, i. e. that the agent explicitly does not have the
power to do an action. Using a query, this could be given precedence over
the original Pow, such that power(Ag, Act)← Pow(Ag, Act) ∧ ¬NotPow(Ag, Act).
However, we have not yet implemented or tested such a feature, and it is left
for future work.
Rule execution order
In the EC, state transitions are atomic. In Drools a state transition consists
of the sequential application of rules. This means that in some cases EC and
Drools could come to different conclusions with the same specification. This
would be the case if rule initiated an intermediate state in Drools, which then
triggered another rule. In the EC, as the first rule initiated a state for the next
timestep, the second rule would not yet have an effect.
These kinds of issues may be addressed in Drools using two mechanisms.
Firstly, salience, a rule annotation which controls the ordering of rule-consequence
execution. Secondly, control facts—facts in the working memory whose pri-
mary purpose is to control the execution of rules. These facts can be used to,
for example, block activation of a rule for a time after the execution of another.
This is a limitation arising from the use of a different reasoning engine, and
requires extra care in the process of writing Drools rules in order to address.
5.4.4 Drools-EInst
We package together the tools and workflow described into a Java library,
called Drools-EInst. This library allows for the implementation of specifica-
tions as modules. These modules consist of Drools rule files, which implement
a specification, and a Java Application Programming Interface (API) for this
specification. The latter provides a high level interface to the state of the insti-
tution, as well as methods to add or remove objects to the working memory
from Java code. These APIs act as the query and manipulation component of
the Electronic Institution.
We have implemented six modules from EC specifications:
• Institutionalised Power – Our implementation of institutionalised power,
as has been used above. This enables powers, permissions and obliga-
tions to be specified for agents. Queries can then be done to check what
power exists for agents. Additionally, we use a Drools feature called
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‘LiveQuery’ to allow for immediate notification when certain powers be-
come true or false.
• Access Control – Assigns RoleOf facts according to the protocol from Pitt
et al. (2012). This includes multiple role assignment methods.
• Micro Payments – A simple implementation of micro-payments within
an institution. Allows for issuing of invoices which agents should pay,
and for virtual currency transfers between agents.
• Provision and Appropriation – This module manages the provision and
appropriation of heterogeneous resources to a pool, as set out in sec-
tion 3.3. It enables the creation of multiple pools which can specify cer-
tain types of resource which can be provisioned to them. Subsequently,
agents can request resources from the pool and appropriate them. Ad-
ditionally allows for retraction/removal of resources. The power to do
these actions is role-based, using the Access Control module for this.
• RONR voting protocol – The voting protocol specification from RONR as
given in section A.1.
• Voting – A more general voting protocol which enables multiple different
vote types and winner determination methods.
Each module is thoroughly unit tested to ensure that the rules are function-
ing correctly. This is done by running various narratives and then testing the
fluents match expected values.
5.4.5 Performance Evaluation
To compare the performance of the Drools-EInst engine to those tested in sec-
tion 5.3 we run the same experiment again with our RONR implementation.
We extend the test to 100 motions and compare the performance to that of our
simple rule-based EC implementation. The results are shown in Figure 13. We
see that the performance is several times slower than this benchmark, but this
is to be expected when going from a hard-coded implementation to a dynamic
rule engine with forward and backward chaining. However, the performance
hit is negligible when compared to the Prolog implementations, and for longer
narratives the performance gap between it and the benchmark reduces. With
30 motions it is 350 times faster than the faster Prolog implementation (whose
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Figure 13: Execution time of voting protocol using Drools-EInst implementation.
performance was shown in Figure 11), and with 100 motions it is already more
than half the speed of the rule-based EC.
5.4.6 Correctness of Manual Specification Translation
In this section we have presented a method of manually translating EC specifi-
cations in to Drools ones. Having performed this translation we want to verify
that the two specifications we have now are equivalent, that the translation is
provably correct.
The deductive portion of the EC can be characterised as a function which
maps a state (being a set of fluents), and a narrative (a set of actions) to a
new state. Similarly, we use Drools to do this same mapping from a state
in the rule-engine and a set of actions to a new state. Therefore a proof of
correctness must prove the equivalence of these two functions. However, there
are significant hurdles to such a proof:
Firstly, our manual translation process may cause some changes to the rep-
resentation of state and fluents. We change some fluents in order to take ad-
vantage of the richer state representations possible in Java, and to better match
the Drools workflow. This means that we have an additional translation, from
EC state and action representations, to those for Drools.
Secondly, the way we handle past values of fluents in the manual translation
is incompatible with the EC method. The new state generated by the Drools
implementation may only store a subset of past fluents, and therefore not be
equivalent.
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This second issue would prevent full correctness being proved, but we may
wish to instead prove that the state concerning the latest time point is equiva-
lent. We do not yet have such a proof, and we leave this for future work.
However, instead of attempting to prove equivalence for all possible inputs,
we can instead test a subset thereof with unit testing. Using the same frame-
work as we did for benchmarking, we can test a series of input state and
narratives in both specifications, and compare the output states between EC
and with manually translated Drools rules. These input combinations can be
chosen to test each rule in isolation, and combined, and thus give a high level
of confidence in the correctness of the manual translation. This method is used
for all specifications implemented in Drools-EInst.
We consider our approach for deductive reasoning and temporal projection
with Drools adequate for the following reasons. Firstly, there is a functional
equivalence between an initiates or terminates statement in the EC dialect we
are using and a Drools rule. The former describes an event that, when an ac-
companying set of conditions are true, will cause a fluent to change. The latter
describes simply a set of conditions which, when true, cause an operation to
change fluents. With the manual translation method we have described, Drools
rules are controlled so as to trigger only when a specified event happens. Sec-
ondly, the EC assumes that fluents obey the law of inertia— that fluents persist
unless there is reason to believe otherwise—as a method of addressing the
Frame Problem (Shanahan, 1999). As a stateful rule engine, Drools has a simi-
lar concept that state will remain constant unless explicitly changed by a rule.
These reasons, coupled with the empirical correctness shown through unit-
testing of representative specifications, give us a high degree of confidence in
the correctness of the temporal projection done by our approach.
5.5 summary
In this chapter we have investigated the operationalisation of electronic in-
stitutions for specification of procedure and institutionalised power in open
agent systems. Existing methods, based on Logics and action languages, are
rich in reasoning capabilities and expressive; however implementations suffer
from poor performance and scalability. Therefore, we advocate an approach
whereby such representations are still used for specification, but for opera-
tionalisation a manual translation to production rules is made, allowing for
significantly faster event processing while maintaining expressiveness. We
demonstrate this approach by describing the manual translation of EC axioms
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into rules for the Drools rule engine, and the implementation of the Drools-
EInst library for the processing of institutional actions. With this library we
achieve a speed-up of two orders of magnitude over the Prolog baseline when
running a representative voting protocol.
This approach is similar to that of Arcos et al. (2005) and Aldewereld et al.
(2006) in that logic-based specifications are translated into faster constraint or
rule specifications, however our method maintains a much closer correspon-
dence between logic and rule specifications. There is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between EC axioms and Drools rules, with each EC query becoming a
single Drools condition. We believe this relation is apparent when comparing
the specifications.
The cost of this performance improvement from EC to Drools is the loss of
abductive and inductive reasoning over the specification, and the loss of the
cache of past values of fluents. As the implementation using rules is primarily
aimed at speeding up deduction at the cost of abduction and induction this
first loss is expected. The second is mitigated by the fact that with Drools we
can still explicitly store fluents describing historical states, and therefore keep
history in a more efficient manner.
Though there are only a relatively small number of modules implemented
in the Drools-EInst library, we expect this to increase as it is used by more
simulations and applications. The modularity of the library’s design enables
it to be used for rapid development and prototyping of electronic institutions.
A user can easily test various different module permutations, as well as rich
configuration options provided by each module itself. Thus, this library can
be seen as a toolkit for deploying electronic institutions into socio-technical
systems.
The performance of the Drools-EInst tool enables its use for the simulation
of larger agent populations than has been previously possible with Prolog
implementations. This allows for the integration of an electronic institution
into a Presage2 simulation, which we do in the next chapter.
6
S I M U L AT I O N O F A K N O W L E D G E C O M M O N S
In this chapter we present a computer model of participatory sensing anduse this model to test our theory that by managing information andknowledge as a commons, and according to Ostrom’s principles for sus-
tainable management of common-pool resources we can improve the outcomes
for agents in this system.
We first describe our model of participatory sensing, which approximates
a participatory sensing campaign as a reinforcement learning problem. This
approximation allows us to abstract the details of individual campaigns and
simply reason about where utility is accrued in the system. We describe the im-
plementation of our simulation model, which combines an abstract reinforce-
ment learning problem with the provision and appropriation system outlined
in chapter 3. This model is implemented using Presage2, with institutional
rules processed by Drools-EInst. We then describe the results of a series of
experiments with this simulation model.
6.1 modelling participatory sensing as a reinforcement learn-
ing problem
So far we have articulated participatory sensing as the contribution of informa-
tion by individuals to a pool. This collected information can then be used to
generate new derived information using some kind of knowledge. However,
we have yet to describe what this knowledge is.
In general, an algorithm which takes data as an input and gives informa-
tion about the data as an output can be classified as a machine learning al-
gorithm. Data aggregation in participatory-sensing applications follows this
pattern. There are three main types of machine learning. Supervised learning
takes data which has been labelled by an expert, and aims to learn how to
predict this label for unlabelled data; unsupervised learning looks for patterns
in unlabelled data; and in reinforcement learning performs actions and receives
feedback from an environment, and aims to chose actions which receive the
highest rewards.
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Participatory sensing may deal with either of these types of machine learn-
ing. Using raw sensor readings of, for example, temperature, and using them
to predict future temperatures would be unsupervised learning from sensing
data. If these readings also had a user specified ‘comfort’ level attached to
them, then we could use supervised learning to work out if comfort level is cor-
related with temperature and infer expected comfort levels from temperature
data. Reinforcement learning would be used when the output of the sensing
process informs actions to be taking in the same environment that sensing is
done.
When viewing participatory sensing as an agent-based system, we can see
that information is often generated as a result of an action: that of taking a
sensor reading. This information, when combined with other information and
processed by a suitable machine learning algorithm, leads to derived informa-
tion with some additional value. In most cases, part of this value is offered
back to the original gatherer as an incentive to contribute. In many cases this
information improves a decision process in the agent, and the whole sensing
process can be seen as an optimisation feedback loop. Consider some of our
reviewed examples from chapter 2:
• Pothole Patrol (Eriksson et al., 2008), VTrack (Thiagarajan et al., 2009),
Parknet (Mathur et al., 2010) and Waze all use information from partic-
ipating cars to provide optimised route information back to them, such
that they can reach their destination quicker, avoid hazards and so on.
• With LiveCompare (Deng and Cox, 2009) users can derive reduced gro-
cery costs from the information provided via the app.
• Cloud2Bubble (Costa et al., 2012) gives feedback to users to improve their
comfort levels during public transportation journeys.
These can be seen as reinforcement learning problems. Users are taking
repeated actions, such as driving, buying grocery items or taking public trans-
portation, and each time deriving both utility and information from the pro-
cess. This can be then used to optimise the process for the next iteration. This
process can be done individually, but participatory sensing can significantly
speed up this learning process.
Reinforcement learning is a form of machine learning where one aims to de-
termine which sequence of actions to take in order to maximise a cumulative
reward. This is a method of learning while interacting with the environment,
and based on the feedback given from each action. It differs from supervised
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learning in that the agent is not provided with examples, it must learn through
trying actions. This reveals an important trade-off in reinforcement learning,
that of exploitation vs. exploration. This trade-off is between exploiting a known
good strategy and exploring unknown strategies for one which may be bet-
ter (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Participatory sensing is particularly useful for these kinds of problems as
it can reduce the need for exploration. In the case of vehicle navigation an
individual would have to do significant exploration to find a suitable route in
a new area. Expanding the number of vehicles contributing data allows indi-
viduals to navigate new areas with little exploration required, and therefore
derive a better utility.
In most practical participatory-sensing applications, the aim is to infer the
utility of actions from the provided information and then provide advice on
the best action to perform next. For our model we simplify this process by
making the information provided be the actual utility observed. This allows
us to frame a participatory sensing problem within the abstract reinforcement
learning framework, defined by Sutton and Barto (1998).
This framework, defines an agent which interacts with an environment in
discrete time-steps. Each time-step the agent receives the environment’s state
and selects an action from the set of those available from the current state.
Then in the next time-step the agent receives a reward from his action, and the
new state and the process continues. The decision about which action to take
is done by the agent’s policy, and this is what reinforcement learning aims to
improve. The agent’s goal is to maximise its total accrued reward.
We instantiate this framework with multiple agents in a shared environment.
Within this environment there are institutions available which provide policies
via provision and appropriation actions. The integration of reinforcement learn-
ing with a provision and appropriation system is shown in Figure 14. When
in a state at time t, st, an agent performs an action at, resulting in a new state
st+1, and a reward rt+1. Unlike in a standard reinforcement learning scenario,
where the agent’s own learning policy is used, the agent provisions a tuple
(at, st, st+1, rt+1) (describing this observation of environment behaviour), and
then appropriates a suggested next action at+1, from an institution.
This model integrates the reinforcement learning framework with our frame-
work for participatory sensing as a provision and appropriation system from
chapter 3. The provision and appropriation actions from reinforcement learn-
ing agents match those of gatherers and consumers. Policies are provided by
analysts. In our model we do not use evaluators, however they could be added
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Figure 14: Abstract reinforcement framework integrated with a provision and appro-
priation system (adapted from Sutton and Barto (1998, p.52)).
to provide meta level analysis of the quality of policies, by determining the
efficacy of actions suggested by them.
6.2 model implementation
We now describe the implementation of this model of participatory sensing
as an abstract reinforcement learning problem. We firstly describe how the
abstract reinforcement learning task is implemented on Presage2, and how
specific tasks can be specified and used. We then integrate Drools-EInst to pro-
vide the institutional framework for the provision and appropriation system
such that agents can interact with it.
Our model implementation makes several assumptions about, and simplifi-
cations of, the participatory sensing problem we are modelling. Namely:
• Rewards gained from an action are directly measurable by the agent.
• Rewards are a tradeable and divisible currency. This reduces complexity
by preventing the need for a separate currency.
• The only flow of rewards into the system is that generated by agents’
actions on the reinforcement-learning problem. For example, an analyst
cannot sell information elsewhere to generate rewards.
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• Agents are working on the problem long-term, therefore we have re-
peated (inter)actions and thus can assume that agents are likely to be
cooperative (Axelrod, 1984).
The computer model is split into two independent components, which are
then linked by the agents’ interaction with each component. These components
are the learning problem itself, and the electronic institution for participatory
sensing.
6.2.1 Reinforcement Learning Problem
We implement a reinforcement learning problem in Presage2 using the afore-
mentioned abstract framework. This allows the simple substitution of any
concrete problem into the simulation without changing how agents interact
with the problem.
We first redefine the reinforcement learning terminology to avoid conflict
with the terms we already use, and define the names we will use for other
entities in this implementation:
• We rename an action to strategy, as we already use action extensively to
describe how agents interact with the institution and environment. This
strategy is a member of the set of possible agent actions, and is encapsu-
lated in the simulation by a Strategy object.
• The policy used to determine a strategy given a set of observed rewards
we call a prediction algorithm.
• The problem state for an agent is defined by a State object.
• The tuple describing an observed reward from a strategy performed from
a State is a measurement, and encapsulated by a Measured object.
Our implementation allows the measuring of rewards to be optional, at the
discretion of the agent. Measuring may incur a cost, which is specified as a
simulation parameter.
A specific reinforcement learning problem is implemented by defining how
a reward is determined for an agent, given a Strategy and State at a time-step
t, and what states and strategies are valid.
As an example, consider the popular N-Armed Bandit problem. In this
problem, agents can choose from N actions, each of which have a different
probability of paying out a reward. There is no intermediate state in this game
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so the state is static, and the prediction algorithm simply aims to estimate
the action with the highest payout probability. These probabilities may also
change over time, a so-called moving bandit problem, requiring the algorithm
to weight newer information higher than old.
Agents playing the N-Armed Bandit game are likely to experience varying
outcomes, largely due to the exploitation vs. exploration trade-off. Reinforce-
ment learning policies often utilise probabilistic random exploration of other
strategies, leading to non-deterministic behaviour. From a simulation perspec-
tive this increases the number of repeats required to achieve statistically signif-
icant results.
Therefore, instead of using a specific learning problem like N-Armed Bandit,
we model the problem and prediction algorithms as a black box. We use the re-
sults, presented by Sutton and Barto (1998, p.43) that an agent using a suitable
prediction algorithm on a moving N-Armed Bandit problem tends towards an
optimal strategy selection. When plotting number of measurements against
average rewards received, this gives a logarithmic curve. Therefore, we can
define a prediction algorithm which generates pseudo strategies, which state
how many measurements the algorithm which generated it has been trained
with. Then we define the reward for a strategy (ignoring the state) as a function
of this number of measurements. We include a time window on the usefulness
of measurements, such that old measurements are eventually superseded by
new.
The reward function of this game rt, given a chosen strategy a, can be speci-
fied as follows:
rt (a) =
1
e · n |collectedM (t)| , where pred (collectedM (t)) = a
Where e represents the expiry time of measurements, n is a normalising fac-
tor equal to the maximum number of measurements possible in a single time-
step, collectedM returns the set of measurements which have been collected for
a prediction algorithm at time t (limited to the time window [t− e, t]), and the
pred function generates a strategy, a, from a set of measurements.
This function therefore returns the average proportion of possible measure-
ments gathered by the prediction algorithm over the last e time-steps. This is a
value between 0 and 1 which represents how good the policy is. The size of the
expiry parameter, e, adjusts the function’s sensitivity to keeping new informa-
tion. Smaller values will reflect problems with fast-changing strategies which
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need a constantly updated model, while larger values model slow-changing
systems. We use this pseudo reward function for the experiments presented in
this chapter.
To summarise, our model of an abstract reinforcement learning problem is
based on the premise that increasing rewards are correlated with increasing
information about playing the game. In this particular we base the relation-
ship on the empirical results of a single player N-Armed Bandit game using a
Q-Learning strategy. Similar results, where rewards or prediction accuracy in-
crease logarithmically with the number of collected data points or trials, have
also been observed in more complex reinforcement learning problems. These
include Sutton (1996) who applies reinforcement learning to robot control, and
Banko and Brill (2001) whose work concerns Natural Language Processing.
Therefore, we believe this model to be exemplar of a general participatory-
sensing problem.
6.2.2 Institution Design and Implementation
We implement an electronic institution for the provision and appropriation of
information and knowledge, following the framework we outlined in chapter 3,
and using our rule engine for electronic institutions, Drools-EInst. In these
simulations we focus on addressing the first three of Ostrom’s principles in
order to create an enduring, self-organising institution. These three deal with
operational rules of an institution, and therefore represent the first step in
institution implementation. Thus, at this preliminary investigation stage, we
do not implement the other principles at this time. The first three principles,
and the requirements of participatory sensing as a provision and appropriation
system, give the following tasks for the institution:
• Clearly defined boundaries—The boundaries of the institution must be
defined, not only who can contribute and withdraw resource units, but
what resources are managed by the institution.
• Provision and appropriation rules—Appropriate rules are required for
the conditions. In this case the incentivisation of particular user roles to
encourage contribution is important.
• Collective-choice arrangements—The rules should be able to be modified
by those who they affect.
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As the difference between institutionalised power and permission is subtle,
and not used for the features we want to implement here, we will assume that
power implies permission. This simplifies the specification both from an im-
plementation and execution perspective. Note also that, as well as translating
relevant axioms from the Event Calculus (EC) specifications given previously,
we also write some application specific rules directly into Drools.
The Drools-EInst provision and appropriation system module provides the
basis of the resource pools in the institution. This is a role-based implemen-
tation which allows the specification of multiple Pools for different resource
types. The institution specifies which roles are permitted to contribute, ex-
tract1, and remove artifacts to/from the pool. This allows us to then build
institutionalised power for these actions, as shown in Listing 17. This is a gen-
eralised version of the EC specification given for Principle 1 in section 3.3, and
written directly in Drools.
Successful provisions are added to the set of artifacts stored in the pool. As
artifacts are heterogeneous, agents need to be able to specify an artifact when
appropriating. This is done through a Request which searches for artifacts in
the pool matching a query. The individual artifacts can then be appropriated.
The same process applies to Prune actions for artifact removal.
The running of the institution is not free, however. We implement facility
costs using four parameters:
• Sunk costs—This cost is a one-off cost incurred when the institution is
created. This reflects initial hardware/software purchase.
• Fixed costs—This is a recurring cost each time-step. This would reflect
long-term lease of equipment or similar recurring costs.
• Marginal storage costs—This is a recurring cost proportional to the num-
ber of artifacts in the pool. For example renting storage space in a cloud
data-centre.
• Marginal transaction costs—This is a recurring cost proportional to the
number of provision/appropriation requests in the last time-step. This
reflects the cost of processing power or bandwidth in a cloud computing
environment.
1 Note that, as the resource is non-subtractable, the artifact remains in the pool after extraction,
and the extraction action is akin to copying.
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Listing 17: Institutionalised power for provision, appropration and removal from a
pool of artifacts. The artifactMatcher specifies which type of object can
be provisioned to the pool.
rule "Pow Provision"
when
RoleOf($a : actor, $r : role, $i : inst)
Pool(inst == $i, contribRoles contains $r, $type : artifactMatcher
)
then
insertLogical( new Pow($a, new Provision($a, $i, $type)));
end
rule "Pow Appropriate"
when
RoleOf($a : actor, $r : role, $i : inst)
Pool(inst == $i, extractRoles contains $r, $type : artifactMatcher
)
then
insertLogical( new Pow($a, new Appropriate($a, $i, $type)));
end
rule "Pow Remove"
when
RoleOf($a : actor, $r : role, $i : inst)
Pool(inst == $i, removalRoles contains $r, $type : artifactMatcher
)
then
insertLogical( new Pow($a, new Remove($a, $i, $type)));
end 
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These costs are calculated and the institution invoiced each time-step. If the
institution is no longer able to pay these invoices it goes bankrupt, and will
cease to operate.
In order to pay for facility costs the institution provides two mechanisms.
The first is a simple cost sharing, where certain nominated roles share the cost
of the outstanding institution invoices. This shares costs equally and ensures
that, provided the agents can afford it, the institution’s costs are covered. The
other method is the use of a subscription fee on a per role basis. This fee
charges per time-step for the occupation of a role. The rules to implement
both of these methods are shown in Listing 18. These rules calculate a total
value due per agent and then create an obligation to Transfer the required
amount. It is then up to the agent itself whether it fulfils the obligation.
In order to incentivise provision of useful artifacts to the institution we offer
a mechanism for remuneration of providers. This can be done either through a
payment on provision of an artifact, or when a provisioned artifact is appropri-
ated. While the former places a uniform value on each artifact, the latter allows
greater remuneration for more valuable or useful artifacts. Furthermore, the
latter payments can be funded by the institution easier, by simply charging the
fee directly to appropriators. The implementation of the pay on appropriation
method is shown in Listing 19.
We implement collective choice using the Drools-EInst voting module. This
provides configurable voting for any issue. An Issue specifies something
which can be voted on, and how the voting is done in terms of:
• which agent roles are empowered to open and close a ballot on the issue,
• which agent roles are empowered to vote in a ballot on the issue,
• how votes should be cast (e. g. single choice, preference list, rank order),
• what the valid choices are,
• how the winner is determined from the set of votes (e. g. plurality, borda
count, instant runoff)
The module provides the institutionalised powers based on this specification,
and rules to process agent actions to open ballots, vote, and declare winners.
Listing 20 shows examples of the implementation of these rules. The full spec-
ification of this protocol’s actions and fluents is given in section A.3.
Using this module collective choice can be simply implemented by first, spec-
ifying an Issue to apply voting to, and then secondly, writing a rule to react
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Listing 18: Paying for institution costs. Note that the Drools accumulate clause en-
ables the matching of a set of matching facts and uses a function create an
aggregated value over the set. This clause is written with three semi-colon
separated arguments: First a pattern to match to build the set of matches.
Second an aggregation function which collects values matched internally
in the clause, and binds them to a variable available in the outer rule scope.
In this case collectSet collects bound variables into a set. Third is a con-
straint to check whether this pattern can activate the rule.
rule "Share institution costs "
when
// match an institution and the roles which should pay costs
$i : DataInstitution($r : payRoles)
// the balance of the institution is negative
$acc : Account(holder == $i, balance < 0, $bal : balance)
T($t : t)
// control fact to ensure max one execution per inst per time-step
not( PaidInstCosts($i, $t;) )
// collect set of agents with role in the institution
accumulate(
RoleOf(inst == $i, $r contains role, $a : actor);
$payers : collectSet($a);
$payers.size() > 0)
then
// split cost between agents and issue oligation to pay
double balanceDue = -1 * $bal / $payers.size();
for(Object o : $payers) {
Actor a = (Actor) o;
insert( new Obl(a, new Transfer(a, $i, $i, balanceDue) ));
}
insert( new PaidInstCosts($i,$t) );
end
rule " Institution Subscription Fee"
when
RoleOf($a : actor, $i : inst, $r : role)
// agent’s role must pay subscription fees
DataInstitution(this == $i, subscriptionFees.containsKey($r),
$fees : subscriptionFees)
T($t : t)
// control fact to prevent multiple charges
not( FeeIssued($a, $i, $t;) )
then
insert( new FeeIssued($a, $i, $t) );
// create obligation to pay fee
double fee = $fees.get($r));
if(fee > 0) {
insert( new Obl($a, new Transfer($a, $i, $i, fee) ) );
}
end 
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Listing 19: Drools specification of payment for provision of artifacts.
rule "Pay provider on appropriation"
when
T($t : t)
$app : Appropriate(t == $t, $art : artifact, $i : inst,
$appropriator : actor, valid == true)
// Pool appropriated from has a pay-on-appropriation fee
MeteredPool(inst == $i, payOnAppropriation > 0, artifacts contains
$art, $pay : payOnAppropriation)
// Find the original provision for this artifact
Provision($provider : actor, inst == $i, artifact == $art, actor
!= $appropriator, valid == true)
RoleOf(inst == $i, actor == $appropriator ) // appropriator has a
role
RoleOf(inst == $i, actor == $provider ) // provider has a role
not( FeeIssued( $appropriator, $app, $t ;) )
then
insert( new Transfer($i, $provider, $pay, $t) );
insert( new FeeIssued($appropriator, $app, $t) );
end
rule "Pool appropriation fee "
when
RoleOf($a : actor, $i : inst, $r : role)
// Pool with appropriation fees
$p : MeteredPool(inst == $i, appropriationFees.containsKey($r),
$matcher : artifactMatcher, $fees : appropriationFees)
T($t : t)
not( FeeIssued($a, $p, $t;) )
// Count the number of appropriations from this pool by this agent
accumulate( Appropriate($item : artifact, actor == $a, inst == $i,
t == $t, $matcher.matches($item));
$count : count($item); $count > 0)
then
double fee = $fees.get($r)
if(fee > 0) {
insert( new Obl($a, new Transfer($a, $i, $i, fee * $count) ) )
;
}
insert( new FeeIssued($a, $p, $t) );
end 
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Listing 20: Opening of ballots and voting.
rule "Open Ballot "
when
$open : OpenBallot($a : actor, $i : inst, $is : issue, $t: t,
valid == false)
Issue(this == $is)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($open))
then
insert( new Ballot($is, $t) );
modify($open) {
setValid(true);
}
end
rule "Pow open ballot "
when
$is : Issue($i : inst, $r : cfvRoles)
RoleOf($h : actor, inst == $i, $r contains role)
not( Ballot(issue == $is, status == Ballot.Status.OPEN) )
then
insertLogical( new Pow($h, new OpenBallot($h, $i, $is) ) );
end
rule "Pow Vote"
when
$b : Ballot(status == Ballot.Status.OPEN, $r : voteRoles, $t :
started)
RoleOf($a : actor, inst == $b.issue.inst, $r contains role)
not( Vote(actor == $a, inst == $b.issue.inst, ballot == $b, t > $t
, valid == true) )
then
insertLogical( new Pow($a, new Vote($a, $b.getIssue().getInst(),
$b, null) ) );
end 
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to the appropriate winner declaration and update fluents to reflect the conse-
quence of the vote.
For example, to implement a dynamic subscription fee for an institution
we create a SubscriptionFee which extends Issue. This issue implements a
function updateFee which we can use to update the fee following a vote. This
process can then be implemented in a simple rule:
rule "Change Subscription fees "
when
$issue : SubscriptionFee($i : inst)
Declare( ballot.issue == $issue, $w : winner, valid == true )
then
$issue.updateFee($w);
end
We use this method to implement collective choice for institution subscrip-
tion fees and pool appropriation fees.
This implementation brings together the general purpose tools from Drools-
EInst, with the library of general purpose modules to create an implementation
of generic components for a provision and appropriation system. For the spe-
cific simulation we wish to simulate, we construct an instance with the correct
components enabled and configured. This is done by simply inserting facts
to describe the institution configuration into the rule engine, loaded with the
general specification.
For our reinforcement learning problem we require two pools, one for Measured
artifacts, and another for Prediction artifacts as generated by prediction al-
gorithms. These Prediction artifacts represent a recommended strategy for
the agent who appropriates them. The Measured pool allows contributions
from gatherers, extraction by analysts and removal by a manager role. For the
Prediction pool, contribution and extraction roles are reversed. These pools
can also be configured with initial provision or appropriation fees and collec-
tive choice regarding how these can be changed. Figure 15 shows this institu-
tional configuration and the actions each role will perform.
6.2.3 Agent Implementation
The agents in this simulation can be classified into two groups: those who
are playing the reinforcement learning game, PlayerAgents, and those who
are not, NonPlayerAgents. The former are the gatherers and consumers of infor-
mation, while the latter constitute any other agent who is involved with the
6.2 model implementation 146
Reinforcement 
Learning Problem
PlayerAgent
(gatherer, consumer)
NonPlayerAgent
(analyst)
NonPlayerAgent
(initiator)
Strategy Measured
Provision and 
Appropriation System
Measured 
Pool
Prediction 
Pool
provision(Measured)
appropriate(Prediction) provision(Prediction)
appropriate(Measured)
openBallot
vote
closeBallot
declare
vote vote
Figure 15: Configuration of an institution for reinforcement learning. Lines show ac-
tions and the movement of information in the system. The roles for each
agent are displayed in brackets.
institution in some way. These two groups have significant overlap in terms of
their interactions with the institution, therefore we propose a behaviour-driven
agent implementation where we define agents with a set of behaviours. These
behaviours are independent, but may read and write shared data to allow for
complex behaviours from their combination. We describe the behaviours we
have implemented and how we compose them.
Our agents have two operating modes which are specified when the agent
is created:
• Sustainable—This mode pursues what it deems to be sustainable deci-
sions for the institution. It aims for sustainable outcomes over individual
enrichment. However, this does not mean that the agent will sacrifice
all his resources on this goal, he will leave the institution if there is no
long-term benefit for himself.
• Greedy—This mode pursues individually optimal decisions. It makes
self-interested choices whenever possible, in order to maximise acrued
rewards.
Where applicable we note how a behaviour will be different in each opera-
tion mode.
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Gameplay Behaviour
This behaviour implements an agent’s interaction with the reinforcement learn-
ing problem. This involves choosing a strategy and performing it, as well as
deciding whether to measure the reward gained from this strategy.
There may be multiple Predictions available, from different prediction al-
gorithms, in pools which the agent can appropriate from. The agent may
also have its own prediction algorithm to generate strategies. Therefore the
agent employs basic learning to dynamically choose a preferred source for
Predictions based on the reward gained using this source in the past.
All agents also have a behaviour to train their own prediction algorithm
given the Measured artifacts available to them. This maybe only self-measured
artifacts, or be ones appropriated from a pool.
Lastly, greedy PlayerAgents have a behaviour to determine whether to mea-
sure the reward of strategies or not. This behaviour compares the cost of mea-
suring to the reward given by the institution for provision or appropriation of
this information. If the former is greater then measuring is disabled for the
aforementioned gameplay behaviour.
Institutional Behaviours
The remaining behaviours involve interaction with the institution. For several
of these we are only interested in triggering the behaviour when the agent
is empowered to do a particular action in an institution. For this we use
a PowerReactiveBehaviour. This behaviour reacts to a particular institution-
alised power for an agent, enabling the behaviour when the agent is empow-
ered, and disabling when they are not. Behaviours that extend from this class
specify the action they require empowerment for, and the behaviour for each
institution where this power exists.
In addition to this use, we define a number of institutional rules which com-
pel agents to perform actions via an obligation. An InstitutionalBehaviour
is implemented which responds to the presence of obligations for an agent.
The behaviour listens for incoming obligations for an agent and performs the
action as specified.
Provision and Appropriation
The provision and appropriation behaviours are the primary institution interac-
tion behaviour for all agents. We implement these as PowerReactiveBehaviours
for each artifact type. These behaviours are:
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• ProvisionMeasuredBehaviour—When pow(provision(A, _, M)) = true for
an agent A and Measured artifact M, agent A will provision any measure-
ments to the institution.
• AppropriatePredictorBehaviour—When pow(appropriate(A, _, P)) = true
for agent A and Prediction artifact P, agent A will Request for any new
Predictions in the pool. Additionally, when this power no longer holds
for an institution, any appropriated Predictors from this institution will
be removed from the set available to the gameplay behaviour.
• ProvisionPredictorBehaviour—When pow(provision(A, _, P)) = true for
an agent A and Predictor artifact P, agent A will provision its Predictor
to the institution, if it has not done so already.
• AppropriateMeasuredBehaviour—When pow(appropriate(A, _, M)) = true
for agent A and Measured artifact M, agent A will Request new Measured
artifacts to appropriate from the pool. If there is an appropriation fee for
this pool he will limit the number of appropriations such that he does
not bankrupt himself.
• PruneMeasuredBehaviour—When pow(remove(A, _, M)) = true for agent
A and Measured artifact M, agent A will Prune old Measured artifacts
from the pool. This behaviour aims to keep the number of artifacts in the
pool down to avoid incurring high storage costs.
Role Management
The RoleManagement behaviour keeps track of the agent’s use of institutional
roles. If an agent is no longer utilising the benefits of a role he can resign in
order to avoid incurring costs associated with it. For example if a consumer has
appropriated Predictions from multiple institutions, but is only using one, he
can Resign membership of the other institutions with no loss of his ability to
appropriate from the preferred Predictions.
Voting
Finally, agents’ VoteBehaviour specifies how they will vote when they are em-
powered to vote on a ballot. It has modules for each ballot they may vote on.
Agents are given limited information with which to decide how to vote. They
do not have information about how other agents are performing, and therefore
must decide based on purely their own performance and operating mode. The
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exception to this rule is that they can also see the public information of the
institution in order to judge how to set subscription fees.
In our institution implementation we have implemented two issues we may
have collective choice on: subscription fees and appropriation fees. We have
separate voting behaviour for each. Both votes are done by preference list,
where the candidates are the possible absolute values for these fees.
Firstly, the subscription fee vote strategy varies based on the agent’s operat-
ing mode, and whether they occupy the role of initiator or not:
• If the agent is sustainable, they look at the current profit margin of the in-
stitution and chose a subscription value which will lead to the institution
breaking even. Preferences are chosen by calculating a projected balance
for the institution in the future, based on current conditions.
• If the agent is greedy and is in the initiator role, they aim to extract a high
fee to make the institution profitable while not so high as to make other
agents leave their roles.
• If the agent is greedy and must pay the fee, they vote for the lowest
possible fee.
The algorithm for agents to generate these preferences is given in Listing 21.
The appropriation fee voting strategy varies based on whether the agent is
a beneficiary of the fee, a payer, or if they are an initiator. There are also
different strategies for sustainable and greedy operating modes. Generally,
these strategies determine whether to increase, decrease, or keep the same
subscription fee based on their current profit and a range where they deem
their profit acceptable:
• Greedy beneficiaries chose to increase the fee if their profit is too low;
• Sustainable beneficiaries increase or decrease the fee depending on whether
they are making too little or too much profit respectively, or keep it the
same if it is within this range;
• Greedy payers simply vote for the minimum possible fee;
• Sustainable payers employ the reciprocal strategy to sustainable benefi-
ciaries and;
• Initiators simply select an optimal balance between pool fees (which we
determine from the first experiments).
The algorithm for agents to generate these preferences is shown in Listing 22.
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Listing 21: Subscription voting algorithm.
currentFee ← Current subscription fee
profit ← Current Institution profit
balance ← Current Institution balance
S ← Set of possible subscription fee choices
nPayers ← Number of agents currently obligated to pay this fee
l ← Time window over which to make balance estimation
begin
switch profile do
case "SUSTAINABLE"
baseProfit ← profit - currentFee * nPayers
foreach f in S do
projections[f] ← abs(balance + l * (baseProfit + f * nPayers)
)
preferences ← List of preferences from S, sorted by projections
end
case "GREEDY"
if initiator then
targetSub ← 0.7 - measuringCost
foreach f in S do
diffs[f] ← abs(targetSub - f)
preferences ← List of preferences from S, sorted by diffs
else if payer then
preferences ← List of preferences from S, sorted in ascending
order
end
end
end
return preferences
end 
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Listing 22: Appropriation fee voting algorithm.
c ← Current appropriation fee
S ← Set of possible appropriation fee choices
b ← Current balance of the agent,
p ← Current profit made by the agent
begin
if beneficiary of fee then
switch profile do
case "GREEDY"
if p < 0.1 then r ← c + 0.1
else if p < 1 then r ← c + 0.05
else r ← c
end
case "SUSTAINABLE"
if p < -0.5 or b < 0 then r ← c + 0.1
else if p > 0.8 then r ← c - 0.05
else if p > 1 then r ← c - 0.1
else if p < 0.1 then r ← c + 0.05
else r ← c
end
end
else if payer of fee then
switch profile do
case "GREEDY"
return List of preferences from S, sorted in ascending order
end
case "SUSTAINABLE"
if p < -1 then r ← c - 0.1
else if p <= 0.1 then r ← c - 0.05
else if p > 1 then r ← c + 0.05
else if p > 2 then r ← c + 0.1
else r ← c
end
end
else if initiator then
if measuredPool then r ← measuringCost
else r ← 0.075 + (9 * measuringCost / 10)
end
foreach f in S do
d[f] ← abs(r - f)
end
preferences ← List of preferences from S, sorted by d
return preferences
end 
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Behavioural Composition
Due to the power-reactive nature of most of the institutional behaviours we can
include them in all agents, and they will lie dormant if they are not applicable
to the roles the agent occupies in the institution. This means that the dif-
ferences between agents are determined by the allocation of non-institutional
behaviours, their operating mode and the initial Predictor. We define agents
for each of the participatory sensing roles as follows:
• Gatherer/consumer agents, which use gameplay and predictor training
behaviours;
• analyst agents, which use predictor training behaviour, and will have a
better Predictor than gatherers; and
• an Initiator agent, which uses only institutional behaviours.
6.3 evaluative criteria
In our analysis of participatory sensing using the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) framework, we finished by discussing five evaluative cri-
teria which can be used to assess the efficacy of a knowledge commons. We
revisit these within the context of our model to obtain quantitative measures of
system performance. We can then use these as tools for objective comparison
of different approaches to managing information and knowledge resources.
We define these criteria in the context of our experimental model. We then
describe how we use these criteria in our simulations in order to present com-
parisons between simulation runs.
6.3.1 Definition
1. Increase in knowledge evaluates the extent to which the system has gener-
ated new knowledge. In our model, reward gained is a direct measure of
the quality of knowledge. Therefore, we can give a metric of the knowl-
edge generated by the system as the sum of all agent accrued rewards.
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The knowledge generated in a time-step t, K(t), can therefore be ex-
pressed as the sum of the rewards accrued by all agents in the system
within this time-step:
K(t) := ∑
ag∈A
rewardAccrued(ag, t)
where A is the set of all agents in the system.
2. Sustainability measures whether a system endures in the long term. This
can be simply measured by testing whether the institution has not shut
down due to bankruptcy after a fixed period of time.
We can express this as whether the institutional account, which pays for
facility costs, is positive at a time-step t. This function S(i, t) returns
a Boolean representation of whether the institution i has endured until
time t:
S(i, t) :=
(
t
∑
t′=0
rewardAccrued(i, t′)
)
> 0
Where i is the institutional account, such that rewardAccrued(i, t) returns
the rewards received for the running of the institution at time t, minus
the cost of running it.
3. Participation standards measures the level of participation within the insti-
tution. As our agents are implemented such that they will resign roles
they no longer need, the number of occupied roles is a good measure of
participation.
Thus, we express this metric, P(i, t) as the number of roles occupied in
the institution i at the time t:
P(i, t) := ∑
ag∈A,r∈R
x
where x =
1 if holdsAt (role_of (ag, i, r), t) = true0 otherwise
Where A is the set of agents and R is the set of possible roles.
4. Efficiency determines the economic cost of the system relative to its pro-
ductive output. In this case the cost is purely measured by facility cost
and the output is the accumulated rewards.
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We express this metric by measuring the fractional proportion of output
used on facility costs, and subtracting this from 1. This expression can
be written as follows:
η(i, t) := ∑
t
t′=0K(t′)
∑tt′=0 (K(t′) + facilityCost(i, t′))
WhereK(t) is accumulated knowledge, from metric 1, and facilityCost(i, t)
returns the cost of the facility for institution i in time-step t.
5. Equity measures whether agents the are compensated according to their
efforts. Given that all agents have the potential to achieve the same, we
can expect that an equitable system will result in all agents achieving
the same total rewards. Therefore the equity can be measured as the
standard deviation of the set of all agents’ accrued rewards.
This is expressed by E(t) which constructs the set of accrued rewards
for all agents for the time window 0 − t, then calculates the standard
deviation over this set:
E(t) := σ(St), where St =
{
ag ∈ A :
t
∑
t′=0
rewardAccrued(ag, t′)
}
In order to match the other criteria, which all have the property that
a higher value represents better performance, we instead measure the
ratio of the standard deviation and mean, which gives a unitless mea-
sure of inequity, then subtract it from 1. This gives a measure where 1
means everyone received the same rewards, values less than this indicate
increasing inequity:
E ′(t) := 1− σ(St)
St
6.3.2 Presentation in the results
The criteria which we have defined can all be measured at various time-points
in the simulation. For the purposes of our simulations we use the criteria for
comparison between simulation runs, to determine if one run is ‘better’ than
another. We measure the defined criteria as follows:
• Increase in knowledge is measured as the cumulative sum over the whole
simulation time: ∑tmaxt=0 K(t).
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• Sustainability is measured at the end of the elapsed simulation time, thus
we measure S(i, tmax).
• Participation Standards are measured by comparing the institution mem-
bership at the start and end of the simulation: P(i,tmax)P(i,0)
• Efficiency is measured at the end of simulation time: η(i, tmax)
• Equity is also measured at the end of simulation time: E ′(tmax)
When comparing a group of simulations we also normalise the total rewards
(increase in knowledge) by dividing all values by the largest in the set. This
therefore leads to all criteria being specified in the range [0, 1]. Averaging
the normalised criteria for each simulation gives a total score, representing
performance across all criteria.
When performing parameter sweeps we display the resulting evaluative cri-
teria in heatmaps. These visualise where optimal parameter configurations lie.
Our heatmaps show four individual maps, showing normalised participation
standards, increase in knowledge, equity, and the total score over all 5 criteria.
6.4 experimental agenda and simulation results
We now combine the three components from the previous section: the rein-
forcement learning problem, the institution for provision and appropriation
of artifacts for this problem, and the agent implementations as described to
create our computer model of participatory sensing. We perform controlled
experimentation with this model in order to answer the following question.
How can governance be provisioned for participatory sensing?
In chapter 2 and chapter 3 we outlined the problem of supply of institu-
tions. This problem is the difficulty in supplying an effective institution to a
Common-Pool Resource (CPR) problem. Here we have done much of the work
in specifying an institution which defines boundaries and provides scope for
dynamic appropriation and provision rules depending on conditions. How-
ever, this is no guarantee of a ‘good’ outcome.
In our first round of experiments we investigate the specification space of our
system to determine whether a trade-off between our evaluative criteria can be
found, and how the system’s equilibrium changes under different conditions.
In the second set of experiments we take this further, and test our hypoth-
esis that appropriate enfranchisement of agents can lead to a good outcome,
according to our evaluative criteria. To do this we exploit the flexibility of our
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institutional specification to deploy centralised, market-based, and collective
governance in simulation. Through comparison of these three paradigms we
can draw parallels with our participatory-sensing review and the problems we
outlined in chapter 2.
6.4.1 The Problem of Supply
Experimental Setup
In these experiments we investigate how a static institution (one without coll-
ective-choice to change its parameters during operation) performs according
to our evaluative criteria. We construct an institution as follows:
• Facility costs shared between consumer and analyst roles.
• Configurable fees to pay providers when their artifacts are appropriated.
This fee is paid by the appropriators. These fees remain constant through-
out the simulation.
We configure a population of agents as follows:
• 10 PlayerAgents in sustainable mode and occupying gatherer and consumer
roles. These agents are given no Predictor initially.
• One NonPlayerAgent in the analyst role. This agent is given a Predictor.
• One NonPlayerAgent in the initiator and manager roles to perform institu-
tion administration tasks.
We run parameter sweeps to investigate how the pool appropriation fees
affect the evaluative criteria. We test the cost to appropriate an action from
Predictor in the range 0− 1 in intervals of 0.1, and the cost to appropriate
Measured information in the range 0− 0.5 in 0.02 intervals. For each parameter
set we simulate 200 time-steps. The simulations are deterministic, so we do
not require repeats.
We create a set of scenarios with varying environmental conditions, as shown
in Table 10. We have two facility cost profiles: flexible costs, where each provi-
sion and appropriation action costs 0.1; and fixed costs, where the facility costs
a fixed fee of 2.0 per time-step. We also test with no cost for measuring, and
with a small cost of 0.1. Finally, we test the introduction of three PlayerAgents
who are in greedy mode, replacing three of the sustainable agents. These scenar-
ios aim to test increasingly difficult environmental conditions, and how they
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Table 10: Conditions for static simulation scenarios.
Scenario Facility cost Measuring cost Greedy agents
1 flexible 0 0
2 flexible 0.1 0
3 fixed 0.1 0
4 flexible 0.1 3
affect the performance, in particular participatory levels and sustainability of
the institution.
The first scenario has low facility costs, no cost of measuring, and all agents
behave in a way which aims to lead to sustainability. Therefore the institution
simply needs to cover the facility costs allocate rewards suitability to ensure
that all agents can effectively contribute.
The second scenario introduces a measuring cost into the previous configu-
ration. This tests whether the institutional configuration is able to handle the
additional cost incurred for the gathering of information.
The third scenario modifies the second configuration, changing the nature
of the facility costs. This aims to test if the nature of these costs will affect the
system performance, even when the total facility costs over the course of the
simulation will not be significantly different.
Finally, the fourth configuration replaces some sustainable agents with greedy
ones, with the conditions as in scenario 2. This will test firstly, whether greedy
agents will negatively affect the system as a whole, and secondly, whether
greed is beneficial for the individual, in terms of higher accrued rewards.
In this experiment we aim to firstly determine the effect of the values of the
fees charged for different artifacts in the institution, and secondly, how these
effects change under differing environmental conditions.
Results
Figure 16 shows heatmaps for the first scenario2: flexible facility costs and no
measuring cost. As can be seen also in Table 11, there are several configurations
which all give high scores. Firstly, the participation standards graph shows that
there are many viable configurations which will keep all agents participating
in the institution, however comparing to the total knowledge plot we see that
several of these lead to a less optimal outcome. Equity can be seen to peak at
several equilibria when the correct balance between Measured and Prediction
2 A description of how data is displayed in the heatmaps was given in subsection 6.3.2
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Table 11: Evaluation of institution configurations in scenario 1. Shows only best and
worst five parameter combinations.
Meas. Pred. Rewards Endures? Partic. Efficiency Equity Total
0.22 0.3 1287 Yes. 100.0% 76.4% 0.97 0.996
0.12 0.2 1273 Yes. 100.0% 76.2% 0.97 0.994
0.32 0.4 1284 Yes. 100.0% 76.4% 0.96 0.994
0.02 0.1 1265 Yes. 100.0% 76.1% 0.97 0.994
0.42 0.5 1274 Yes. 100.0% 76.2% 0.95 0.990
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0.0 0.8 -44 Yes. 13.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.274
0.0 0.7 -44 Yes. 13.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.274
0.0 0.4 -44 Yes. 13.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.274
0.0 0.6 -45 Yes. 13.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.274
0.0 0.5 -45 Yes. 13.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.274
fees is achieved. When the criteria are aggregated into a total score, equity
is to be the differentiating factor between the best performing configurations,
causing those equilibria to be visible in the total score too.
Introducing a measuring cost into the scenario significantly reduces the num-
ber of enduring configurations, as shown in Figure 17. Additionally, the opti-
mal equilibria are slightly shifted compared to in the previous scenario.
When facility costs are set at a fixed rate, we see that the configurations
which lead to endurance and high participation are further reduced, shown in
Figure 18. However, the facilities are only marginally dearer overall, as we can
see from the efficiency given in Table 12.
Finally, we test the effect of the introduction of greedy agents into the sys-
tem. Figure 19 shows the results for a system with 3 greedy agents. Here
participation levels and utility are reduced when the reward for provision of
Measured artifacts is less than 0.1. This is due to the greedy agent behaviour to
not measure when the reward is less than the cost.
Discussion
From these experiments we see that, firstly, if the right balance between costs
and benefits for agents in each role is not achieved, we will not get high par-
ticipation standards. In the case when the PlayerAgents’ costs outweigh their
rewards they will choose to stop appropriating predictions, and then resign
their consumer role. Similarly, if the cost of Measured artifacts is too high, the
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Figure 16: Comparison of scores between configurations in scenario 1. Darker/higher
is better.
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Figure 17: Comparison of scores between configurations in scenario 2. Darker/higher
is better.
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Figure 18: Comparison of scores between configurations in scenario 3. Darker/higher
is better.
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Figure 19: Comparison of scores between configurations in scenario 4 (3 greedy
agents). Darker/higher is better.
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Table 12: Evaluation of simulation performance in scenario 3. Shows only best ten
parameter combinations.
Meas. Pred. Rewards Endures? Partic. Efficiency Equity Total
0.44 0.5 1084 Yes. 100.0% 73.1% 0.96 0.997
0.34 0.4 1064 Yes. 100.0% 72.7% 0.97 0.993
0.24 0.3 1077 Yes. 100.0% 72.9% 0.95 0.992
0.14 0.2 1063 Yes. 100.0% 72.7% 0.95 0.989
0.04 0.1 1064 Yes. 100.0% 72.7% 0.94 0.987
0.42 0.5 1084 Yes. 100.0% 73.0% 0.91 0.982
0.02 0.1 1083 Yes. 100.0% 73.0% 0.9 0.98
0.32 0.4 1095 Yes. 100.0% 73.3% 0.89 0.979
0.12 0.2 1085 Yes. 100.0% 73.1% 0.9 0.979
0.22 0.3 1078 Yes. 100.0% 72.9% 0.88 0.974
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
analyst will no longer be able to afford to appropriate them all, resulting in
sub-optimal predictions, and lower rewards for everyone.
Secondly, many configurations result in near-optimal accrued rewards; how-
ever very few result in optimal equity. This is because optimal rewards can be
achieved simply by ensuring that all agents provision and appropriate as much
as possible. This is a looser constraint than for equity, which must balance the
allocation of rewards between roles. Optimal equity is only achieved when the
exact balance between fees is achieved to make their rewards converge over
time.
Thirdly, the nature of facility costs can have a significant effect on the sustain-
ability of the institution. We saw that with fixed costs sustainability was much
more difficult to achieve. At the start of a simulation we find that rewards are
particularly scarce. With flexible institution costs, a reduction in institutional
transactions, for example when agents cannot afford to appropriate, will result
in a lower facility cost, giving the leeway required to raise enough rewards to
appropriate in the next time-step. When costs are fixed there is the opposite
effect, causing struggling institutions to fail. This leads to the divergence in
rewards shown in Figure 18, where configurations either succeed with high
utility or fail. With dynamic costs we see a larger range of outcomes.
Similarly, greed affects the sustainability of the institution, as the introduc-
tion of free-riders reduces the efficiency of the institution. However, this free-
riding can be easily corrected through the use of an incentive for the greedy
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agents to contribute. This incentive is also non-discriminatory, because sustain-
able agents also receive it, and its cost can be easily offset through the cost of
appropriating predictions. In Figure 19 we see that once the Measured cost is
over 0.1 the system behaves as with no greediness.
6.4.2 Self-Organisation
We have seen in the previous experiments that we firstly require several mech-
anisms in place to successfully provision an enduring and efficient institution,
and secondly the optimal configuration of this institution depends on several
factors, including the cost of measuring rewards, the cost of facilities, and the
greediness of the agents using the institution. In real-world scenarios these
factors are unlikely to be static, thus a pre-selected equilibrium may become
sub-optimal over time. Therefore we require that these parameters can be ad-
justed over time, and can use the institution’s voting mechanism to do so.
We test three different approaches to self-organisation of the institution.
Firstly, centralisation3 , where control is concentrated with one individual who
determines the best course of action on behalf of the other users. Secondly, in a
market situation agents act individually in their best interests, and the balance
between supply and demand should result in an optimal equilibrium. Finally,
we have a collective approach, where we apply Ostrom’s third principle and
enfranchise all individuals who are affected by a rule in its modifications.
We firstly present how these self-organisational paradigms are implemented
with our institution specification. We then provide an initial benchmark of
these approaches, under the same scenarios as in the previous round of ex-
periments. This provides an initial evaluation of the relative benefits of these
paradigms under different conditions. We then perform a series of experiments
to test the power of individuals under each paradigm. This power is measured
as the extent to which agents can benefit themselves by switching to a greedy
profile. This provides a measure of the system’s robustness to manipulation
by self-interested parties, and exploitation of certain groups of agents.
Institutional Configurations
We can implement all three of these paradigms through correct configuration
of the institution.
3 As the organisation of the system originates with an agent inside the system this centralisation
still counts as self-organisation. Additionally, we use this paradigm mainly as a benchmark to
evaluate ‘full’ self-organisation paradigms.
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A centralised institution is created as follows:
• Facility costs paid via a subscription charged to consumers and analysts.
• Fees are used to incentivise provision of artifacts as before.
• Subscription and appropriation fees are set by the initiator only.
Agents can create a market as follows:
• Each PlayerAgent has their own institution with a Measured pool. They
are the sole agent occupying the gatherer role, and thus the only one able
to provision to this pool.
• Each analyst agent has their own institution with a Prediction pool. They
are the sole agent occupying the analyst role.
• Each PlayerAgent occupies the role of consumer in each of the analyst’s
institutions.
• Each analyst occupies the role of analyst in each of the PlayerAgent’s
institutions.
• Each agent has individual control over the appropriation rates in their
own institution.
This mimics a market as each producer has control over the price of their
goods, and all consumers can choose who to purchase from.
Finally, collective governance is achieved with the same configuration as for
centralised, except we enfranchise all agents who pay or receive a fee in the
vote over its value, in order to satisfy Ostrom’s Principle 3. Thus we have the
following:
• consumers and analysts may vote on subscription fees,
• gatherers and analysts may vote on the cost of Measured artifacts,
• consumers and analysts may vote on the cost of Predictor artifacts.
Note that as populations in each role are uneven, we weight votes in order
that each group has equal voting power. For example, when there is one
analyst agent, the weight of his vote is increased such that it is equal to that
of all of the prosumers combined. This prevents his choice being drowned out
by the majority role.
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Table 13: Vote enfranchisement in centralised, market and collective systems.
Role Centralised Market Collective
initiator
subscription fee
– subscription feemeasured cost
prediction cost
analyst – own prediction cost
subscription fee
measured cost
prediction cost
gatherer – own measured cost subscription fee
measured cost
consumer – – subscription fee
prediction cost
We tabulate the enfranchisement we have described in Table 13. This shows
which of the three issues (subscription fees, measured cost and prediction
costs) each role is empowered to vote on. Note that in a market it is only
within their own personal pool that agents can set costs.
In each of these scenarios votes may be called periodically by an empowered
agent. For these simulations we compel these agents to do so regularly, such
that he cannot prevent a change by simply not calling any votes. We do this
with a rule which creates an obligation to open a ballot every ten time-steps.
This is accompanied by a rule which ensures that the ballot is also closed in a
timely manner. These rules are shown in Listing 23.
In all votes we determine winners using a Borda-count protocol.
Comparison of paradigms
We start by testing these paradigms under the same four scenarios as in the
previous experiments (described in Table 10). This is to test that the organi-
sational configuration is capable of finding an appropriate equilibrium under
these static conditions.
From the results, in Table 14, we see that centralised control performs the
best in all four scenarios. This is as expected, as under this paradigm the
initiator sets fees in the best interests of the institution, which in this case leads
to an optimal outcome. The collective voting paradigm performs close to the
centralised one, being slightly less efficient in the more resource constrained
scenarios. Finally, the market approach performs equally well in the first two
scenarios. However, in scenario 3, with high fixed costs for utilities, it fails to
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Listing 23: Rules to force opening and closing of ballots
rule "Force periodic vote"
when
T(t % 10 == 1)
$issue : Issue($cfv : cfvRoles, $i : inst)
RoleOf($a : actor, inst == $i, $cfv contains role)
then
OpenBallot act = new OpenBallot($a, $i, $issue);
insert( new Obl($a, act) );
end
rule "Close opened ballot "
when
T($t : t)
OpenBallot(t < $t, $issue : issue, $i : inst, $a : actor)
$b : Ballot( issue == $issue, status == Ballot.Status.OPEN )
then
CloseBallot act = new CloseBallot($a, $i, $b);
insert( new Obl($a, act) );
end//$ 
Table 14: Evaluation of paradigms across simulation scenarios.
Scen. Paradigm Rewards Endures? Partic. Eff. Equity Total
1 central 1280 Yes. 100.0% 68.2% 0.88 1.000
1 collective 1278 Yes. 100.0% 68.2% 0.86 0.995
1 market 1247 Yes. 100.0% 67.6% 0.83 0.979
2 central 1082 Yes. 100.0% 64.4% 0.85 0.999
2 collective 972 Yes. 100.0% 62.4% 0.85 0.975
2 market 943 Yes. 100.0% 61.2% 0.75 0.93
3 central 1076 Yes. 100.0% 64.2% 0.85 1.000
3 collective 839 Yes. 100.0% 58.3% 0.74 0.912
3 market -231 No. 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 -0.054
4 central 1070 Yes. 100.0% 64.2% 0.86 1.000
4 collective 989 Yes. 100.0% 62.9% 0.82 0.971
4 market 967 Yes. 100.0% 62.0% 0.2 0.785
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endure. Additionally, in scenario 4, with three greedy agents, overall rewards
accrued are close to that of the others, but equity is significantly reduced.
The failure of the market in scenario 3 is expected. As each individual has
their own facility in a market, having high fixed costs incurs an impossibly
high cost on the individuals. In the other two paradigms these costs are shared.
The low equity in the market in the final scenario can be attributed to the
greedy agents exploiting being able to set higher fees or free riding. In the first
case they gain more rewards at the expense of the analyst, and the latter the
quality of predictions will be reduced for all.
Individual Power
In our final experiment we test the effect of greedy actors on these institutions,
and the individual benefit which can be accrued by pursuing a greedy strategy.
If each individual can achieve a better outcome by switching to greedy then
we have a dilemma, and rational agents will cause a tragedy of the commons
through greed.
We set up a system like Scenario 2, with flexible facility costs and a mea-
suring cost of 0.1. We run this scenario with all agents in sustainable mode
in order to get a baseline measurement for each organisational paradigm. We
then test system performance with certain agents in greedy mode. In turn, we
tested each of the follow groups in greedy mode:
1. Agent in the role of initiator.
2. Agent in the role of analyst.
3. Three of the prosumer agents (gatherer and consumer).
4. Six of the prosumer agents.
5. All (10) of the prosumer agents
We then measure the change in utilities accrued over the simulation for each
agent type between each configuration and the baseline. With this experiment
we aim to measure the benefit to individuals, or groups of individuals, who
utilise a greedy strategy. We also test the effect on the institution, and on
its self-organisation mechanisms, of these greedy agents. The first test is a
measure of how the institutional mechanisms encourage sustainable behaviour.
The second tests the robustness of the institution to greedy behaviour, and that
a greedy minority cannot significantly negatively impact the outcomes of well
behaved agents.
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Figure 20: Change in accrued rewards of agent groups with selected groups of greedy
agents. Positive represents an increase in rewards over the baseline, nega-
tive a reduction.
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Figure 21: Comparison of evaluative criteria under different organisational paradigms
with different greedy agents.
Figure 20 shows how individual rewards change for each group of greedy
agents, when compared to the baseline. We see that in a centralised system the
initiator is able to extract significant benefit at the cost of the other agents, while
these others have no impact on the system at all from their non-compliance. In
both of the other systems the analyst is able to achieve a significant improve-
ment at a small cost to prosumers. Greedy prosumers are also able to improve
at the cost of other agents in the market system, but this strategy fares better
when they are in the minority. When using Principle 3, there is no benefit to
greed as a prosumer.
If we analyse these simulations further at a global level, using the evaluative
criteria we can see other effects of greed. Figure 21 shows this analysis. We
can see that:
• The centralised solution is robust to greed, always achieving full partici-
pation and optimal rewards. However, when the initiator is greedy, equity
is lost entirely.
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• A market based solution rewards greedy behaviour, but leads to inequity
when agents exploit this. High levels of greed lead to inefficiency and
inequity, and therefore lower participation.
• Using Principle 3 performs better than the market in each case. How-
ever, as the number of greedy agents approaches a majority, equity and
efficiency are lost.
While the additional rewards which can be accrued by analysts in market
and collective systems reduces the equity overall, it is worth noting that the
total system rewards in these cases is actually higher than the baseline. The
higher reward for the analyst from voting greedily allows him to appropriate
more information early in the simulation, leading better knowledge as a result.
Additionally, when applying Principle 3, we expect that when the greedy
population approaches the majority, performance will suffer. Therefore the
fall in participation when the majority of prosumers are greedy is expected.
The voting mechanism relies on a majority working in the interests of sustain-
ability, and when there is none the balance is skewed towards less optimal
equilibria. This presumes that these results are rooted in the assumption of
cooperation between agents. This can generally be assumed when interactions
are repeated (Axelrod, 1984).
What we see from these results is that, of the three tested organisational
paradigms, only with Principle 3 do no agents have a greed dilemma which
can lead to an unsustainable outcome, or a significantly worse outcome for
other agents. While the centralised paradigm is immune to greed by other
agents, we have demonstrated the significant power of the initiator to accrue
significant reward for little input.
We find that the results from self-organisation are very sensitive to the voting
strategies of agents. Due to the reciprocity between roles we find that being
too greedy often leads to the system failing to endure. Therefore, agents must
vote conservatively, with the limited information they have available, in order
to allow the agents they rely on to be able to provide for them. This makes
some exploitation by greedy agents possible, as sustainable agents will not
respond provided their accrued reward is still within acceptable bounds.
6.5 evaluation and conclusions
In this chapter we have described how a subset of participatory-sensing prob-
lems can be modelled as reinforcement-learning problems. We then described
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the implementation of a simulation model which combines an abstract reinf-
orcement-learning problem, an institution for provision and appropriation of
information and knowledge, and agents who are able to interact with the for-
mer, using this institution in order to better exploit their combined information
and knowledge. We then showed how the evaluative criteria for the knowledge
commons, described in chapter 3, can generate objective criteria from this sim-
ulation model. We presented a series of experiments using this simulation
model to show that the use of appropriate institutional rules can be used to
manage an information and knowledge commons in this context.
These experiments represent an initial study into the value of Ostrom’s prin-
ciples when applied to the knowledge commons and provision and appropri-
ation systems. We also demonstrate the various factors which must be consid-
ered and accounted for in order to achieve an effective institution for partici-
patory sensing. This is therefore a demonstration of the problem of supply of
institutions which Ostrom (1990) outlined.
The results also offer a contribution towards this problem of supply. We
demonstrate particular combinations of institutional rules and configurations
will succeed, according to the evaluative criteria. This is not an exhaustive
study of these permutations—that would be almost infeasible given the de-
grees of freedom available in the configuration of the model. However, the
model itself can be a tool for institution designers to configure and test to find
the correct configuration for their domain. In this way the model is a tool for
applying Ostrom’s second principle—that appropriation and provision rules
should relate to the local conditions—allowing these rules to be tested before
being deployed to a live system.
We went on to show how collective choice can be used to create a self-
organising knowledge commons for participatory sensing. Provided agents
are able to make sufficiently intelligent voting decisions, we can shift some of
the burden of finding sustainable equilibria from the supplier of the institu-
tion to the agents using it. By differentiating between who is empowered to
participate in collective choice we can also represent different organisational
paradigms, namely centralisation, market-based and collective governance.
Our results with self-organisation validate our initial hypothesis from chap-
ter 2—that centralisation in participatory sensing leads to exploitation of the
data gatherers—as we showed that the initiator agent is able to extract signif-
icant rewards. We also showed that utilising Ostrom’s principles, specificially
Principle 3 in this situation, is able to prevent this use, and therefore that the
knowledge-commons approach works in participatory sensing.
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However, this model so far only implements the first three of Ostrom’s prin-
ciples. Others have been tested in isolation in other work, and could be also
investigated within our model. The implementation of the agents and model
here is such that we didn’t need monitoring and sanctions in order to sus-
tain the system. For example, we assumed that all agents will always per-
form the actions they are oliged to do. If this is not the case, then we require
principles 4, 5 and 6—monitoring, graduated sanctions and conflict-resolution
mechanisms—to detect this non-compliance, punish it, and to appeal when
the former two are incorrectly applied. Pitt et al. (2012) demonstrate the use of
these principles to counter such non-compliance.
From this chapter we therefore have four main contributions:
• A general model of participatory sensing as a reinforcement learning
problem.
• A specification and implementation of an institution for provision and
appropriation of heterogeneous information and knowledge resources.
• An experimental validation of the problem of supply in this domain, and
the pitfalls in centralisation of participatory sensing.
• An extension to the conclusion of Pitt et al. (2012), that Ostrom’s Princi-
ples 2 and 3 lead to robustness in environmental variation, to add that
they can also be used to address greed and self-interest when used in
this domain.
7
S U M M A RY, C O N C L U S I O N A N D F U RT H E R W O R K
In this thesis, we have described the importance of governance to part-icipatory-sensing applications, and how algorithmic governance can bedeployed, in line with the theory of the knowledge commons, to lead to
a more equitable outcome for users of these applications.
In chapter 2 we reviewed governance in participatory-sensing applications,
finding predominantly that this governance was centralised and did not en-
franchise users. Having looked at the theory of the knowledge commons, from
the social sciences, we saw that similar systems based on the exchange of in-
formation and knowledge could be managed as a shared resource, and the
principles defined by Ostrom (1990), for sustainable management of common-
pool resource systems, could be applied to increase the likelihood of success
of this endeavour. Thus, we argued that the characteristics of participatory
sensing allow it to be seen as a knowledge commons, and that managing it as
such could address the problems we identified in current applications.
We presented a formalisation of participatory sensing as a provision and
appropriation system in chapter 3. This allowed us to do a thorough analysis
of the problem using Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
framework, and to link this system to an axiomatisation of Ostrom’s princi-
ples by Pitt et al. (2012). From this we developed a derivation of the latter’s
Event Calculus (EC) axioms for the purpose of the knowledge commons, and
participatory sensing in particular.
The problem of implementing the system and axioms described in chapter 3
posed a significant technical challenge. In chapter 4, we described a simula-
tion platform for this purpose, Presage2. We then followed with a discussion
of the specification and execution of electronic institutions in chapter 5. We
presented a method for manual translation of EC axioms for use with the JBoss
Drools rule engine to enable fast runtime execution of EC specifications, and a
reference implementation with accompanying libraries, Drools-EInst.
In chapter 6 we proposed a model of participatory sensing as a reinforce-
ment learning problem. We implemented this model using Presage2 and then
integrated this model with an institution specification. This specification was
based on the axioms given in chapter 3 and implemented using Drools-EInst.
174
7.1 conclusions 175
Using this simulation model, we ran a series of experiments which give us
empirical evidence of the benefits of Ostrom’s principles for the management
of a knowledge commons in participatory sensing.
This thesis makes the following contributions:
• A review of governance in participatory-sensing applications, identifying
a lack of governance consideration and user enfranchishment.
• An analysis of participatory sensing as a knowledge commons, using
the IAD framework in conjunction with a framework for self-organising
electronic institutions, which provides an architectural and algorithmic
basis for governance of a knowledge commons.
• A general purpose simulation platform for agent-based simulation and
modelling, Presage2, suitable of the principled operationalisation of a
model of the participatory-sensing knowledge commons.
• A method of manually translating Event Calculus into business rules,
and an implementation for the specification of electronic institutions,
Drools-EInst, along with a suite of modules, with which we can imple-
ment a specification for a self-organising knowledge commons.
• An experimental model of the management of participatory sensing as a
knowledge commons, with which we validated the problem of supply of
institutions, and identified that proper enfranchisement of users can be
used to counter greed and self-interest in participatory-sensing.
7.1 conclusions
We conclude with the three distinct sets of contributions made by this thesis
individually. First, we conclude on the main topic of this thesis: the manage-
ment of participatory-sensing applications as a knowledge commons. From
both our analysis and experimentation we derive rough guidelines for the ap-
plication of Ostrom’s principles to these applications. Second, we conclude the
contributions of the Presage2 platform. Finally, we discuss the specification
of electronic institutions, using our method of manually translating EC into
Drools rules, and our specification library Drools-EInst.
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7.1.1 Management of Participatory-sensing Applications
This work represents the first steps to a design toolkit for the digital knowledge
commons. Much like the Free/Open-Source Software (FOSS) model provides
a framework for starting an open-source software project, we are providing
a framework for providing provision and appropriation systems for partici-
patory sensing. Ostrom (1990) described the problem of providing suitable
institutions, which tends to lead to centralised solutions that are simpler to
manage. Our analysis demonstrates why this is the case: there are many fac-
tors to consider which, if not handled correctly can lead to a failure of the
institution.
Our guidelines for creating an enduring and equitable knowledge commons
are based on Ostrom’s principles, and their axiomatisation by Pitt et al. (2012).
The latter’s formalisation deals with an exogenous resource-allocation system
with highly subtractable resources, while the knowledge commons is an en-
dogenous provision and appropriation system with no subtractability. This
means that the specifications differ significantly, and we can no longer assume
some of the previous conclusions with respect to Ostrom’s principles. Pitt et al.
(2012) described the effect of six of Ostrom’s principles, and this was extended
to all eight by Schaumeier (2013). These benefits are shown in Table 15.
Table 15: Benefits of Ostrom’s principles for resource allocation (Schaumeier, 2013)
Principle Benefit
1 Clearly defined bound-
aries
robustness to intentional violation by outsider-
s/overpopulation
2 Provision and appro-
priation rules
robustness to environmental variation
3 Collective choice
robustness to environmental variation
robustness to ‘unfair’ behaviour
4 Monitoring robustness to non-compliant behaviour
5 Graduated sanctions
mitigation of intentional violation
tolerance of unintentional violation
6 Conflict-resolution
mechanisms
repair of unintentional violation
7 Minimal recognition of
rights to organise
robustness to arbitrariness/despotism
8 Nested enterprises robustness to underpopulation
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In our work we showed how Principle 1 can be addressed for a purely dig-
ital resource via role-based access control. This establishes institutionalised
power to contribute and extract from the resource, effectively preventing out-
side access. This does, however, rely on the security of the authentication and
protection mechanisms used to provide this access control.
Our experiments in supplying institutions showed that provision and appro-
priation rules play an important role in providing robustness to environmental
conditions. Therefore, with significantly different rules and different resource
characteristics we observed the same effect as in Pitt et al. (2012) for Principle
2. Furthermore, we also showed that Principle 2 can mitigate greed by making
the dominant strategy a sustainable one.
In participatory sensing we saw that covering the costs of measuring is an
important aspect in ensuring all agents contribute, and providing a balance
between the cost of raw and derived information was key to sustainability and
equity.
Principle 3 provides further robustness to environmental variation by allow-
ing the aforementioned rules to be modified. Schaumeier (2013) also shows
that this principle reduces ‘unfair’ behaviour, according to various fairness
metrics. We show similarly, that we can reduce inequitable outcomes through
this principle, which, for some definitions of fairness, is the same result1. Fur-
thermore, we demonstrated that this principle is able to mitigate the effect of
agents with greedy strategies gaining self-benefit. This is an important prop-
erty, as over time it will lead to greater levels of compliance and cooperation in
a system as agents’ strategies evolve. This property was demonstrated by Ax-
elrod (1984)—that agents will evolve a socially optimal strategy if they cannot
extract individual benefit in the long run from greedy decisions.
We discussed Principle 4 in chapter 3, noting that if institutional actions are
logged, analysis of this log can detect institutional violations. Again, having
a digital resource with access control largely prevents malicious extraction of
it, which was the primary target of this principle in Ostrom’s (1990) work.
However, other violations such as provisioning false information have yet to
be explored here. We expect the approaches to monitoring given are likely to
be appropriate.
Principles 5 and 6 are general purpose and do not depend on the specifics of
the system characteristics, beyond the specific sanctions given. Therefore we
1 Schaumeier (2013) initially measures fairness using the concept of utilitarian social welfare,
which is equivalent to our ‘equity’ metric. She later explores alternative, individual and self-
aware fairness measures.
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expect the conclusions of Pitt et al. (2012) and Schaumeier (2013) to hold: that
together they provide mitigation of non-compliant behaviour, while being able
to self-correct for when punishments are incorrectly given.
We discussed how Principle 7 could be applied in the context of a knowl-
edge commons. In a knowledge commons, resources are heterogeneous and
attributed to an individual or group of individuals, therefore the rights given
through copyright law may contradict the institutional rules. The requirement
of permissive licensing of provisioned content can be used to prevent such con-
flicts without taking away other important rights of the individuals. However,
this hypothesis remains to be tested.
Thus, this work has provided a study of the similarities and differences
in application of Ostrom’s principles between a resource-allocation system,
where resource provision is exogenous and appropriation is subtractive, and
a provision and appropriation system, in which provision is endogenous and
appropriation non-subtractive. The common-pool resource abstraction is ap-
plicable to both, but specifics of suitable rules vary with the types of actions
performed, which patterns of interaction are to be encouraged and which are
to be discouraged. We find that the IAD framework is a particularly useful tool
for determining these specifics.
With our general framework of participatory sensing as a provision and
appropriation system, we have a method of specifying participatory-sensing
problems in terms of these actions and the pools of information which are gen-
erated. We have shown that within this framework we can specify institutional
rules to adhere to each of Ostrom’s principles, but also that other methods
of managing the resource can be specified within the same framework sim-
ply with a change in institutional rules and/or changes to the institutionalised
powers, permissions and obligations of certain roles.
Our implementation of this framework and rule set therefore allows for di-
rect comparison between organisational paradigms, and individual rules or
rule permutations. We find with self-organising mechanisms, that inferring
the performance of combinations thereof is not always predictable (Sanderson
et al., 2013), and therefore being able to test them in simulation is beneficial. As
our implementation is also distinct from the experimental simulation model,
it can be separated and deployed in a runtime scenario with the same rule-set.
This is a key advantage of working with an executable specification, that is also
performant and scalable.
Our approach aims to find a method of democratising the large-scale aggre-
gation of user-generated information, with participatory sensing as an example
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of this process. As these systems are digital and often online, using electronic
institutions and algorithmic governance enables us to bring both the enforce-
ment of rules, as well as governance determining what the rules are, into one
place. It also enables autonomous agents to interact with the governance layer
along with human actors.
We see this as a tool for enabling collective data sharing in open multi-agent
systems while maintaining rights and appropriate rewards for individual con-
tributors. It provides a middle ground between the two extremes of informa-
tion sharing—sharing nothing and sharing everything. The former is often
the preferred strategy of self-interested agents, leading to socially sub-optimal
results. The latter is an altruistic strategy which is likely to benefit those who
don’t share more than those who do. This middle ground gives incentives
to ensure everybody contributes while promoting openness and preserving
individual rights to information.
7.1.2 Principled Operationalisation with Presage2
In the simulation platform Presage2, we have built a general-purpose tool for
agent-based modelling. We have also shown its suitability for the principled
operationalisation and controlled experimentation phases of the Sociologically-
Inspired Computing (SIC) methodology, both in this thesis and in other work (Mac-
beth et al., 2014).
While there exist multiple simulation platforms for multi-agent systems and
agent-based systems, we argued that an important and oft ignored feature
of a platform is an environment-level specification of the observability of the
simulation state. This is an intermediary in between an agent and the raw state
of the environment, which can limit access to state or provide a modified view
of it. This has two advantages:
Firstly, it provides a level playing field for all agents. Particularly if agents
are being developed independently, they must agree on a level of observabil-
ity that they would expect in the simulation context. By specifying a single
Application Programming Interface (API), which both teams’ agents will use it
prevents any ambiguity or ‘cheating’ in terms of access to a simulation state.
Secondly, the underlying state representation may change, but if the API is
consistent, the agent will still be able to function. The APIs expressing reading
and writing of state are therefore just connectors to an outside environment
of any kind, not just a simulated one. Therefore, we can take agents out of
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simulation and into deployment by rewriting these APIs for interaction with
the target environment.
The development of Presage2 also goes some way to addressing a limitation
in the previous Presage implementation, given by Neville (2011). Scalability is
noted as an issue for their implementation, as it is a single-threaded program.
Presage2 is designed to support multi-threaded simulation natively and seam-
lessly. However, we have yet to explore fully distributed simulation with the
platform.
The Presage2 platform has shown its usefulness and generality in its use in
this thesis, as well as in several other models, including simulation of resource-
allocation systems, which our work is built upon (cf. Schaumeier (2013) and
Pitt et al. (2014)).
7.1.3 Executable Specification of Electronic Institutions
We have shown the performance improvements available through the manual
translation of EC specifications into business rules. This enables fast, real-time
deductive reasoning with executable specifications, and we showed the appli-
cation of this for electronic institutions.
Our use of the Drools-EInst engine within a Presage2 simulation allows us
to address two limitations given in the previous work of Schaumeier (2013),
which used an electronic institution in a Presage2 simulation.
Firstly, in their simulations, institutionalised power was only represented
implicitly, using conditions in the agent logic. This approach precludes full
listings of when powers, permissions and obligations occur, requires that the
agent knows of the conditions which lead to its empowerment, and therefore
also precludes dynamic institutionalised powers whose activating conditions
change. With Drools-EInst we explicitly represent institutionalised power, and
furthermore give software tools to allow agents to respond to the presence or
absence of powers, permissions and obligations. Thus we have a richer model
of the institution, allowing us detect events, such as when an agent is obliged
to perform an action but has yet to do so.
Secondly, their electronic institution implementation was synchronous in
simulation, in that processes which are usually asynchronous to the main sim-
ulation task had to be resolved on the same time-scales. For example the en-
tirety of a voting protocol would have to be completed in a single simulation
time-step. In reality institutions have the concept of ‘action situations’ which
can operate independently on different time-scales. In our simulations, and
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with Drools- EInst, we achieved this by firstly having the voting protocol fully
specified, requiring independent actions for opening and closing ballots with
will usually occur multiple time-steps apart. Secondly, agents are reactive to
the voting process, so will be aware of when they can vote, but not being di-
rectly compelled to do so. Thus we can simulate multiple protocols operating
asynchronously on independent time scales.
7.2 limitations
We now identify the limitations of our work. We firstly present limitations in
our model of participatory sensing as a knowledge commons, and our experi-
mentation with this model. We then give limitations of the Presage2 simulation
platform, and the Drools-EInst library for executable specification of electronic
institutions.
7.2.1 Knowledge Commons simulations
There are several limitations in our model of participatory sensing. As with
any model, there are multiple explicit and implicit assumptions and simplifi-
cations made in its creation and usage, which will affect the simulation results.
We discuss these assumptions, how they might affect the results, and how we
might accommodate them if we wish to test them.
parameters Our simulation model has many degrees of freedom in the
parameter specification, resulting in too many permutations to investigate ex-
haustively. We chose parameter sets that attempt to exemplify certain likely
scenarios. The choice of these parameters have a significant influence on the
results. For example, we only explored a small subset of the possible facility
costs available in our model. Some of the untested combinations of facility
costs may lead to interesting results, but were outside of our experimental
agenda.
explicit assumptions We make four explicit assumptions for our simu-
lation model (section 6.2). These are:
1. Rewards gained from an action are directly measurable by the agent.
2. Rewards are a trade-able and divisible currency. This reduces complexity
by preventing the need for a separate currency.
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3. The only flow of rewards into the system is that generated by agents’
actions on the reinforcement-learning problem. For example, an analyst
cannot sell information elsewhere to generate rewards.
4. Agents are working on the problem long-term, therefore we have re-
peated (inter)actions and thus can assume that agents are likely to be
cooperative.
The first assumption is merely a slightly tighter constraint on what must be
true for the model to be valid: that some kind of reward can be measured.
When a direct reward measurement is not possible, a reward can be derived
implicitly from the agent’s overall progress towards a goal. If it is not possible
to measure a reward, then it is impossible to apply learning to the problem,
and there is also no sensing which can be done. Therefore the problem would
be neither a reinforcement-learning problem, nor a participatory-sensing one.
The second assumption is a simplifying assumption and enables frictionless
exchange of currency between agents. In real-world scenarios micropayments
are likely to come with some overhead (Papaefstathiou and Manifavas, 2004).
However, recent traction gained by digital, cryptographic currencies, such as
Bitcoin2, have the potential to significantly lower transaction costs, and lower
the barrier to currency creation (provided these new technologies are not sub-
jected to over-regulation in the future).
The third assumption prevents external rewards from flowing into the sys-
tem. Therefore all rewards are derived from strategies used on the learning
problem. Due to assumption 1, this then necessitates that gatherers are also
consumers, as, if one consumes, one is also able to gather. However, there
were cases in our review of participatory-sensing applications where the gath-
erer and consumer groups were disjoint or only partially intersecting. For
example, OpenSignal sells the information and knowledge generated from col-
lected mobile phone coverage data to third-party companies. Having disjoint
gatherer and consumer groups removes the reciprocity with analysts, and will
change the dynamics of collective choice shown in our experiments. Therefore,
our model is currently unable to tell us much about these kinds of sensing
applications.
Finally, the fourth assumption has important implications for the commons.
If agents are only briefly using the commons and will not use it ever again
afterwards, they will have no incentive to act sustainably in their use of it.
All common-pool resource systems have the same assumption—that there is a
2 http://bitcoin.org
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core of parties who are interested in the maintenance of the resource for their
long-term benefits from it. In further work we may be able to test what level of
agent turnover leads to the loss of stability and sustainability in the institution.
multiple analysts In our simulations we use a single agent in the role of
analyst. This leads to this agent having significant power over the institution,
as shown in the results when this agent follows a greedy strategy. To address
this we may consider having multiple analysts, and this would be a desirable
scenario, giving more choice and competition to agents.
However, our simulation model is ill-equipped for this configuration. As
consumers appropriate a single prediction each time-step, adding another an-
alyst will increase the number of predictions provided, but the number of
appropriations will not change. Therefore the number of appropriations per
analyst will be reduced by half. This has the implication that, in order to
achieve equity as we have defined it, the institution must compensate analysts
twice as much per prediction. Furthermore, if one analyst’s predictions are
‘better’ (i. e. generate higher rewards) than the others’, consumers will prefer-
entially appropriate these predictions, and the second analyst brings no benefit
to the institution.
Therefore, this poses the question of whether it is worthwhile to have the
redundancy of multiple analysts. With the simulated reinforcement-learning
problem we use for our simulations this is not the case, however we see several
possibilities when it may be:
• If predictions are specific to an individual consumer and the analyst has
limited computational capacity to generate them, then additional ana-
lysts will increase the capacity of the system to handle consumers’ re-
quests.
• If each analyst’s knowledge is comparatively better in a different area of
the solution space, then combined they will provide better knowledge
than either would be able to individually.
• If analysts provision knowledge in the form of their prediction algorithm,
then the combination of multiple analysts’ knowledge could lead to bet-
ter knowledge as a result.
voting and counting votes Our institutional model used preference
voting, and determined winners by a Borda count procedure. This is one of
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many possible combinations of voting methods. The choice of voting protocol
can have a significant effect on the result of a vote—as Pitt et al. (2011b) demon-
strate, the same preferences can lead to a different result under each winner
determination method. Furthermore, most winner-determination methods are
also open to exploitation via collusion (Conitzer et al., 2007).
In our simulations, we often encountered the problem of two groups with
equal voting power who are representing opposite views. Therefore, the Borda
count was useful in this context to generate a fair winner in the mid-point
between these views. Other methods, such as plurality and instant runoff
would result in a deadlock in these situations.
reinforcement learning problem We used a model of a reinforcement-
learning problem for our simulations in order to get determinism and re-
peatability in the results. However, the use of actual learning problems and
policies would expose several other issues in the simulation. The inherent
non-determinism of reinforcement learning, caused by random exploration of
strategies, would have implications for equity, both coincidently or possibly
due to malicious activity. These learning algorithms rely on occasionally ‘ex-
ploring’ unknown actions to find possible better alternatives. Most times these
exploration actions will give lower rewards than the current greedy strategy
choice, therefore there is a question of how such actions should be allocated.
If this allocation is done randomly, then an ‘unlucky’ agent could end up
with significantly lower accrued rewards purely through bad allocations. There
are methods to make allocations fairly in such scenarios (cf. Pitt et al. (2014)),
however in this case the allocation may be at the discretion of the provider of
predictions, and outside the boundaries of the institution. This opens the door
for corruption in this allocation method.
Alternatively, both exploitative and exploratory predictions could be provi-
sioned to the pool and labelled as such, then additional incentives could be
provided to those who chose to do exploration. With proper selection of the
value of this incentive, this method would have the potential of finding an
optimal exploration rate, while socialising the cost of exploration.
Further work is required to test these issues. If a viable solution to this
problem is found we would then be able to begin to investigate how the nature
of the learning problem to be solved affects how the institution needs to be
managed. This would also further test robustness in the presence of different
levels of rewards and costs.
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external resource flows Our results show that, when the provision
and appropriation system is tested in isolation, it is rarely possible to achieve
the ideal of free and libre access to the resource—the cost of the institution
and incentivising users must be covered. In other knowledge commons, these
costs are covered by exogenous utilities accrued, or by voluntary contributions
to costs. However, within the bounds of an isolated system, paid access is
required to encourage the rational agent to share. We do not yet have a model
of these external resource flows and their effect on the system equilibrium.
7.2.2 Presage2
support for modelling The Presage2 platform currently requires strong
programming experience in order to effectively implement models. The plat-
form particularly lacks graphical tools for the expression of models compared
to other popular tools such as NetLogo and RePast.
modelling libraries As a relatively young project, Presage2 lacks the
range of module libraries of other simulation software. This means that users
will often have to implement certain features themselves for their models,
which they may not need to if they were using other platforms. However,
this is a property of software which improves over time as the community
grows around the project.
7.2.3 Drools-EInst
scalability In chapter 5 we showed how the performance of Drools-EInst
was significantly better than that of EC implementations, and fair when com-
pared to a fast, hard-coded implementation, when performing deductive tasks
on a representative electronic-institution specification with large numbers of
actions. However, this test which contained, as a maximum, thousands of flu-
ents and actions may not be representative of the kinds of conditions we may
expect the rule engine to handle in large-scale electronic institutions.
The Drools-EInst library depends on JBoss Drools for its performance. The
current Drools implementation keeps all state in memory and has single threaded
execution, therefore this will cause scalability issues as the number of fluents
and actions increase. Depending on the requirements of the specification,
memory usage can be managed through the removal of old facts from the
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state. However, executing large numbers of facts serially may result in per-
formance that is too slow for real-time environments. Parallelisation of the
Rete algorithm (which Drool’s engine is based on) is something which could
address this in the future.
rule execution order The incremental execution of Drools rules can
create issues of consistency when compared to the atomic transitions of the EC.
Drools does offer mechanisms to control the order of rule activation and execu-
tion which we discussed in subsection 5.4.3, however this represents possible
source of inconsistency between EC and Drools specifications.
correctness We presented no proof of the correctness of the manual
translation of EC into Drools. However, we are able to use unit-testing to
provide confidence in the correctness of a manual translation. As the man-
ual translation process should make changes to the representation of state in
the specification, a formal proof of correctness would be difficult to achieve,
and require a more stringently prescribed process of rule and state translation
than what we have presented. Therefore we leave this as further work.
7.3 further work
There are several threads of potential further work from what has been pre-
sented here. Most significant are the further investigations with the simulation
model we developed in chapter 6. We then discuss the deployment of our
framework to real-world participatory-sensing problems, and testing the sim-
ulated results in reality. Finally, we present the possible directions of further
development of the Presage2 and Drools-EInst projects.
7.3.1 Further investigations with the simulation model
Our simulation model of participatory sensing as a knowledge commons is
only just beginning to explore the issues of self-organising management of
information and knowledge. The implementation already has scope to begin
investigating various other factors around this problem, which we identified
at the analysis stage in chapter 3.
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the evaluator role Our experiments do not explore the role of evalua-
tor in the participatory-sensing application. We envisage this role acting in a
monitoring position, detecting users provisioning low quality information to
the pool, or as a reviewer, providing information about the quality of other in-
formation. These tasks are complementary, so could both be performed by the
same process. Execution of these tasks will improve the quality of information
in the pool and better inform agents about which information will be most
beneficial to them. We would like to explore, firstly, how to integrate this role
into the model as a method of implementing monitoring, and secondly, how
collective evaluation of information quality compares to individual methods
which may use trust or social capital (Petruzzi et al., 2014) to access quality of
provisions based on previous outcomes.
non-compliance In our experiments we did not explore non-compliance
with the institutional rules. There exists significant scope for institutional non-
compliance within our simulation. This encompasses performing actions with-
out having the institutionalised power and/or permission to do so, and not
performing an action which one is obliged to perform.
This non-compliance has been explored in previous work, and Principles 4,
5 and 6 offer mechanisms to mitigate the effect of it. However, the improved
institutional representation offered by Drools-EInst allows for more subtle non-
compliance than has been previously tested. For example, by solving the limi-
tation of synchrony from previous work, we open up the possibility to examine
the effect of delayed decision making on non-compliance. For example, if the
chair of a vote expects that the result will not go in his favour, he can decide
to not declare the result—even though he is obliged to—in order to delay the
negative effect on himself. Even though this non-compliance should be caught
and punished, the delay may be sufficient to do damage to the institution.
We could test the effect of institutional non-compliance, by introducing a
behaviour which ignores certain obligations. This can be non-intentional non-
compliance where the agent breaks an institutional rule because of a fault or
other problem. For example if there was a communication problem prevent-
ing the agent from being notified of an obligation. Alternatively, malicious
non-compliance is where an agent will selectively break rules in order to max-
imise rewards for himself. Previously, these kinds of compliance have been
addressed with Ostrom’s Principles 4, 5 and 6 (Pitt et al., 2012).
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knowledge pools So far we only used pools in the institution for in-
formation, in the form of information about how the problem works (mea-
surements of rewards), and information about how best to solve the problem
(predictions about the best strategy). We would like to explore the sharing
of knowledge in the commons. This could be modelled by types of knowl-
edge, possessed by agents and distributed amongst the population, which act
as building blocks and can be provided to create better prediction algorithms.
For example, in machine learning some algorithms work by composition of
other learning algorithms (Opitz and Maclin, 1999), and we can model this
process such that agents are able to iterate on a pool of knowledge to find the
best composition for their target problem.
long-term institutional change In this work we only dealt with
scenarios which started in a certain state and then observed how this state
developed over time. We did not test how the system response to ‘shocks’
or other stimuli after a steady state had been reached. For example, a large
influx of agents to the system will affect the equilibrium. What is the effect
on outcomes for the original population and the newcomers? Does the system
and should the system favour those who were there at its inception, or is it
better to join later? These are questions we would like to answer in the future.
centralised institution In this work we have shown that centralisa-
tion, while good from an efficiency perspective, can lead to inequity, and by
decentralising governance we can achieve similar efficiency while being robust
to attempts to reduce equity. This governance is decentralised in terms of in-
stitutionalised powers, but it is still centralised in administration. A criticism
of centralisation in other fields is that it provides a single point of failure, or
a bottleneck in a system. This system still has this flaw—all institutional state
and rules are kept in the rule engine and executed in one place.
There are several technical solutions which would enable decentralisation
of the institutional state, like those which can be used for decentralised facil-
ities. For example, distributed version control could be used for institutional
rules, and/or peer-to-peer technology for synchronising states between agents.
However, with a distributed system, conflicts may arise, for example if an
agent applies an old version of the rules, or reasons with an old institutional
state. This mandates a conflict-resolution mechanism, as provided by Ostrom’s
Principle 6.
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Furthermore, if we decentralise the institution administration, we must con-
sider the possibility of groups separating from, and later rejoining the insti-
tution. This may be unintentional, as for example a break in communication
can leave a group isolated. In this case, the agents should be able to con-
tinue and then reconcile institutional state with the rest of the system once
communication is restored (Sanderson and Pitt (2012) offer a protocol for such
reconciliation of institutional facts). Here, Ostrom’s Principle 8 (that activities
are organised in layers of nested enterprises) will help, as having this principle
presumes that sub-groups can have reasonable levels on autonomy within the
institution.
Agents may also intentionally break away from an institution and form their
own based on the former’s rule-set. This institutional ‘fork’ is a more extreme
form of collective choice which is enabled by having open rules. This model,
applied to FOSS repositories has been extremely successful in recent years, al-
lowing one to have free reign over one’s own fork of a software repository, but
also be able to push useful changes back up to the original repository, whose
maintainers can then evaluate whether to accept the changes. This model has
also been adapted to federated wikis, which allow personal wikis to be linked
in a federation, with pages forked and merged in between them3. The fork
and merge approach allows each individual to curate their own information
and knowledge, but with the benefit of being able to incorporate the inputs of
others into their repository.
This represents a brief summary into the possible issues and lines of inquiry
opened up by the problem of decentralising an institution in administration as
well as in power.
7.3.2 Deployment of the Knowledge Commons framework
In addition to the lines of investigation we can take with the current simulation
model, there are other aspects of development with respect to our knowledge
commons framework.
Firstly, as a framework for socio–technical systems, we would like to explore
the interactions which the framework enables between human and computa-
tional actors and the institutional rules. While we have designed a framework
to incentivise participation in the system on the operational level, we also want
high participation on the collective-choice and constitutional levels. Thus, for
3 The developer of the first wiki on the web, Ward Cunningham, has developed such a federated
wiki, called the ‘Smallest Federated Wiki’, according to these principles.
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human actors, we envision enabling this participation through serious games
and gamification, with an emphasis on the visualisation of the ‘state’ of the
common pool and the rules (for example Bourazeri et al. (2012) use this ap-
proach to engage smartmeter users).
We mentioned in chapter 3 that the Open Mustard Seed platform (Hardjono
et al., 2014b) was a possible target for deployment of our framework to real-
world socio–technical systems. Providing solid foundations for data control
and privacy, it would allow the introduction of our framework at the gover-
nance and information-management level. Thus, moving forward, we see this
integration as a primary implementation and deployment vehicle for the ideas
expressed in this thesis.
7.3.3 Continued development of Presage2
The Presage2 platform continues to be developed to incorporate new features.
This includes the graphical support for modelling we outlined at the end of
chapter 4. This support would allow for the specification of simulation with
a Graphical User Interface (GUI), by connecting parameters to modules and
agents.
We have recently been exploring the use of the Groovy programming lan-
guage4 for the implementation of such simulation components. This is a
loosely typed language which has full integration with Java, allowing for more
accessible code with less boilerplate which, none-the-less, is able to integrate
with all of Presage2’s features. A language that is simpler to write should have
the effect of making the platform less intimidating for inexperienced program-
mers, and more productive for experienced ones.
We also aim to further develop modules for the platform for common use-
cases and domains. The availability of modules speeds up the prototyping
stage of model implementation, and reduces the amount of programming re-
quired for a working simulation.
Finally, we hope to expand the use of the tool for the deployment of agents.
We have said that our modular approach and the abstraction layer between
agents and environment state allow for agent implementations to be taken out
of the simulation and into a real-world deployment without re-implementation.
This is something we would like to explore and test in further work.
4 http://groovy-lang.org/
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7.3.4 Continued development of Drools-EInst
Drools-EInst is a fairly young project, but has significant scope for further
improvement work. As a library of specifications for electronic institutions,
it thus far only has the specifications described in this thesis implemented.
Therefore, this library should be expanded to increase the number of available
tools it provides.
Additionally, while the tool’s use in simulation has been demonstrated here,
we would like to further test it in a real application. We see a good candidate
for this deployment is the Open Mustard Seed project, for which the current
libraries are appropriate as a governance tool.
We identified possible future work being a proof of the manual translation
process from EC to Drools specifications. This could be complimented by a
formalisation of the translation process, in the form of a transpiler (a source-
to-source compiler) to take the EC as an input, and generate Drools and Java
source. However, as our method aims to have a readable specification in both
languages, significant work would be required to produce machine generated
code which is human-readable, and which can be related to the original EC
source.
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A
V O T I N G P R O T O C O L S P E C I F I C AT I O N S
Here we list the specifications of the voting protocol from Robert’s Rules of
Order (Newly Revised) (RONR) used in the benchmarks in chapter 5, as well as
the voting protocol used in the experiments presented in chapter 6. We have
firstly a Prolog implementation from the original paper of Pitt et al. (2006).
Secondly, we have the translation of this specification into Drools. This specifi-
cation only contains the Drools code, and is missing the associated Java classes
required to execute it. These classes, along with associated code for testing the
specification can be found in the Drools-EInst source repository1. Thirdly, the
voting protocol for our experiments is described in terms of the actions and
fluents used. The full Drools specification is also available in the Drools-EInst
repository.
a.1 ronr voting protocol implementation in prolog
:- dynamic
happens/2.
/****************************************
* SYNTAX OF ACTIONS *
* *
* open_session(Agent, Session) *
* close_session(Agent, Session) *
* propose(Agent, Motion) *
* second(Agent, Motion) *
* open_ballot(Agent, Motion) *
* close_ballot(Agent, Motion) *
* vote(Agent, Motion, aye) *
* vote(Agent, Motion, nay) *
* declare(Agent, Motion, carried) *
* declare(Agent, Motion, not_carried) *
***************************************/
/************
1 https://github.com/sammacbeth/electronic-institutions
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* SESSIONS *
***********/
initiates( open_session(C,S), sitting(S)=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, open_session(C,S))=true, T ).
initiates( open_session(C,S), resolutions=([],[]), T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, open_session(C,S))=true, T ).
initiates( close_session(C,S), sitting(_)=false, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, close_session(C,S))=true, T ).
/********************
* STATE of MOTIONS *
*******************/
% ----- pAgent sAgent chair chair chair
% ----- propose second open_ballot close_ballot declare
% ----- (null) --> proposed --> seconded --> voting --> voted --> {carried
| not_carried}
initiates( propose(A,M), status(M)=proposed, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(A, propose(A,M))=true, T ).
initiates( second(B,M), status(M)=seconded, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(B, second(B,M))=true, T ).
initiates( open_ballot(C,M), status(M)=voting(T), T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, open_ballot(C,M))=true, T ).
initiates( close_ballot(C,M), status(M)=voted, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, close_ballot(C,M))=true, T ).
initiates( declare(C,M,carried), status(_)=null, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, declare(C,M,_))=true, T ).
initiates( declare(C,M,not_carried), status(_)=null, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, declare(C,M,_))=true, T ).
initiates( declare(C,M,carried), resolutions=([M|Ms],Ns), T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, declare(C,M,_))=true, T ),
holdsAt( resolutions=(Ms,Ns), T ).
initiates( declare(C,M,not_carried), resolutions=(Ms,[M|Ns]), T ) :-
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holdsAt( pow(C, declare(C,M,_))=true, T ),
holdsAt( resolutions=(Ms,Ns), T ).
/***********************
* INSTITUTIONAL POWER *
***********************/
holdsAt( pow(C, open_session(C,S))=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( sitting(S)=false, T ),
holdsAt( role_of(C,chair)=true, T ).
holdsAt( pow(A, propose(A,M))=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( status(M)=null, T ),
holdsAt( role_of(A,proposer)=true, T ).
holdsAt( pow(B, second(B,M))=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( status(M)=proposed, T ),
holdsAt( role_of(B,seconder)=true, T ).
holdsAt( pow(C, open_ballot(C,M))=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( status(M)=seconded, T ),
holdsAt( role_of(C,chair)=true, T ).
holdsAt( pow(V, vote(V,M,_))=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( status(M)=voting(_), T ),
holdsAt( role_of(V,voter)=true, T ),
\+ holdsAt( role_of(V,chair)=true, T ),
holdsAt( voted(V,M)=nil, T ).
holdsAt( pow(C, close_ballot(C,M))=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( status(M)=voting(Te), T ), Te < T,
holdsAt( role_of(C,chair)=true, T ).
holdsAt( pow(C, declare(C,M,_))=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( status(M)=voted, T ),
holdsAt( role_of(C,chair)=true, T ).
holdsAt( pow(C, close_session(C,S))=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( sitting(S)=true, T ),
holdsAt( role_of(C,chair)=true, T ).
holdsAt( pow(Agent, Action) = false, T ) :-
\+ holdsAt( pow(Agent, Action) = true, T ).
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/*****************************
* ROLE ASSIGNMENT (SORT OF) *
****************************/
initiates( propose(A,M), role_of(B,seconder)=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(A, propose(A,M))=true, T ),
holdsAt( qualifies(B,seconder)=true, T ),
A \= B.
initiates( second(B1,M), role_of(B2,seconder)=false, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(B1, second(B1,M))=true, T ),
holdsAt( qualifies(B2,seconder)=true, T ).
initiates( open_session(C,M), role_of(A,proposer)=true, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, open_session(C,M))=true, T ),
holdsAt( qualifies(A,proposer)=true, T ).
initiates( close_session(C,M), role_of(A,proposer)=false, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, close_session(C,M))=true, T ),
holdsAt( qualifies(A,proposer)=true, T ).
/*****************************
* VOTING and COUNTING VOTES *
****************************/
% ----- open ballot and initiate votes to (0,0)
% ----- vote for (F,A) --> (F1,A)
% ----- vote against (F,A) --> (F,A1)
% ----- power to vote removed by either act of voting or chair closing the
ballot
initiates( open_ballot(C,M), votes(M)=(0,0), T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, open_ballot(C,M))=true, T ).
initiates( open_ballot(C,M), voted(V,M)=nil, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(C, open_ballot(C,M))=true, T ),
holdsAt( role_of(V,voter)=true, T ).
initiates( vote(V,M,aye), votes(M)=(F1,A), T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(V, vote(V,M,_))=true, T ),
holdsAt( votes(M)=(F,A), T ),
F1 is F + 1.
initiates( vote(V,M,aye), voted(V,M)=aye, T ) :-
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holdsAt( pow(V, vote(V,M,_))=true, T ).
initiates( vote(V,M,nay), votes(M)=(F,A1), T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(V, vote(V,M,_))=true, T ),
holdsAt( votes(M)=(F,A), T ),
A1 is A + 1.
initiates( vote(V,M,nay), voted(V,M)=nay, T ) :-
holdsAt( pow(V, vote(V,M,_))=true, T ).
initially( status(_) = null ).
initially( sitting(_) = false ).
a.2 ronr voting protocol implementation in drools
/************
* SESSIONS *
***********/
rule "Open Session"
when
$open : OpenSession($a : actor, $i : inst, $name : name, $t : t,
valid == false)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($open))
not( exists( Session(inst == $i, name == $name, sitting == true) )
)
then
insert(new Session($i, $name, true));
modify($open) {
setValid(true);
}
end
rule "Close session"
when
$close : CloseSession($a : actor, $i : inst, $name : name, $t : t,
valid == false)
$sesh : Session(inst == $i, name == $name)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($close))
then
modify($sesh) {
setSitting(false);
}
modify($close) {
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setValid(true);
}
end
query getSession(Institution i, String name)
Session(inst == i, name == name, session : this)
end
/********************
* STATE of MOTIONS *
*******************/
rule "Propose"
when
$prop : Propose($a : actor, $m : motion, valid == false)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($prop))
not( exists( Motion(session == $m.session, name == $m.name ) ) )
then
$m.setStatus(Motion.Status.Proposed);
insert($m);
modify($prop) {
setValid(true);
}
end
rule "Second"
when
$sec : Second($a : actor, $m : motion, valid == false)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($sec))
then
modify($m) {
setStatus(Motion.Status.Seconded);
}
modify($sec) {
setValid(true);
}
end
rule "Open ballot "
when
$open : OpenBallot($a : actor, $m : motion, valid == false)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($open))
then
modify($m) {
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setStatus(Motion.Status.Voting),
setVoting($open.getT());
}
modify($open) {
setValid(true);
}
end
rule "Close ballot "
when
$close : CloseBallot($a : actor, $m : motion, valid == false)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($close))
then
modify($m) {
setStatus(Motion.Status.Voted);
}
modify($close) {
setValid(true);
}
end
rule "Declare carried "
when
$decl : Declare($a : actor, $m : motion, status == Motion.Status.
Carried)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($decl))
then
modify($m) {
setStatus(Motion.Status.Carried);
}
modify($m.getSession()) {
addCarried($m);
}
end
rule "Declare not carried "
when
$decl : Declare($a : actor, $m : motion, status == Motion.Status.
NotCarried)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($decl))
then
modify($m) {
setStatus(Motion.Status.NotCarried);
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}
modify($m.getSession()) {
addNotCarried($m);
}
end
query getMotion(Institution i, String sesh, String name)
Session(inst == i, name == sesh, session : this)
Motion(name == name, session == session, motion : this)
end
/***********************
* INSTITUTIONAL POWER *
***********************/
rule "Pow open session"
when
RoleOf($c : actor, $i : inst, role == " chair ")
then
insertLogical(new Pow($c, new OpenSession($c, $i, null)));
end
rule "Pow propose motion"
when
RoleOf($p : actor, $i : inst, role == "proposer")
$sesh : Session(inst == $i, sitting == true)
then
insertLogical(new Pow($p, new Propose($p, new Motion($sesh, null))
));
end
rule "Pow second motion"
when
RoleOf($p : actor, $i : inst, role == "seconder")
$sesh : Session(inst == $i, sitting == true)
$m : Motion(session == $sesh, status == Motion.Status.Proposed)
then
insertLogical(new Pow($p, new Second($p, $m)));
end
rule "Pow open ballot "
when
RoleOf($c : actor, $i : inst, role == " chair ")
$sesh : Session(inst == $i, sitting == true)
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$m : Motion(session == $sesh, status == Motion.Status.Seconded)
then
insertLogical(new Pow($c, new OpenBallot($c, $m)));
end
rule "Pow vote"
when
RoleOf($a : actor, $i : inst, role == "voter")
$sesh : Session(inst == $i, sitting == true)
$m : Motion(session == $sesh, status == Motion.Status.Voting)
not( RoleOf(actor == $a, inst == $i, role == " chair ") )
not( Vote(actor == $a, motion == $m, valid == true) )
then
insertLogical(new Pow($a, new Vote($a, $m, null)));
end
rule "Pow close ballot "
when
RoleOf($c : actor, $i : inst, role == " chair ")
$sesh : Session(inst == $i, sitting == true)
T($t : t)
$m : Motion(session == $sesh, status == Motion.Status.Voting,
voting < $t)
then
insertLogical(new Pow($c, new CloseBallot($c, $m)));
end
rule "Pow declare"
when
RoleOf($c : actor, $i : inst, role == " chair ")
$sesh : Session(inst == $i, sitting == true)
$m : Motion(session == $sesh, status == Motion.Status.Voted)
then
insertLogical(new Pow($c, new Declare($c, $m, null)));
end
rule "Pow close session"
when
RoleOf($c : actor, $i : inst, role == " chair ")
Session(inst == $i, sitting == true, $name : name)
then
insertLogical(new Pow($c, new CloseSession($c, $i, $name)));
end
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/*****************************
* ROLE ASSIGNMENT (SORT OF) *
****************************/
rule "Assign seconders"
when
T($t : t)
Propose($a : actor, $i : inst, valid == true, t == $t)
Qualifies($b : actor, role == "seconder", actor != $a)
then
insert( new RoleOf($b, $i, "seconder") );
end
rule "Unassign seconders"
when
T($t : t)
Second($i : inst, valid == true, t == $t)
$r : RoleOf(role == "seconder", inst == $i)
then
retract($r);
end
rule "Assign proposers"
when
T($t : t)
OpenSession($i : inst, valid == true, t == $t)
Qualifies($a : actor, role == "proposer")
then
insert( new RoleOf($a, $i, "proposer") );
end
rule "Unassign proposers"
when
T($t : t)
CloseSession($i : inst, valid == true, t == $t)
$r : RoleOf(role == "proposer", inst == $i)
then
retract($r);
end
/*****************************
* VOTING and COUNTING VOTES *
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****************************/
rule "Aye Vote"
when
$v : Vote($a : actor, $i : inst, $m : motion, vote == Vote.Choice.
AYE, valid == false)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($v))
then
modify($m) {
addAye();
}
modify($v) {
setValid(true);
}
end
rule "Nay Vote"
when
$v : Vote($a : actor, $i : inst, $m : motion, vote == Vote.Choice.
NAY, valid == false)
Pow(actor == $a, this.matches($v))
then
modify($m) {
addNay();
}
modify($v) {
setValid(true);
}
end
a.3 alternative voting protocol specification
Here we state the actions and fluents of the voting specification used in chap-
ter 6.
There are four actions in the protocol:
• OpenBallot(actor, inst, issue): This action opens a ballot on an issue
issue in the institution inst, provided the agent actor is empowered to
do so.
• CloseBallot(actor, inst, ballot): This action closes the open ballot
ballot in the institution inst, provided the agent actor is empowered
to do so.
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• Vote(actor, inst, ballot, vote): This action specifies a vote of vote
for the agent actor on ballot ballot in the institution inst, provided the
agent actor is empowered to vote on this ballot.
• Declare(actor, inst, ballot, winner): This action declares the win-
ning candidate of the ballot ballot in institution inst. The ballot must
have been closed, and the agent actor must be empowered to declare the
result of the ballot.
The state of votes and issues are represented by Issues and Ballots.
An Issue represents a topic about which a ballot may be called. It contains
the following attributes:
• The institution to which this issue belongs, institution;
• the name of the issue, name;
• a set of agent roles who are empowered to open, close and declare results
of ballots on this issue, cfvroles;
• a set of agent rules who are empowered to vote on this issue, voteroles;
• the method with which voters should submit their votes (e. g. single vote,
preference list), method;
• a set of allowable values or candidates which can be submitted in a vote,
votevalues;
• the winner determination method for votes on this issue (e. g. plurality,
borda count etc.), wdm.
A Ballot represents a collection of votes on an issue. It contrains the follow-
ing attributes:
• The status of the ballot: open or closed, status;
• the issue to which this ballot belongs, issue;
• the timestep in which this ballot was opened, started;
• the set of agent roles who are empowered to vote in this ballot, voteRoles;
• the set of allowable values for agents to vote on, options;
• the winner determination method for this vote, wdm;
• the agent who closed the ballot (used to specify who is obliged to declare
the result), closedBy.
